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Abstract  
The human visual system is steadily stimulated by dynamic cues. Faces provide crucial information 
about identity, gender, ethnicity, speech, attention, eye-gaze direction, or emotions, all important 
for adapted social interactions. From an evolutionary perspective, humans have been more 
extensively exposed to dynamic faces, as static face images have only appeared recently with the 
advent of photography and the expansion of digital tools and social networks. Yet, most studies 
investigating face perception have relied on static faces and only a little is known about the 
mechanisms involved in dynamic face processing.  
 To clarify this issue, this thesis aimed to use dynamic faces to investigate different aspects of 
face processing in different populations and age groups. In Study 1, we used dynamic faces to 
investigate whether the ability of infants aged 6, 9, and 12 months in matching audible and visible 
attributes of gender is influenced by the use of adult-directed (ADS) vs. infant-directed (IDS) speech. 
Our results revealed that from 6 months of age, infants matched female but not male faces and 
voices when presented with adult-directed speech. This ability emerged at 9 months of age when 
presented with infant-directed speech. Altogether, these findings support the idea that the perception 
of multisensory gender coherence is influenced by the very nature of social interactions.  
 In Study 2, we used a novel 4D technique to reconstruct the dynamic internal representations 
of the six basic expressions in a pure case of acquired prosopagnosia (i.e., a brain-damaged patient 
severely impaired in recognizing familiar faces). This was done in order to re-examine the debated 
issue of whether identity and expression are processed independently. Our results revealed that 
patient PS used all facial features to represent basic expressions, contrasting sharply with her 
suboptimal use of facial information for identity recognition. These findings support the idea that 
different sets of representations underlie the processing of identity and expression. We then 
examined patient PS’s ability to recognize static and dynamic expressions using her internal 
representations as stimuli. Our results revealed that she was selectively impaired in recognizing 
many of the static expressions; an impairment that could be explained by her specific set of lesions 
in the right inferior occipital gyrus. In contrast, she displayed maximum accuracy in recognizing all 
the dynamic emotions with the exception of fear. The latter findings support recent evidence 
suggesting that separate cortical pathways, originating in early visual areas and not in the inferior 
occipital gyrus, are responsible for the processing of static and dynamic face information. Altogether, 
our findings suggest that the temporal properties of human facial expressions influence their 
processing, particularly in fragile face processing systems, questioning the evidence obtained by 
neuropsychological studies investigating expression recognition with static images only.  
 Moving on from our second study, in Study 3, we investigated whether dynamic cues offer 
processing benefits for the recognition of facial expressions in other populations with fragile face 
processing systems; for instance, young children whose systems are yet to fully mature or elderly 
people whose systems are declining. To this aim, we conducted a large sample cross-sectional study 
with more than 400 participants aged between 5 to 96 years, investigating their ability to recognize 
the six basic expressions presented under different temporal conditions. Consistent with previous 
studies, our findings revealed the highest recognition performance for happiness, regardless of age 
and experimental condition, as well as marked confusions among expressions with perceptually 
similar facial signals (e.g., fear and surprise). By using Bayesian modelling, our results further 
enabled us to quantify, for each expression and condition individually, the steepness of increase and 
decrease in recognition performance, as well as the peak efficiency, the point at which observers’ 
performance reaches its maximum before declining. Finally, our results offered new evidence for a 
dynamic advantage for facial expression recognition, stronger for some expressions than others and 
more important at specific points in development.  
 Overall, the results highlighted in this thesis underlie the critical importance of research 
featuring dynamic stimuli in face perception and expression recognition studies; not only in the field 
of prosopagnosia, but also in other domains of developmental and clinical neuroscience. 
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Résumé  
Les visages animés que nous voyons quotidiennement fournissent des informations cruciales sur les 
expressions émotionnelles d’autrui, la direction de l’attention ou du regard, toutes déterminantes 
pour des interactions sociales adaptées. Au cours des dernières décennies, la plupart des études 
investiguant la reconnaissance des visages ont utilisé des photographies statiques. Or dans notre 
environnement naturel, les visages et leurs expressions émotionnelles sont des phénomènes 
dynamiques qu’il est difficile de communiquer écologiquement avec des images statiques. Les visages 
dynamiques auxquels nous sommes constamment exposés sont plus riches et plus réalistes et ils 
permettent de transmettre plus finement et naturellement les sentiments, émotions et intentions 
d’autrui. Cette exposition quotidienne et répétée à des visages en mouvement pourrait-elle avoir un 
effet sur notre système visuel, favorisant le traitement de stimuli dynamiques au détriment des 
statiques ?  
  Afin d’éclairer cette problématique, les recherches présentées dans cette thèse avaient pour 
but d’utiliser des stimuli dynamiques pour étudier différents aspects du traitement des visages à travers 
plusieurs groupes d’âge et populations. Dans notre première recherche, nous avons utilisé des visages 
animés pour voir si la capacité de nourrissons âgés de 6-, 9- et 12 mois à associer des attributs 
audibles et visibles à un genre est influencée par l'utilisation d’un discours de type adulte (ADS) par 
opposition à un langage de type enfantin (IDS). Nos résultats ont montré qu’à partir de 6 mois, 
lorsqu'ils étaient soumis à un discours de type adulte, les nourrissons associaient les voix et visages 
de femmes, mais pas d’hommes. Par contre, lorsqu'ils étaient confrontés à un langage de type 
enfantin, cette capacité apparaissait seulement à l'âge de 9 mois. Ces premiers résultats soutiennent 
l'idée selon laquelle le développement de la perception multisensorielle chez les nourrissons est 
influencé par la nature même des interactions sociales. 
  Dans notre deuxième recherche, nous avons utilisé une nouvelle technique 4D pour 
reconstruire les représentations mentales des six émotions de base d’une patiente présentant un cas 
unique et pure de prosopagnosie acquise (i.e., une incapacité à reconnaître les visages), afin de 
réexaminer une question bien débattue, à savoir si les modules cérébraux sous-jacents à la 
reconnaissance de l’identité et des expressions faciales sont séparés ou communs. Les résultats ont 
montré que notre patiente a utilisé toutes les caractéristiques faciales pour identifier les émotions 
de base, ce qui contraste fortement avec son utilisation déficitaire de l'information faciale pour la 
reconnaissance de l’identité. Ces résultats confortent l’idée selon laquelle différents systèmes de 
représentations sous-tendent le traitement de l'identité et de l'expression. Par la suite, nous avons 
pu démontrer que notre patiente était capable de reconnaître adéquatement les expressions 
émotionnelles dynamiques, mais pas les émotions statiques provenant de ses propres représentations 
internes. Ces résultats qui pourraient être expliqués par un ensemble spécifique de lésions dans son 
gyrus occipital inférieur droit, soutiennent l’idée selon laquelle le traitement des stimuli statiques et 
dynamiques se produit dans des régions cérébrales différentes. Finalement, notre étude souligne 
l’importance de l’utilisation de stimuli dynamiques dans la recherche, notamment chez des patients 
cérébro-lésés, et questionne les résultats obtenus par d’autres travaux étudiant la reconnaissance des 
expressions uniquement avec des stimuli statiques. 
  Dans notre troisième recherche, nous avons investigué si d'autres populations ayant un 
système visuel neurologiquement fragile ou en développement bénéficient également de la 
présentation d’expressions dynamiques. Nous avons demandé à plus de 400 sujets âgés de 5 à 96 ans 
de catégoriser les six expressions de base en versions statique, dynamique ou bruitée. En utilisant un 
modèle Bayésien, nos résultats nous ont permis de quantifier la pente d'amélioration et de déclin 
pour chaque expression dans chaque condition, ainsi que d'estimer l'âge auquel l’efficacité est 
maximale. En résumé, nos résultats montrent la supériorité des stimuli dynamiques dans la 
reconnaissance des expressions faciales, de manière plus marquée pour certaines expressions que 
d'autres et de façon plus importante à certains moments spécifiques du développement. 
 Dans l'ensemble, les résultats de cette thèse soulignent l'importance d’investiguer la 
reconnaissance des visages avec des stimuli dynamiques, non seulement en neuropsychologie, mais 
aussi dans d'autres domaines des neurosciences développementales et cliniques. 
 
Someone once asked me: Why do you love music so much? I replied: Because it’s the only thing that 
stays when everything and everyone is gone. 
Unknown 
 
 
 
Avoir envie de réaliser un rêve, c’est le talent. Le reste, c’est de la sueur.  
Jacques Brel 
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Introduction and thesis overview 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The most interesting aspect of other people,  
the point where we go inside them, is the face.  
It tells all. 
 
David Hockney 
 
 
 
“It happens almost every day. When I pick up my children from school, when I drink a coffee 
at the coffee shop next to my office, when I go shopping… Suddenly someone bumps into me, 
a woman, a man or a group of people. Obviously, they know me, because they call me by my 
name. We exchange a few words, they laugh, I wince, embarrassed. Usually it takes me only a 
few seconds to end the conversation. Why? Mainly because I don’t know who on earth they are. 
Are they close friends or more distant acquaintances? Colleagues? Relatives? Neighbors? I don’t 
have the slightest idea. For me being impaired in recognizing the faces of people around me, 
of public figures, or even of my own children, is like not possessing the adapted screwdriver to 
unscrew the resistant bolts that open the doors to identity. My universe is filled with thousands 
of people, thousands of people with no faces nor identities” (ARC7/7).  
 
These were the words reported to me a few months ago, by a patient severely impaired 
in recognizing faces. A face is not only the gateway to identity, but as rightly pointed out by the 
British painter David Hockney, it is probably one of the richest and most fascinating stimuli 
we encounter in our daily lives. Faces are a wide variety of powerful information sources that 
are critical for survival and adapted social interactions. For instance, lip motion facilitates 
speech perception, gaze direction provides information about attention and interest, hair and 
skin texture convey cues for gender and race categorization, whereas facial expressions 
communicate the internal states of other individuals. From an evolutionary perspective, it seems 
reasonable to assume that our brain is tuned to rapidly achieve categorization of these different 
facial features and detect subtle changes in the emotional states of our conspecifics. Although 
some previous reports have evidenced that the human visual system displays a certain sensitivity 
to facial motion – for instance for expression and identity recognition (Ambadar, Schooler, & 
Cohn, 2005; Bould, Morris, & Wink, 2008; Butcher & Lander, 2017; Lander & Butcher, 2015; 
O'Toole, Roark, & Abdi, 2002), the majority of studies investigating face processing have 
overlooked the importance of this factor.  
 
 
 
 
 3 
To clarify this issue, this thesis aims to use dynamic faces to investigate different aspects of face 
processing in different populations and age groups. More precisely, this work examines three 
distinct questions:  
 
1) Is the extraction of gender from dynamic faces and voices influenced by the nature of 
speech signal in 6-, 9-, and 12-month-old infants?  
2) Are the dynamic internal representations of the six basic expressions in a pure case of 
acquired prosopagnosia (i.e., a brain-damaged patient severely impaired in recognizing 
familiar faces) similar to those of healthy controls? Further, are these dynamic expressions 
better recognized by patient PS than static images?  
3) Besides prosopagnosic individuals, do other populations with immature or fragile face 
processing systems also benefit from the presentation of dynamic emotional signals?  
 
In order to answer these questions, this thesis is divided into six chapters, each including 
different sections. 
 
CHAPTER 1 – Literature review. The first chapter provides an overview of the literature 
related to face processing. After a general introduction outlining the reasons why human faces 
are special, I will first review some developmental studies revealing how face processing 
develops throughout infancy. The second section gives an overview of some aspects of facial 
expressions of emotion, how they are perceived throughout development, and whether temporal 
dynamics facilitate their recognition. Finally, the last section of the first chapter offers a general 
overview of the neuroanatomical bases of human face processing based on studies from the 
neuropsychological and functional neuroimaging literature.  
 
CHAPTER 2 – Experimental contribution. The second chapter introduces the experimental 
contribution of this thesis and provides an overview of some methodological aspects.  
 
CHAPTER 3 – A developmental research. This chapter presents the first study of this thesis 
investigating the multisensory perception of gender in 6- to 12-month-old infants. In this study, 
conducted in collaboration with colleagues from the University of Grenoble-Alpes, we used 
dynamic faces to assess whether the extraction of gender from faces and voices is influenced by 
the very nature of speech signal, namely by infant- or adult-directed speech.  
 
CHAPTER 4 – A neuropsychological research. The second experimental contribution of 
this thesis, presented in Chapter 4, is a neuropsychological research conducted in collaboration 
with researchers from the University of Glasgow. This study re-examines the widely debated 
question regarding whether distinct or common face representational systems underlie the 
processing of identity and facial expressions. In order to examine the existence of a dichotomy 
 
 
 
 
 4 
between identity and expression recognition, we reconstructed the dynamic mental models of 
the six basic expressions in a pure case of acquired prosopagnosia. In a follow-up experiment, 
we assessed patient PS’s recognition abilities of the reconstructed dynamic and static 
expressions.  
 
CHAPTER 5 – A cross-sectional research. The last experimental contribution conducted at 
the University of Fribourg is a cross-sectional study. In this research presented in Chapter 5, 
we aim to investigate whether the dynamic advantage for facial expression recognition that we 
found in our prosopagnosic patient (CHAPTER 4) extends to other populations with fragile face 
processing systems, such as very young children or elderly people.  
 
CHAPTER 6 – General discussion. In the last chapter, I provide a brief and concise summary 
of the work done and discuss the main findings, their implications, limits, and perspectives.  
  5 
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Box 1 – Key Terminology 
Face-selective brain regions 
OFA:  
FFA: 
antFUS: 
pFUS: 
STS: 
pSTS: 
aSTS: 
ATL: 
OFC: 
IT:  
PO: 
PL: 
PA: 
Occipital Face Area located in the inferior occipital gyrus 
Fusiform Face Area located in the middle fusiform gyrus 
Anterior part of the fusiform gyrus 
Posterior part of the fusiform gyrus 
Superior Temporal Sulcus 
Posterior part of the Superior Temporal Sulcus 
Anterior part of the Superior Temporal Sulcus 
Anterior Temporal Lobe 
Orbitofrontal Cortex 
Infero-Temporal Cortex 
Prefrontal Orbital Cortex 
Prefrontal Lateral Cortex 
Prefrontal Arcuate 
AMG: Amygdala 
PG: Parahippocampal Gyrus 
 
Brain-recording techniques 
PET: 
fMRI: 
fMRIa: 
DTI: 
ERP: 
TMS: 
TBS: 
 
Positron Emission Tomography 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging adaptation studies 
Diffusion Tensor Imaging 
Event-Related Potentials  
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation 
Thetaburst Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation  
 
 
Optogenetic: A recent technique that combines optical and genetic methods to optically 
control the electrical activity of excitable neurons or cells (Fenno, Yizhar, & Deisseroth, 2011; 
Kalanithi & Henderson, 2012).  
 
Optical imaging: A technique that measures simultaneously the activity of a group of 
neurons in a specific cortical region by detecting changes in blood oxygenation triggered by 
neural activity (Wang, Tanifuji, & Tanaka, 1998).  
 
fNRIS: A non-invasive neuroimaging technique that allows the localization of brain activity 
in specific cortical regions by monitoring relative changes in oxy-, deoxy-, and total-
haemoglobin concentrations (Nakato et al., 2011).  
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1.1 FACE PROCESSING  
 
1.1.1 Is face processing special? 
Human faces are one of the richest and most powerful tools among social stimuli, playing a 
fundamental role in even the most basic human social interactions. Observers can reliably and 
rapidly derive a wide variety of information from faces such as identity, sex, race, gender, sexual 
orientation, attractiveness, speech patterns, direction of attention, emotional states, physical health, 
and even personality traits such as trustworthiness, competence dominance, or likeability. Our 
ability to perform relevant categorizations of these different facial features is a highly developed 
human skill, strongly encoded in our biology and critical for survival. This powerful expertise has 
raised a central question, guiding the work of thousands of studies over the last century: Is face 
processing special? Does this ability involve specific strategies and functionally and anatomically 
discrete brain regions? 
 
Historically, several studies have provided evidence supporting the claim that face 
processing is special. First, developmental studies have revealed that within minutes after birth, 
neonates will preferentially look at face-like geometrical stimuli and discriminate faces in a 
remarkable manner. Morton and Johnson (1991) have hypothesized that newborns possess an 
innate mechanism, selectively tuned to process face patterns. This very early responsiveness to 
faces supports the view that faces are special, because such early preference does not seem to be 
present for the processing of non-face objects (McKone & Robbins, 2011; but see Arcaro et al., 
2017).  
 
Second, behavioral studies in adults relying on specific experimental paradigms, such as 
the face-composite paradigm (Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987) (for a review, see Rossion, 2013, 
see Box 2) or the whole-face paradigm (Farah et al., 1998; Tanaka & Farah, 1993, see Box 3), 
have revealed that the processing of faces elicits specific perceptual strategies, more 
holistic/configural (Farah et al., 1998; Rossion, 2013; Sergent, 1984; Tanaka & Farah, 1993) than 
the strategies used for other objects (Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 2002; Rossion, 2008, but 
see Box 4). As mentioned by Rossion (2008), holistic or configural processing strategies imply the 
simultaneous combination of the multiple distinctive features of a face (e.g., eyebrows, nose, 
mouth, eyes) into a unique representation. Three different types of configural processing strategies 
are used to recognize faces (Maurer et al., 2002). The first one considers information regarding 
the features of the face (i.e., two eyes located above a mouth). The second one relies on the space 
between the different features (second-order configural relations), whereas the last one focuses on 
the global structure of the face (holistic processing). Experimental tasks that disrupt configural 
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processing, such as inverting images (the face inversion effect, Rossion & Gauthier, 2002; Yin, 
1969), lead to a poorer recognition performance for faces than any other classes of objects. This 
latter evidence supports the assumption that the processing of faces entails specific perceptual 
strategies compared to non-face objects.  
 
In addition to behavioral evidence, electrophysiological studies in primates (e.g., Hasselmo, 
Rolls, & Baylis, 1989; Tsao et al., 2003; Tsao et al., 2008b), neuroimaging studies in adults (e.g., 
Gauthier et al., 2000b; Haxby et al., 1999; Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Kanwisher, McDermott, & 
Chun, 1997; Sergent, Ohta, & MacDonald, 1992), as well as neuropsychological studies in brain-
damaged patients (Busigny et al., 2010a; Dalrymple et al., 2011; Rossion, 2014; Rossion et al., 2003) 
have also provided strong evidence in support of the claim that faces are special and that a particular 
neural circuitry, characterized by structural and neural specialization, is dedicated to their 
processing. The following sections of this chapter will overview some of these studies, starting with 
developmental evidence.  
 
Box 2 – The Face-Composite Paradigm 
The face-composite paradigm is based on the visual illusion that two physically identical top 
halves of a face are erroneously perceived as being different when aligned with different bottom 
halves. According to Rossion (2013), this paradigm provides strong evidence that human faces 
are perceived as integrated wholes rather than a collection of individual discrete features and 
thus processed in a holistic way. Interestingly, the composite face illusion disappears when faces 
are inverted (Figure 1.1). When presented upside-down, two identical top halves are no longer 
perceived as being different. That is due to a reduction of the perceptual field, leading to a 
disruption of configural processing strategies (Rossion, 2013). In other words, when inverted, top 
halves are no longer influenced by bottom halves, as the individual parts of a specific face are 
processed independently, in an analytical way (Rossion, 2013).  
 
A 
 
 
   
 
 
B 
 
 
C 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. The face-composite paradigm. Left: (A) When five physically identical top halves are 
presented with different bottom halves, participants misperceived them as being different. (B) A 
delayed-matching task designed to evaluate the face-composite illusion. Participants have to determine 
whether the top half of the probe face is identical or different to the top half of the target face. (C) 
When presented upside-down, top halves are being correctly perceived as identical. Right: The expected 
matching performance for upright and inverted faces. Reprinted from Rossion (2013).  
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Box 4 – Flexible Face Processing Strategies  
Although the dominant view in the literature posits that face processing is governed by universal 
holistic perceptual strategies (for a review, see Rossion, 2013), recent eye movement studies, 
investigating visual information sampling during face processing have put into question this 
prevalent assumption (for a review, see Caldara, 2017). For instance, Miellet, Caldara and Schyns 
(2011) have found that face identification was supported by both local and global strategies, 
depending on the location of the first fixation. Different strategies were even adopted by the same 
observer when the same face was presented in different trials.  
Moreover, cross-cultural studies have provided further evidence for distinct face identification 
processing strategies. Blais et al. (2008) have demonstrated that Westerners identified faces by 
fixating the regions around the eye and the mouth, whereas Easterners favored central fixations 
towards the nose region (Figure 1.3).  
Altogether these findings challenge the prevailing view that universal mechanisms support face 
identification, suggesting rather the existence of distinct and flexible strategies for face 
recognition. 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Sampling visual 
information reveals culture-
specific perceptual strategies. Left: 
Fixation maps of Western Caucasian 
and East Asian observers. Right: 
Fixation biases are evidenced by 
subtracting the East Asian z-scores 
from the Western Caucasian z-scored 
fixation maps. Reprinted from 
Caldara (2017).  
 
 
 
 
Box 3 – The Whole-Face Paradigm 
The whole-face paradigm tests participants’ performance at recognizing either the entire or 
individual parts of previously studied faces (Figure 1.2). In line with the holistic view of human 
face processing, recognition rates have been found to be greatly superior in the whole face 
compared to the condition in which the individual features are presented in an isolated way 
(Tanaka & Simonyi, 2016). 
 
A 
 
B 
 
 
 
 
 
C 
 
D 
 
Studied face The nose presented in 
isolation 
The nose presented in the 
whole face  
The nose presented in the whole 
face (new configuration) 
 
Figure 1.2. The whole-face paradigm. (A) Observers first study a face. Their memory for individual 
features presented (B) in isolation (C) in the studied face as a whole or (D) in a new face is 
subsequently tested in a two-alternative forced-choice task. Adapted from Tanaka and Simonyi (2016). 
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1.1.2 The early development of face processing  
Is there an innate preference for faces? The first stimuli that neonates perceive when they 
open their eyes are the faces of other human beings. Previous studies have revealed that within 
a few minutes after birth, newborns preferentially attend to schematic face-like configurations 
compared to scrambled stimuli that do not resemble a face (Goren, Sarty, & Wu, 1975; Morton 
& Johnson, 1991; Valenza et al., 1996). Other developmental studies have provided evidence 
that within a few hours after birth, newborns recognize the face of their mother (Bushneil, Sai, 
& Mullin, 1989; Pascalis et al., 1995; Sai, 2005). Such remarkable abilities already present at 
birth can be either supported by general perceptual mechanisms or by intrinsic predispositions 
to process faces (Pascalis et al., 1995). By relying on the latter proposition, Morton and Johnson 
(1991; for a recent review, see Johnson, Senju, & Tomalski, 2015) proposed a two-process theory 
of the development of face processing, defined primarily by an innate subcortical mechanism 
called CONSPEC. This face-sensitive mechanism is selectively tuned to geometrical face-like 
configurations (Figure 1.4A) and to the detection of biologically relevant conspecifics (Johnson 
et al., 2015; Morton & Johnson, 1991). The second mechanism, a stimulus-specific cortical 
mechanism, called CONLEARN replaces the initial CONSPEC mechanism approximatively at 
the age of two months and specializes in the recognition and processing of individual faces. For 
example, this cortical mechanism enables infants to distinguish between two individual faces 
based on internal fine-detailed features, an ability that develops between two to four months of 
age after extensive visual experiences with faces (Deruelle & de Schonen, 1998; Pascalis et al., 
1998). According to this two-process theory, the subcortical mechanism guides the developing 
domain-specific cortical circuitry to acquire important information about faces. This complex 
interaction between both mechanisms, in turn, leads to the gradual emergence of the face-
specialized neural network (Johnson et al., 2015). Since 1991, this two-process theory has been 
at the core of numerous debates and criticisms in the field of developmental psychology. Perhaps 
one of the most controversial proposals of this theory is the notion that intrinsic predispositions 
support infants’ initial preference for faces (e.g., Gauthier & Nelson, 2001; Macchi Cassia, 
Simion, & Umiltaà, 2001; Nelson, 2001). Doubts regarding this assumption along with new 
results have led some authors to propose alternative views.  
 
These alternative views are based on 1) findings suggesting that the psychophysical 
properties of the stimuli account for infants’ visual preferences for faces, 2) evidence that infants 
possess complex – non-specific – processing abilities at birth, 3) observations that infants exhibit 
visual preferences for up-down asymmetry, and 4) indications that cortical face-selective brain 
regions are activated shortly after birth. These different views and findings will be now briefly 
presented.  
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The sensory hypothesis. An alternative view proposes that particular characteristics of faces, 
though not face-specific, can simply account for newborns’ visual preferences (Lee et al., 2011), 
because their psychophysical properties happen to best match the sensitivity of newborns’ visual 
system (Turati et al., 2002). For example, Kleiner (1987) demonstrated that neonatal preferences 
for face-like patterns over other paired stimuli appeared only if the face-like patterns had an 
amplitude spectrum that better suited the contrast sensitivity of newborns’ sensory channels as 
compared to the other stimuli.  
 
Complex face processing abilities at birth. Previous experimental studies have shown that 
newborns possess more complex face representations than initially presumed (Quinn et al., 
2008a). For example, infants prefer attractive faces over non-attractive ones (Slater et al., 1998; 
Slater et al., 2000); they are particularly sensitive to the eye region of a face (Batki et al., 2000) 
and prefer to look at smiling faces (Farroni et al., 2007) or at faces that directly gaze at them 
(Farroni et al., 2002). Such findings support the idea that newborns’ face recognition abilities 
are more developed than originally assumed (Quinn et al., 2008a).  
 
Visual preferences for up-down asymmetry. Other studies suggested that newborns’ 
preference for face-like pattern is due to the presence of more elements on the upper portion 
compared to the lower portion of a configuration (Turati, 2004; Turati et al., 2002). By using 
the preferential looking paradigm (for more details on this paradigm, see Box 5), Turati et al. 
(2002) reported that newborns preferentially attended to stimuli with more elements in the 
upper region (Figure 1.4B), regardless of whether or not these stimuli resembled a face. By 
extending these findings to real faces, Macchi-Cassia et al. (2004) found that (1) newborns 
preferred real faces characterized by the presence of more elements in the upper part when 
contrasted with their reversed versions, (2) up-down asymmetry was not face specific, as non-
face stimuli with more elements in the upper part triggered visual preference in infants, and 
(3) face-like configurations paired with non-face stimuli with more elements in the upper region 
did not trigger increased visual preference (Figure 1.4C). These experimental findings suggest 
that a non-specific top-heavy vertical-bias rather than a face-bias elicits infants’ preference for 
face-like patterns.  
 
Interestingly, a very recent prenatal study by Reid et al. (2017) evidenced the existence 
of a preference for face-like visual patterns present in human fetuses. More specifically, the 
authors investigated human fetuses’ behavioral responses to upright and inverted face-like 
stimuli using 4D ultrasound technology. The data collected revealed that human fetuses, in the 
last trimester of pregnancy, were more likely to turn their heads to upright configurations as 
compared to inverted stimuli (Figure 1.5). These findings, consistent with previous results 
obtained with newborns or infants (e.g., Turati et al., 2002), suggest that postnatal experience 
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is not necessary for infants to exhibit a preference for face-like visual configurations (Reid et 
al., 2017). Finally, top-down asymmetry is a structural property that has also been proven to 
modulate the response of face-selective regions in adults. A neuroimaging study by Caldara and 
colleagues (2006) revealed an increased activation of the right Fusiform Face Area (rFFA), a 
key region among the face-selective brain regions, when geometrical patterns with high-
contrasted elements in the upper part were exhibited to adult observers. These findings 
corroborate the idea that top-heaviness (i.e., up-down asymmetry) plays a crucial role in face 
processing, not only evoking face preferences in newborns, but also activating neural 
computations in the rFFA in adult observers. 
 
Cortical activations at birth. A very recent developmental functional near-infrared 
spectroscopy study (fNIRS, for a description of this technique, see Box 1) with newborns, 
revealed face-selective activation over the bilateral posterior temporal cortex shortly after birth 
when neonates were exposed to human dynamic faces, but not when they were exposed to 
human arms (Farroni et al., 2013). This study provides evidence that certain cortical areas 
contribute to the processing of faces, even before major postnatal sensory experiences occur, 
corroborating the idea that both the subcortical and cortical pathways are already functional at 
birth (Acerra, Burnod, & de Schonen, 2002) and further develop through complex interactions 
(Nakano & Nakatani, 2014). Although this study clearly demonstrates cortical activation in 
response to dynamic faces, it is less evident whether the regions activated also control neonates’ 
initial preferential looking orientation towards face-like patterns (Farroni et al., 2013).  
 
Challenged by these findings, an expanded version of the CONSPEC mechanism has 
been elaborated (Johnson, 2011). This updated version suggests that the primary functions of 
this mechanism are not only to support the detection and preferential orientation of infants’ 
attention towards faces, but also to enable them to choose adapted faces for social interactions 
(i.e., faces with a direct gaze or smiling). Thus, according to this view, the CONSPEC 
mechanism would serve as a basis for both face perception and social interactions (Johnson, 
2011). 
 
 
  
 
1.1 FACE PROCESSING 
 
 
 
 
 14 
A 
 
 
B 
 
 
C 
 
 
Figure 1.4 Infants’ visual preference for faces. (A) Schematic configurations used in studies 
investigating infants’ preference for face-like patterns. The two stimuli on the left are characterized 
by face-like configurations, although the second one is presented without the typical facial features. 
The two-stimuli on the right are non-face stimuli, possessing facial features that are arranged in 
wrong configurations. Reprinted from Morton and Johnson (1991). (B) Schematic configurations 
used by Turati et al. (2002) to investigate whether up-down asymetry (higher number of elements 
in the upper part) influences infants’ visual preference for schematic face-like patterns. Reprinted 
from Turati et al. (2004). (C) Results of the study conducted by Macchi-Cassia et al. (2004) 
investigating whether newborns’ face preference is driven by a top-heavy vertical bias. In experiment 
1, pairs of stimuli presenting upright or inverted faces elicited greater preference for the upright 
versions. In experiment 2, non-face top-heavy configurations were preferred to bottom-heavy 
configurations. In experiment 3, upright faces were not preferred to top-heavy configurations. 
Reprinted from Macchi-Cassia et al. (2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5. Prenatal preference for face-like visual patterns. Left: Upright and inverted examples 
of the stimuli presented on the maternal abdomen to the fetuses. (A) and (C) are examples of the 
stimuli before any contact with the abdominal tissue. (B) and (D) illustrate how the stimuli are 
perceived by the fetuses. Right: Mean number of head turns made by human fetuses towards and 
away the face-like (red) and non-face-like (gray) visual configurations. Error bars show standard 
errors, while stars indicate statistical significance. Adapted from Reid et al. (2017).  
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Box 5 – Experimental Paradigms Used in Infants’ Studies 
The preferential looking paradigm. The preferential looking paradigm is one of the most 
commonly used technique to study preverbal newborn and infant behavior. It was first introduced 
by Fantz in the 1960s (Fantz, 1961, 1964, 1965). In preferential looking tasks, infants are 
presented with pairs of stimuli that differ in a specific manner (e.g., race, gender, specie, 
emotional expressions). The amount of looking time spent at each stimulus in the display is 
measured, indicating the relative level of interest for either one. In the original paradigm, a 
person looking through a hole measured looking time to either stimulus (Figure 1.6A). Nowadays, 
a low-light video camera located above stimulus presentation monitor digitally records infants’ 
looking behavior. The video-recordings are then digitized and manually coded frame-by-frame. 
This technique has been applied in the first study presented in this thesis (for more details, see 
CHAPTER 3).  
 
The familiarization-novelty preference paradigm. The familiarization-novelty 
preference paradigm is a variation of the habituation-dishabituation method, a technique that 
uses heart rate (e.g., Canestrini, 1913), sucking (e.g., Bronshtein et al., 1958), and visual fixations 
(e.g., McCall & Kagan, 1970) as measures. The habituation–dishabituation technique measures 
the natural attentional decrease occurring in infants when repeatedly exposed to the same stimuli 
and their reaction to the presentation of a novel contrasting stimulus. If infants can distinguish 
between both stimuli, experimenters expect their attention to increase with the presentation of 
a novel stimulus (Houston-Price & Nakai, 2004). The familiarization-novelty preference 
technique employs a very similar procedure. Infants are first familiarized with a certain stimulus 
presented on display for a limited period of time. This is followed by a preferential-looking task 
during which a pair of stimuli (the familiar one and a novel one) are displayed to the infants 
(Figure 1.6C). If infants are able to differentiate between both stimuli, they should demonstrate 
a novelty-preference for the non-familiarized stimulus (Quinn & Eimas, 1986).  
 
A 
 
B 
 
 
C 
 
 
Figure 1.6. Experimental paradigms used with preverbal infants. (A) The preferential looking 
paradigm. In the original task, a newborn was placed in a “looking chamber” on whose ceiling 
different kinds of stimuli were presented by holding them with a handle over the newborns’ head. 
The experimenter measured infants’ looking behavior by peeping through a tiny hole. Reprinted from 
Fantz (1965). (B) Examples of the stimuli used in the original preferential looking task (Fantz, 1961, 
1964). Newborns and infants were presented with several trials of paired stimuli. Their looking time 
for each stimulus was monitored, yielding a relative measure of their preference. Reprinted from 
Fantz (1965). (C) The familiarization-novelty procedure used by Kelly et al. (2007). Infants were 
familiarized to a face (in this example the face shown on top of the triad) until their attention was 
turned away for more than 2s. During the test phase, two faces (novel and familiar) were presented 
side-by-side. If infants were able to discriminate between both faces, their attention was directed to 
the novel face. Reprinted from Kelly et al. (2007).  
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1.1.3 The role of experience in face processing 
In contrast to the widely debated phylogenetic view pertaining to the development of face 
processing, the CONLEARN mechanism emphasizing the importance of experience has been 
more readily accepted over the last two decades of developmental research. For instance, Le Grand 
et al. (2003) have demonstrated that early deprivation of visual inputs to the right hemisphere, 
due to congenital cataract in the left eye, strongly affected configural or second-order relational 
face processing abilities (i.e., distance between different facial features). Interestingly however, 
Sugita (2008) revealed that infant monkeys reared in isolation since birth in a visually rich 
environment, but with no exposure to faces or face-like visual stimuli, preferentially engaged with 
human and monkey faces compared to other non-face objects (see also Reid et al., 2017). A fine-
grained discrimination advantage for human and monkey faces over non-face objects appeared 
however later, after an exposure to faces. A recent fMRI study by Arcaro and colleagues (2017) 
has provided further evidence that early exposure to faces is critical for developing face-domain 
brain circuits. Clusters of face-selective neurons are present in macaque monkeys exposed to faces 
since birth. In this study, such clusters were absent in macaques temporarily deprived from an 
exposure to faces during early development (Figure 1.7). Altogether, these findings emphasize the 
critical role played by early visual experience on the development of face processing abilities. 
Intriguingly however, in humans, a very recent study revealed that the ventral temporal cortex – 
a critical region for the processing of visual information – of individuals who were born blind 
elicited strong discriminatory responses to the auditory- presentation of stimuli from four distinct 
categories (e.g., faces, objects, body parts, scenes). Although congenitally blind individuals never 
processed any visual information, their category-selective visual map was remarkably similar to 
the cortical layout observed in normal-sighted controls. These findings suggest that early visual 
experience is not mandatory for the brain to develop category selectivity in the extrastriate cortex 
(Van den Hurk, Van Baelen, & Op de Beek, 2017). Altogether, these studies suggest that the 
ventral visual cortex is functionally shaped to develop category-selective processes independently 
from visual experience, but that such experience is mandatory for developing the more elaborated 
fine-tuned mechanisms dedicated to the recognition of individual exemplars (i.e., face recognition). 
 
Developmental studies in early infancy have demonstrated that increased experiences 
with faces lead to stronger preferences for more sophisticated face properties. For example, 
Mondloch and colleagues (1999) discovered that newborns and 6-week-old infants were not able 
to distinguish schematic faces with a positive contrast (darker elements on lighter background) 
from faces with a negative contrast (lighter elements on darker background). By a marked 
contrast, 12-week-old infants, having had more experience with faces, exhibited preferences for 
faces with a positive contrast, a typical characteristic of the faces encountered in daily life 
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Figure 1.7. The role of experience in the development of face processing abilities. (A) Face 
selective brain regions (i.e., the superior temporal sulcus in the example) were absent in monkeys 
who were reared with no exposure to faces. Brain regions responding preferentially to hands were 
however disproportionally large in these monkeys. (B) Interestingly, face-deprived monkeys 
preferentially attended to hands compared to any other objects while control monkeys preferentially 
looked at human and monkey faces. These findings suggest that early visual experience selectively 
affects brain connectivity and functional selectivity for processing objects of different categories. 
Adapted from Arcaro et al. (2017).   
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(Farroni et al., 2005). Other studies have revealed that the lack of experiences with specific 
types of faces leads to poorer recognition of these kinds of faces. Pascalis and Bachevalier (1998), 
for example, have evidenced that adult observers reliably recognized other human faces, but 
exhibited a decreased recognition performance with monkey faces. Interestingly, monkey faces 
demonstrated the opposite recognition pattern, being proficient with monkey, but impaired with 
human faces (Pascalis & Bachevalier, 1998). Such species-specific abilities have been explained 
by the increased experiences humans have with members of their community. Indeed, in their 
daily life, human observers are more exposed to other human faces than to monkey faces, 
whereas the opposite is true for monkeys.  
 
During the early development stage, face processing abilities appear to be less affected by 
particular face types (Nelson, 2001). For example, Pascalis, de Haan, and Nelson (2002) revealed 
that 6-month-old infants were able to discriminate the identity of both monkey and human faces 
(Figure 1.8A). This was not the case of 9-month-olds, unless they were exposed to such faces daily 
(Figure 1.8B) (Pascalis et al., 2005). This progressive loss of ability with advancing age has also 
been observed with human faces from different ethnicities. By using the familiarity-novelty 
preference technique (for more details, see Box 5), Kelly et al. (2007), for example, evidenced that 
3-month-old Caucasian infants were able to distinguish faces from their own and three other 
racial groups (African, Middle Eastern, and Chinese), 6-month-olds recognized Chinese faces as 
well as faces from their own group, whereas the recognition abilities of 12-month-olds were 
restricted to their own racial group (for an example of the stimuli, see Figure 1.8C). These 
observations are in line with the findings found while testing 3-, 6-, and 9-month-old Chinese 
infants (Kelly et al., 2009). This pattern of results, pointing to the crucial role played by experience 
in shaping face processing abilities, suggests that the face processing system progressively tunes 
to the faces encountered in our daily life (e.g., Kelly et al., 2007; Pascalis et al., 2002; Pascalis et 
al., 2005; Simpson et al., 2000). This process, named perceptual narrowing, parallels the course 
of language development (e.g., Kuhl, 2004; Kuhl et al., 2006; Kuhl et al., 1992; Werker & Tees, 
1984 ; 2005); voice (e.g., Friendly, Rendall, & Trainor, 2013) and even music perception (e.g., 
Hannon & Johnson, 2005; Trainor, 2005; Trehub & Hannon, 2006). For example, previous 
studies have demonstrated that during the six first months of life, infants could discriminate the 
phonetic variations in almost every language in the world. Between 6 and 10 months however, 
their speech processing abilities progressively specialized in the perception of phonetic changes 
in their native language only (Kuhl et al., 2006; Werker & Tees, 1984 ).  
 
Scott et al. (2007) suggest that the progressive tuning of domain-specific abilities can be 
explained by a gradual consolidation of the neural network supporting the processing of relevant 
properties that are encountered daily. According to this view, the decline in sensitivity, typical of 
perceptual narrowing, is not a developmental regression, but a gradual improvement in becoming 
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more proficient at processing biologically relevant features. Corroborating this idea, Humphreys 
and Johnson (2006) revealed that 7-month-olds, as compared to 4-month-olds, relied on fewer 
physical information to distinguish between two faces of their own race, suggesting that perceptual 
narrowing enhances fine-grained recognition abilities of experienced face subtypes.  
 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
 
 
Figure 1.8. The different stimuli used to investigate perceptual narrowing during infancy. 
(A) Pascalis et al. (2000) tested 6- and 9-month-old infants’ abilities to recognize human and monkey 
faces. Reprinted from Pascalis et al. (2000). (B) The daily exposure of infants between 6 and 9 months 
of age to non-native faces of Barbary macaques facilitates the discrimination of these monkey faces at 9 
months, an ability that is otherwise lost by this age. Reprinted from Pascalis et al. (2005). (C) An example 
of the stimuli used by Kelly et al. (2007, 2009). At 3 months of age, infants were able to discriminate 
faces from all race groups (Caucasian, African, Middle Eastern, and Chinese), an ability that was 
restricted to Chinese faces and faces from their own group at 6 months. By the age of 9 months, the 
discrimination abilities were restricted to faces of their own race. On each trial, infants were first 
habituated to a particular face (in this example the face shown at the top of the triad). This presentation 
was followed by a test phase consisting of a paired presentation of the familiar and a novel face (faces at 
the bottom). Reprinted from Kelly et al. (2009).  
 
1.1.4 Gender processing 
Daily perceptual experiences play a crucial role in shaping face processing abilities. For instance, 
they modulate identity discrimination for faces of the same race as compared to faces of people 
from other race or species and also extend to the categorization of socially-relevant classes, such 
as gender. For example, Quinn et al. (2002) revealed that 3- to 4-month-old infants were able to 
discriminate novel female faces from familiar faces, but showed deficits in recognizing familiar 
male faces (see also, Ramsey-Rennels & Langlois, 2006). Infants’ advantage in the processing of 
female over male faces is considered driven by the predominant visual experience with female 
faces as compared to male faces during early infancy. Interestingly, Quinn and colleagues (2008b) 
revealed that this fundamental preference for female faces is present only in the same but not in 
faces from other races (Quinn et al., 2008b), and the opposite pattern of preference is observed 
when the primary caregiver is a male (Quinn et al., 2002). Moreover, Liu et al. (2015) evidenced 
that the preference disappears in older infants after increasingly experiencing male faces.  
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Research with older infants have displayed that their ability to categorize face gender 
develops between five months and one year of age, although the precise age of emergence remains 
unclear (e.g., Cohen & Strauss, 1979; Cornell, 1974; Fagan & Singer, 1979; Leinbach & Fagot, 
1993; Younger & Fearing, 1999). For example, Cohen and Strauss (1979) demonstrated that by 
the age of 7 months, infants could perform inclusive categorization of female faces. The ability to 
form exclusive categories of female and male faces appeared to emerge between 9 and 12 months 
when body-related aiding cues such as hair contours or clothes were provided (Leinbach & Fagot, 
1993). In another study, Younger and Fearing (1999) used a familiarization-novelty preference 
procedure to investigate infants’ ability to distinguish faces judged as gender-typical from faces 
difficult to categorize with respect to gender. Infants were familiarized to both female and male 
faces that clearly matched a gender-specific category (Figure 1.9A). Following familiarization, 
infants were exposed to novel faces that either matched the female–male face category previously 
exhibited, or novel faces that were gender ambiguous (Figure 1.9B). As shown in Figure 1.10, the 
findings revealed that 10-month-olds, but not 7-month-olds, were able to differentiate gender-
typical from gender ambiguous faces (i.e., their attention increased towards faces whose gender 
was ambiguous). Thus, the current literature suggests that the ability to perform categorization of 
female faces emerges between 5 and 7 months, whereas the ability to classify both female and 
male faces into separate categories emerges later, between 9 and 10 months.  
 
 
 
 
A 
 
B 
 
 
Figure 1.9 Gender processing in infants. Stimuli used by Younger and Fearing (1999) to 
investigate infants’ ability to separate faces into specific categories (gender-typical vs. gender-atypical). 
(A) Stimuli presented during the familiarization phase. During the familiarization phase, two groups 
of infants (7- and 10-month-olds) were habituated to 8 gender typical faces (4 females, 4 males). (B) 
Stimuli presented during the test phase. The first row represents male stimuli, the second female 
stimuli. The first column displays gender typical faces, whereas the second displays gender-
ambiguous faces. During the test phase, in addition to the eight familiarized faces, half of the infants 
of each age group saw a novel male gender-typical as well as a novel male gender-ambiguous face. 
The other half of the infants saw the novel gender-typical and gender-ambiguous female faces. 
Adapted from Younger and Fearing (1999).  
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Figure 1.10. Developmental change in categorization abilities. Results reported by Younger and 
Fearing (1999). During the familiarization phase, the mean looking time to peak habituation trials 
(P1 and P2) as well as criterion habituation trials (C1, C2, C3) were measured. During the test phase, 
mean looking time for gender-typical (GT), gender-ambiguous (GA) as well as non-face trials (NF) 
were measured. The 7-month-olds were not able to differentiate female and male faces into specific 
categories. Moreover, they showed habituation to both gender-typical and gender-ambiguous faces. 
In contrast, 10-month-olds were able to form specific gender-related categories during the 
familiarization phase, as well as discriminate gender-typical (decreased attention to a gender-category 
previously shown during the familiarization phase) from gender-ambiguous faces (increased 
attention to a gender-category that did not clearly fit a category to which they were familiarized). 
Reprinted from Younger and Fearing (1999).  
 
1.1.5 Faces as a multiple source of information  
The integration of audible and visible information. Previous intermodal matching studies 
investigating infants’ abilities to integrate various multisensory properties (e.g., a voice with a 
particular face) revealed that 4.5-month-old infants were able to match phonetic information 
with faces and voices when presented with vowels (Kuhl & Meltzoff, 1982, 1988; Patterson & 
Werker, 1999; Walton & Bower, 1993) or consonant–vowel disyllable speech (MacKain et al., 
1983). Other studies evidenced indirect sensitivity of 4.5-month-old infants to articulatory 
movements and vowel sounds by revealing greater imitation abilities for the coherent entity 
rather than the audiovisual mismatch (Kuhl & Meltzoff, 1988; 1996; Legerstee, 1990; Patterson 
& Werker, 1999). A recent study demonstrated, however, that infants acquire the ability to 
match faces and voices for fluent speech only between 12 and 14 months of life, with a later 
emergence for non-native language affected by perceptual narrowing (Lewkowicz et al., 2015). 
This latter example illustrates that although the ability to associate audible speech with visual 
information emerges early in infancy (Lewkowicz, 2000; 2010), it seems to be, at an initial stage, 
restricted to the understanding of whether articulatory movements and sounds occur together. 
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Multisensory perception of gender. The audio–visual matching skills associated with distinct 
and more complex properties, such as native or non-native language (Lewkowicz et al., 2015), 
emotional expressiveness (Walker-Andrews, 1986), identity (Lewkowicz & Pons, 2013), or 
gender, appear later (Patterson & Werker, 2002; Poulin-Dubois, Serbin, & Derbyshire, 1998; 
Poulin-Dubois et al., 1994; for a review, see Ramsey, Langlois, & Marti, 2005, pp. 219–229; 
Walker-Andrews et al., 1991). Previous studies have demonstrated that infants’ ability to match 
audible and visible attributes of gender emerges between 6 and 8 months of age (e.g., Hillairet 
de Boisferon et al., 2015; Patterson & Werker, 2002; Poulin-Dubois et al., 1994). For example, 
Patterson and Werker (2002) evidenced that 8-month-old infants could match faces and voices 
when presented with infant-directed vowels (Figure 1.11). In contrast, Poulin-Dubois et al. 
(1994) revealed that the specific skills mandatory to effectively match faces and voices when 
presented with gender information emerged only between 9 and 12 months of age for female 
faces and not before 18 months for male faces (Poulin-Dubois et al., 1998). Consistent with 
these findings, a very recent study by Hillairet de Boisferon et al. (2015) revealed that infants 
were not able to extract gender information from faces and voices before the age of 9 months, 
with the relevant skills being restricted to female faces and voices (Figure 1.12). As reported by 
Ramsey et al. (2005), a large part of the inconsistency prevalent across studies regarding the 
developmental time course of the multisensory perception of gender might stem from 
methodological factors, such as differences in the visual stimuli (static vs. dynamic) or auditory 
stimuli (isolated vowels vs. fluent speech) used in tasks or their complexity. Interestingly, 
Kubicek et al. (2014) recently reported that the integration of multisensory information was also 
influenced by the manner of speech. These authors revealed that infant-directed speech (see 
CHAPTER 2 and CHAPTER 3) facilitated inter-sensory matching of audible and visible native-
language attributes. In contrast, adult-directed speech did not facilitate the integration of these 
attributes. To the best of our knowledge, no study has evaluated the influence of the speech 
manner on the integration of multisensory gender information yet. The first experimental 
contribution of this thesis aims at elucidating this question, also considering the aforementioned 
methodological considerations (CHAPTER 3).  
 
In this first section, I provided a brief overview of the development of face processing. 
Subsequently, I will focus on the literature related to emotion, presenting the six basic 
expressions, the way their perception develops throughout lifespan, and whether naturally 
evolving dynamic expressions are better recognized than their static versions.  
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Figure 1.11. Multisensory integration of faces and voices. By the age of 8 months, infants can 
match faces and voices when presented with infant-directed vowels. Reprinted from Patterson and 
Werker (2002).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
 
 
 
 
B 
 
 
 
Figure 1.12. Multisensory integration of faces and voices is restricted to female faces. (A) 
Schematic representation of the procedure used by Hillairet de Boisferon et al. (2015) to investigate 
6- and 9-month-old infants’ abilities to match audible and visible attributes of gender when exposed 
to dynamic faces reciting infant-directed nursery rhymes. Infants viewed two side-by-side video clips 
of a man and a woman reciting a nursery rhyme and heard a synchronous male or female 
soundtrack. (B) Infants did not associate audible and visible gender attributes until the age of 9 
months, and even then, it was only for female faces. Adapted from Hillairet de Boisferon et al. 
(2015).  
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1.2 FACIAL EXPRESSIONS OF EMOTION 
 
1.2.1 Origins and categories of emotions 
From an evolutionary perspective, physiological drives such as hunger, thirst, lust, avoidance 
of pain, and need for sleep are critical for our survival, hence the need to possess them. What 
about emotions? Are they also critical for our survival? Do we all have emotions? But first and 
foremost, what are emotions?  
 
Aristotle (384–322 B.C.) defined emotions “as that which leads one’s condition become 
so transformed that his judgement is affected and which is accompanied by pleasure, and pain. 
Examples of emotion include anger, fear, pity and the like, as well as the opposites of these” 
(Solomon, 2008, p. 5). In Ancient Greek, emotions were initially described as pathèma, 
translating to passion in English and French, before Descartes (1596–1650) first introduced the 
term emotion in “Les émotions de l’âme” (Frijda, 2008). In his seminal work “The Expression 
of the Emotions in Man and Animals”, Darwin (Darwin, 1999/1872) emphasized the 
phylogenetic nature of facial expressions, paving the way for decades of research in the domain 
of emotional expressions. His evolutionary approach of considering emotions as biologically 
relevant signals, shaped by selection and critical for survival and adaptation, has become the 
common foundation for several psychological theories pertaining to emotions (Plutchik, 2003). 
From a psychological perspective, emotions are commonly defined as episodic changes in 
different subsystems of the organism, including neural responses, physiological reactions, 
internal feelings and muscular activations. These changes are triggered by external or internal 
influences that are of critical importance for the organism, enhancing fitness and reactions in 
specific situations (Scherer, 2000). Fear signals potential danger encouraging escape, disgust 
leads to the avoidance of harmful substances, anger provokes counterattack, sadness leads people 
to seek help or encourages them to overcome a loss, whereas joy encourages people to repeat 
actions that result in pleasure or happiness (Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009; Plutchik, 2003).  
 
How many different emotion categories are there? This question has been at the core of 
ensuing debates over the past decades (Ekman, 1992a; 1992b; Ekman & Davidson, 1994; Nesse 
& Ellsworth, 2009; Ortony & Turner, 1990, see Table 1.1). Although some theorists have 
postulated the existence of only two distinct affective states (i.e., positive vs. negative) (Nesse & 
Ellsworth, 2009), Ekman and Friesen (1976b; 1978), founders of the most prominent categorical 
approach and proponents of the Darwinism approach, have posited the existence of a limited 
number of six basic emotions: anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, and surprise. These so-called 
pure emotions are defined by specific facial activations, autonomic responses, and subjective 
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feelings (Ekman, 1992a; Ekman & Friesen, 1971; 1976b; 1978; Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 
1983).  
 
By virtue of their evolutionary and biological relevance, the six basic expressions have 
long been considered as universal signals, critical for communicating internal states (e.g., 
Ekman & Friesen, 1978; Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969). This universal hypothesis has, 
however, been recently challenged by findings from the cultural neuroscience literature. Jack 
et al. (2009), for instance, have observed that individuals from East Asia commonly rely on the 
region around the eyes to achieve expression discrimination tasks, whereas Western adults 
sample information from all facial features (Jack et al., 2009). By using a novel 4D method, 
coupled with a reverse correlation technique, the authors have further demonstrated that the 
diagnostic information used to decode and represent basic expressions differed across cultures 
(Jack, Caldara, & Schyns, 2012a; Jack et al., 2012b) with the eyes being more informative for 
Easterners, whereas the region around the mouth provided more diagnostic information to 
Westerners. Interestingly, these cultural differences were already observed in 7-month-old 
infants (Geangu et al., 2016), suggesting cultural influences very early on in the development 
of facial expression recognition (Caldara, 2017).  
 
 
Table 1.1. The basic emotions. Adapted from Ortony and Turner (1990). 
Reference Fundamental emotion Basis for inclusion 
Arnold (1960) Anger, aversion, courage, dejection, desire, despair, fear, 
hate, hope, love, sadness 
Relation to action, tendencies 
Ekman, Friesen and 
Ellsworth (1982) 
Anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, surprise Universal facial expressions 
Gray (1982) Rage and terror, anxiety, joy Hardwired 
Izard (1971) Anger, contempt, disgust, distress, fear, guilt, interest, joy, 
shame, surprise 
Hardwired 
James (1884) Fear, grief, love, rage Bodily involvement 
McDougall (1926) Anger, disgust, elation, fear, subjection, tender-emotion, 
wonder 
Relation to instincts 
Mowrer (1960) Pain, pleasure Unlearned emotional states 
Oatley and Johnson-
Laird (1987) 
Anger, disgust, anxiety, happiness, sadness Do not require propositional 
content 
Panksepp (1982) Expectancy, fear, rage, panic Hardwired 
Plutchik (1980b) Acceptance, anger, anticipation, disgust, joy, fear, sadness, 
surprise 
Density of neural firing 
Watson (1930) Fear, love, rage Hardwired 
Weiner and Graham 
(1984) 
Happiness, sadness Attribution independent 
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Although other theorists (e.g., Gray, 1982; Izard, 1971; Panksepp, 1982; Plutchik, 1980b) 
have postulated the existence of additional basic emotions (Table 1.1) such as pain, pleasure, 
anticipation, contempt, panic, or distress, studies investigating the recognition of facial 
expressions commonly rely on the six basic emotions originally defined by Ekman and Friesen 
(1976). This thesis follows this common direction, as the experimental contributions presented 
in CHAPTER 4 and CHAPTER 5 restrict their investigations to the expressions of “anger”, 
“disgust”, “fear”, “happiness”, “sadness”, and “surprise”. 
1.2.2 Transmitting and decoding facial expressions 
Understanding the manner in which emotions are transmitted and decoded is of fundamental 
importance for achieving adapted social interactions. The dynamic interaction between 
signaling and decoding facial information is inherent to all communication (e.g., emotions, gait, 
vocal prosody, body postures and gestures). As illustrated in Figure 1.13, a face, as a sender, 
transmits a signal (e.g., an expression) to the brain that decodes and extracts the perceptually-
relevant information to achieve an adequate interpretation of the incoming inputs, based on 
prior knowledge (Jack, 2013; Jack & Schyns, 2015). Both perceptual signals transmitted by facial 
expressions and top-down mechanisms are necessary for an effective categorization of a 
perceived expression. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.13. Transmitting and decoding facial expressions of emotion. Reprinted from Jack and 
Schyns (2015).  
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Smith, Cottrell, Gosselin, and Schyns (2005) examined the perceptual characteristics of 
the facial signals transmitted by the six basic expressions (plus neutral) by adopting an ideal 
observer model approach with a response classification technique named Bubbles, which 
samples information in a 3D space (Gosselin & Schyns, 2001; Schyns, Bonnar, & Gosselin, 
2002) (Box 6, Figure 1.14). Their findings revealed that the face, as a facial expression 
transmitter, maximizes orthogonal signals with low overlap to reduce ambiguities and enhance 
categorization performance. As shown in Figure 1.15, the characteristics of the six basic 
expression signals were highly distinguishable from each other, as low Pearson correlations 
were observed between the different facial features used for transmitting the expressions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.14. Bubbles. Bubbles is a response classification technique that samples the information 
in a 3D space (2D face and spatial frequency). Left: The sampling procedure used originally by 
Gosselin and Schyns (2001) to create bubblized stimuli. Right: The procedure used by Smith et al. 
(2005). The upper part of the figure provides a schematic illustration of how the stimuli were created. 
An original face (first column) was decomposed into five different bandwidths of spatial frequencies 
(first row, 120 to 7.5 cycles per face). Each bandwidth was then sampled with randomly positioned 
bubbles (second row). The third row illustrates how the bubbles were integrated within the 
decomposed pictures and summed to generate an experimental stimulus (for more details of this 
technique, see Gosselin & Schyns, 2001; Schyns et al., 2002). Reprinted from Smith et al. (2005).  
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Figure 1.15. Facial expression signals are weakly correlated with one another. The upper row 
represents the diagnostic filtering function for the human observers whereas the lower row the 
diagnostic function of the model observer. A diagnostic filtering function was generated for each 
expression at each scale, by locating the pixels leading to a criterion level of performance of 75% 
correct. The resulting filters, specific to each scale, were then smoothened and multiplied by a 
selected stimulus sample to generate the images shown in the figure. The numbers reported indicate 
the values of the Pearson correlations between the diagnostic filtering functions of humans and 
observer model. High correlation values indicate high adaptation to image information statistics (for 
more details, see Smith et al., 2005). Reprinted from Smith et al. (2005).  
 
Box 6 – Bubbles 
Bubbles is a response classification technique that isolates the facial information used by 
observers to categorize different facial features. This general technique, elaborated by Gosselin 
and Schyns in 2001, has been used in different tasks (e.g., expression, identity, and gender 
categorization) to segregate the location of the facial cues responsible for adequate categorization. 
Although the Bubbles technique has been extensively used for face recognition, its principles 
have also been extended to the recognition of objects (Wasserman et al., 2004) and scenes 
(McCotter et al., 2005) as well as to the investigation of visual perception in brain-damaged 
patients (Adolphs et al., 2005; Caldara et al., 2005; Fiset et al., 2017). In the Bubbles technique, 
a mask consisting of randomly located bubbles (Gaussian apertures) is generated and applied on 
an original image decomposed into five bandwidths of spatial frequency. The resulting stimuli 
sample a subset of the visual information presented in the original image (Figure 1.14). Observers 
categorize the stimuli generated throughout this sampling process, a procedure that allows to 
assign credits to the bubbles leading to correct categorization. Over the testing procedure, the 
number of bubbles is adjusted in order to obtain a criterion level of performance of 75% of correct 
categorization (Gosselin & Schyns, 2001).  
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 Besides the response classification technique adopted by Smith et al. (2005) in 
characterizing the information transmitted by the six basic expressions, other systems, such as 
the Facial Action Coding System (FACS, Ekman & Friesen, 1976b; 1978), were previously 
developed in order to examine which facial signals are involved in the production of specific 
emotions. 
1.2.3 Communicating emotions: the activation of different facial muscles 
Over the last decades, most studies investigating facial expression recognition have been 
influenced by Ekman and Friesen’s Facial Action Coding System (1976b; 1978), providing an 
anatomical taxonomy of the muscles activated during the generation of natural expressions. 
According to this system, facial expressions can be described in terms of facial muscle 
activations, the so-called action-units. An action unit corresponds to a small movement of a 
single muscle or a group of muscles, which is easily distinguishable from a different movement 
(for an illustration of the different muscles for facial expressions, see Figure 1.17). The activation 
of an action unit leads to a specific change in the appearance of the face, such as a smile, the 
lift of an eyebrow, a grin, or an upper or lower nose wrinkle. The FACS consists of 46 actions 
units (AUs) corresponding to all the independent different facial motions. As illustrated in 
Figure 1.16, an expression can be decomposed into its specific AUs. The FACS is a very sensitive 
system, which is able to distinguish subtle changes in facial appearance. It has been used to 
detect genuine, suppressed, or fake painful expressions in children (e.g., Larochette, Chambers, 
& Craig, 2006), older adults with or without Alzheimer (e.g., Lints-Martindale et al., 2007), 
patients suffering from chronic back pain (e.g., Craig, Hyde, & Patrick, 1991), and patients with 
depression (e.g., Reed, Sayette, & Cohn, 2007). It has also proven to be a useful tool for detecting 
subtle momentary changes in genuine or fake smiles (e.g., Del Giudice & Colle, 2007), for 
detecting inappropriate affects in schizophrenic patients (e.g., Kohler et al., 2008), and to 
examine how specific the activations of individual actions units are in healthy adults (e.g., 
Kohler et al., 2004a).  
 
Ekman and Friesen’s facial action coding system has also been the starting point for 
the development of state-of-the-art new technologies created to investigate facial expression 
recognition. For instance, Hamm et al. (2011) developed an automated FACS to examine 
dynamic changes of facial movements in neuropsychiatric disorders. Roesch et al. (2011) created 
FACSGen, an innovative tool based on the FACS, to develop static and dynamic realistic 3D 
face stimuli by controlling the activation of specific AUs. Furthermore, Jack, Caldara, and 
Schyns (2012a) reconstructed the internal representations of the six basic expressions in 
Easterner and Westerner adults using a FACS-based generator of random facial muscle 
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activations with a reverse correlation technique. This study revealed cultural specificity in the 
set of facial movements used by Easterners and Westerners to represent basic emotions (Jack et 
al., 2012, for more details on this technique, see CHAPTER 2 and CHAPTER 4).  
 
  In the first part of this second section, I provided a theoretical overview of some aspects 
of emotions, their origins, how they are transmitted and decoded. The next part proposes a brief 
review of their development, from childhood to old age. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.16. AUs for disgust. The expression of disgust leads to the activation of both AUs 9 (upper 
nose wrinkle) and 10 (lower nose wrinkle and lift of the upper lip). Reprinted from Pochedly, Widen 
and Russell (2012).  
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Figure 1.16. Muscles for facial expressions. Reprinted from Clemente (1997).  
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1.2.4 The development of expression recognition: a lifespan perspective 
Infancy. The development of emotional processing has been thoroughly investigated in infants 
(for reviews, see Bayet, Pascalis, & Gentaz, 2014; Leppänen & Nelson, 2009). Several studies have 
evidenced a gradual improvement in the recognition of individual expressions, between 4 months 
and one year of age. For instance, performing a “peek-a-boo” game and measuring infants’ looking 
behavior, Montague and Walker-Andrews (2001) found that 4-month-old infants displayed varied 
patterns of responsiveness to the different emotions. These findings are consistent with other 
developmental studies showing early expression imitation abilities in neonates (Field et al., 1983) 
as well as research demonstrating that 4-month-old infants prefer smiling to neutral faces 
(LaBarbera et al., 1976; Rochat, Striano, & Blatt, 2002), smiling to sad faces (Montague & Walker-
Andrews, 2002), and smiling to fearful faces (Farroni et al., 2007; but see, Peltola et al., 2009). 
Other studies have shown that infants at a very young age are able to determine the emotional 
intensities of subtle versus intense happy faces (e.g., Nelson & De Haan, 1996). 
 
A first important developmental shift has been evidenced in 6- to 7-month-old infants 
with the emergence of categorization and discrimination abilities (Bayet et al., 2014; Leppänen & 
Nelson, 2009). Several studies have demonstrated that infants were able to perform categorical 
discrimination between happiness and surprise (Caron, Caron, & Myers, 1982), sadness (Leppänen 
& Nelson, 2009), and fearful faces (Kotsoni, de Haan, & Johnson, 2001). Using functional near-
infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS), Nakato et al. (2011) further demonstrated that 6- to 7-month-old 
infants were able to discriminate happy from angry expressions and that their hemodynamic 
responses to these two expressions were distinct. More specifically, in their experiment, infants’ 
looking behavior was measured by video-recordings and their brain activity using fNIRS while 
they viewed passively angry and happy faces (Figure 1.18). As shown in Figure 1.19A, the 
experimental procedure comprised baseline and test phases. Vegetables were displayed during the 
baseline, while expressions were presented during the test phase. Changes in hemodynamic 
responses between baseline and test phases were computed to identify the hemodynamic 
activations during emotional face processing. Results revealed distinct patterns of hemodynamic 
responses to both expressions, with gradually increasing left temporal activations to happy faces, 
while angry faces elicited hemodynamic responses in the right-sided temporal areas (Figure 1.19 
B and C).  
 
Figure 1.18. fNIRS procedure in developmental studies. 
The fNIRS cap is placed over the right- and left-sided temporal 
regions in 6- to 7-month-old infants. Reprinted from Nakato 
et al. (2011).  
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A 
 
B 
 
C 
 
 
 
Figure 1.19. Differences in hemodynamic responses to happy and angry faces evidenced by a 
near-infrared spectroscopic study. (A) An example of the experimental procedure used in the 
study. (B) Time-course of oxy-, deoxy-, and total-hemoglobin concentrations during the happy and 
the fearful face conditions. The left column reports concentration changes in the left temporal cortex, 
whereas the right column indicates changes in the right-sided temporal cortex. (C) The figure 
displays the mean z-scores for oxy-, deoxy-, and total-hemoglobin concentrations for happy and angry 
faces during the last 3s of the test phase and the 3s following the test phase in left and right temporal 
cortices. Adapted from Nakato et al. (2011).  
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Although young infants already demonstrate a few expression differentiation abilities, 
it is not until the end of the first year of life that their emotion decoding system becomes 
sensitive enough to detect more subtle differences in emotional facial signals. For instance, 8- 
to 10-month-old infants expect specific emotional reactions (e.g., happy faces) in response to the 
outcomes of particular actions (e.g., success) and detect expressions (e.g., sad faces) that are 
incongruent with the outcomes elicited by specific conditions (e.g., success) (Skerry & Spelke, 
2014).  
 
Childhood and adolescence. While the behavioral and fNIRS data presented above 
demonstrate that 6- to 7-month-old infants display sensitivity to emotional faces and can discern 
certain emotions, their ability to reliably label and categorize expressions emerges later and 
gradually increases from childhood to early adulthood (Herba & Phillips, 2004; Montirosso et 
al., 2010; Rodger et al., 2015; Vicari et al., 2000). Although it is evident that emotion recognition 
steadily improves with increasing age, little consistency is found across studies regarding the 
exact developmental trajectory of this ability. Differences in the methodologies applied, in the 
stimuli (static versus dynamic), and in the emotions tested make it particularly difficult to 
compare findings across studies. For instance, recognition rates have been proven to be task 
dependent, varying even within the same study when the type of task is modified (Vicari et al., 
2000). Furthermore, the responses required from the participants also varied across studies – 
free labeling tasks involve lexico-semantic abilities, matching tasks rely on perceptual faculties, 
whereas forced-choice tasks require categorization abilities (e.g., Bruce et al., 2000; Mancini et 
al., 2013). As different stimuli as well as cognitive faculties are tested across studies, drawing 
comparisons between the results is difficult.   
 
Despite the heterogeneous results, there is a general consensus among researchers that 
the developmental trajectory of expression recognition varies among emotions. A substantial 
amount of data indicates that the expression of happiness is the first one to be accurately 
recognized, with 5-year-old children reaching identical recognition scores as adults (Durand et 
al., 2007; Gao & Maurer, 2010; Gross & Ballif, 1991; Herba & Phillips, 2004), even when the 
emotional faces are presented as fast as 500ms (Rodger et al., 2015). After happiness, studies 
have reported the emergence of recognition abilities for anger and sadness (Durand et al., 2007; 
Mancini et al., 2013; Montirosso et al., 2010) followed by the expressions of surprise, fear, and 
disgust (e.g., Mancini et al., 2013). In a recent study investigating facial expression recognition 
in late childhood, Mancini et al. (2013) observed steep improvements for neutral and sadness, 
whereas more gradual increases were found for anger, fear, and disgust. Using morphed faces 
varying in emotional content, Thomas et al. (2007) observed steep improvements from childhood 
to adolescence in the recognition of fear to neutral and fear to anger morphed faces, while an 
improvement for the recognition of the anger to neutral sequence was observed only later, from 
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adolescence onwards. These results imply that the developmental trajectories for fear and anger 
rely on distinct mechanisms.  
 
In another study, using dynamic faces, Montirosso et al. (2010) examined the effects of 
emotional intensity on the categorization performance of the expressions of anger, sadness, fear, 
happiness, and disgust in 4- to 18-year-old observers. In line with previous studies (Herba et 
al., 2006), results have proven that labeling accuracy improved with the emotional intensity, 
although the effects of intensity varied across facial expressions. For instance, happy faces were 
equally well recognized at a low or high intensity. Among negative expressions, recognition 
rates were nearly identical for intense expressions, with fear however being better recognized 
than anger or sadness when presented at low intensity. Since the expression of fear signals 
potential dangers, the brain might be tuned to detect it more rapidly, even when presented in 
its subtle form (Montirosso et al., 2010; Plutchik, 1980a). Moreover, although fear was 
frequently confused with surprise, results have displayed that it was rarely confused with other 
negative emotions, probably because the action units commonly activated by fear (i.e., raised 
eyebrows) are perceptually more distinctive than those initially activated by angry or sad faces 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1978; Montirosso et al., 2010). Overall, this study revealed age-related 
increases in recognition performance for all expressions, except for disgust. Improvement in 
patterns were not uniform across emotions, accuracy rates for happiness and fear increasing 
faster than for anger and sadness. Recognition rates were also dependent on the intensity of the 
emotional expressions presented. Interestingly, although this study used dynamic expressions, 
its results were generally consistent with other research featuring static faces (Vicari et al., 2000; 
but see, Mancini et al., 2013, for disgust; Rodger et al., 2015).  
 
In another emotional intensity study, Gao and Maurer (2010) determined children’s 
thresholds for recognizing the six basic expressions presented with varying emotional intensity 
ranging from 0% (neutral) to 100% (apex). The results reported an early sensitivity to happy 
faces, consistent with previous findings (Camras & Allison, 1985; Durand et al., 2007; Vicari et 
al., 2000), while thresholds for negative expressions developed at different rates up to adulthood. 
Thresholds for fear, sadness, and disgust achieved adult-like levels earlier (10 years) than anger, 
which was the latest (after 10 years).  
 
In line with these findings, a study by Rodger et al. (2015) very recently mapped the 
development of facial expression recognition from childhood up to adulthood by adopting an 
innovative psychophysical approach. Observers’ perceptual thresholds for effectively detecting 
and labeling emotional faces were identified by using a threshold-seeking algorithm, enabling 
the manipulation of the quantity of signals provided by the faces (Figure 1.20A). The results 
revealed that the six basic expressions could be grouped into three distinct developmental 
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trajectories: the first included disgust, neutral, and anger exhibiting a steep increase with age; 
the second group consisted of sadness and surprise, two expressions that displayed more 
moderate improvements. The last group included expressions that were already well recognized 
at a very young age (happiness) or remained stable from childhood to adulthood (fear) (Figure 
1.20B). The findings obtained from this study also outlined two important stages during the 
development of expression recognition, the first one spanning from 5 to 12 years and the second 
one from 13 years to early adulthood. These developmental stages mirror the results of previous 
studies, revealing noticeable improvements between 9 and 10 years as well as marked increases 
in recognition accuracy between 13 and 14 years (Kolb, Wilson, & Taylor, 1992; Somerville, 
Fani, & McClure-Tone, 2011).  
 
Developmental stages as well as prominent improvements may be driven by structural 
and functional changes in the brain. For instance, substantial evidence has supported that the 
brain structures underlying emotional processing develop from childhood till late adolescence 
(e.g., Giedd, 2008; Giedd et al., 1999; Giedd et al., 1996; Shaw et al., 2008) with substantial 
increases in left and right amygdala volume between 7.5 and 18.5 years of age (Figure 1.21) 
(Giedd et al., 1996; Schumann et al., 2004). Other factors such as environmental and affective 
influences (Figure 1.22) (Bornstein et al., 2011; Bornstein et al., 2012; Pinel et al., 2014; Pollak 
& Kistler, 2002; Pollak & Sinha, 2002), cultural (Geangu et al., 2016), visual, or perceptual 
experiences (Bate et al., 2013; Calder et al., 2000; Gao, Maurer, & Nishimura, 2013) may also 
impact the development of facial expression recognition.  
 
A 
 
 
B 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.20. Fine-grained developmental mapping of emotional face processing. (A) Mean 
thresholds for each age group and each emotion category. Very low recognition thresholds can be 
observed for happiness, while recognition thresholds for fear remain high throughout development. 
Recognition thresholds for anger and neutral decrease with increasing age. (B) Fitted slopes of the 
General Linear Model indicating the steepness of decrease of recognition thresholds across ages. 
Disgust, neutral, and anger displayed a steep increase with age; sadness and surprise exhibited more 
moderate improvements, whereas happiness and fear remained stable from childhood to adulthood. 
Reprinted from Rodger et al. (2015).  
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Figure 1.21. Neurobiological changes in the amygdala throughout development. The figure 
displays the linear regression scatterplot for amygdala volume as a function of age. The mean 
volumetric data revealed a positive correlation between (A) right- and (B) left-sided amygdala volume 
and age. This gradual increase in volume was however not observed in the (C) right- and (D) left-
amygdala of autistic children. Adapted from Schumann et al. (2004).  
 
 
 
  
  
 
Figure 1.22. Affective influences in shaping expression recognition. Percentage of accurate 
identification rates for the expressions of anger, happiness, fear, and sadness in abused (dashed lines) 
and non-abused (solid lines) children as a function of the amount of information provided by the 
images (1: low; 10: high). Abused children required less information to accurately recognize the 
expressions of anger and fear compared to non-abused children. The opposite pattern was observed 
for sadness and happiness. Reprinted from Pollak and Sinha (2002).  
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Lifespan approaches. Studies relying on lifespan approaches to investigate the perception of 
emotional expression evidenced inverted u-shaped recognition trajectories, with younger and 
middle-aged adults performing the best, while children and elderly people were the least 
accurate (Horning, Cornwell, & Davis, 2012; Williams et al., 2009). Importantly, these lifespan 
studies revealed another fundamental shift in recognition performance occurring in late 
adulthood with normal aging.  
 
Normal aging. Age-related gradual declines in the recognition of facial expressions have broad 
implications for the physical and mental well-being of elderly people as well as for their use of 
non-verbal communicative information. Although some previous reports have demonstrated an 
increase in the recognition of certain expressions with increasing age (Calder et al., 2003; Suzuki 
et al., 2006; but see, Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004a; 2004b), most studies have revealed that normal 
aging is followed by a gradual decline in emotion recognition. However, defining the exact 
emotion category that is affected is more challenging, because there is little consistency across 
studies in the methodologies used and the expressions tested – some relying only on a subset of 
expressions (Table 1.2). Using the Ekman and Friesen (1976) static posed faces, Calder et al. 
(2003) for instance observed a reduction in the recognition of fear and anger, and to a lesser 
extent sadness, in adults above 60, whereas the recognition of disgust further improved. By 
using dynamic faces providing richer and ecologically more valid depictions of the manner in 
which faces are perceived in daily life, Horning et al. (2012) revealed preserved recognition 
abilities for anger, surprise, and disgust, but marked deficiencies for happiness, fear, and 
sadness in the older age group spanning from 65 to 89 years of age. In a meta-analytic review 
of the literature of emotion recognition and aging, Ruffman et al. (2008) observed severe 
impairments in the recognition of anger and sadness across several modalities, such as voices, 
bodies, faces, or face-voice matching in normally aging people (mean age 70). Deficits were also 
observed for fear, surprise, and happiness, within some modalities, but not others. In contrast, 
the recognition of disgust was preserved (Ruffman et al., 2008, see also, Borod et al., 2004; 
MacPherson, Phillips, & Della Sala, 2002; Moreno et al., 1993; Phillips, MacLean, & Allen, 
2002). However, this latter finding was neither confirmed by a more recent study evidencing a 
gradual decline in the recognition of disgust in very old people, aged 81 to 90 years (Williams 
et al., 2009), nor by previous reports revealing a deficit for this expression prevalent from 60 
years onwards (Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004a; 2004b).  
 
As shown in Table 1.2, the general pattern that arises from these different studies is 
that the recognition of some expressions remains relatively stable over the years, whereas the 
recognition of others drastically decreases with increasing age.  
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Table 1.2. Main studies investigating facial expression recognition across life span. Adapted 
from Isaacowitz et al. (2007).  
Study  N Age ranges by 
group 
Stimuli Answer 
format 
A D F H Sa Su N 
 
Borod et al. 
(2004) 
 
 
36 
 
25–35, 45–55, 
65–75 
 
 
450 posed faces 
(Moreno et al., 1993) 
 
 
MC, verbal 
labels 
 
 
NT 
 
= 
 
NT 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
Calder et al. 
(2003,  
Study 1) 
 
48 18–30, 58–70 
 
60 posed faces (Ekman 
& Friesen, 1976b) 
MC, verbal 
labels 
 
= á â = â = NT 
Calder et al. 
(2003,  
Study 2a) 
227 17–30, 31–40, 
41–50, 51–60, 
61–70 
 
60 posed faces (Ekman 
& Friesen, 1976b) 
MC, verbal 
labels 
 
â á â = = = NT 
Calder et al. 
(2003,  
Study 2b) 
125 18–30, 31–40, 
41–50, 51–60, 
61–75 
 
30 morphs of posed faces 
(Calder, 1996) 
MC, verbal 
labels 
 
â á â = = = NT 
Horning et 
al. (2012) 
732 5-11, 12-17, 18-
39, 40-64, 65-
89 
36 dynamic posed faces 
(Ekman & Friesen, 
1976b) 
 
MC, verbal 
labels 
= = â â â = NT 
MacPherson 
et al. (2002) 
 
90 20–38, 40–59, 
61–80 
 
49 posed faces 
(Matsumoto & Ekman, 
1988) 
 
MC, verbal 
labels 
 
= = = = â = NT 
McDowell 
et al. (1994) 
 
60 17-22, 65-90 50 posed faces, (Ekman 
& Friesen, 1976b) 
 
MC, verbal 
labels 
 
â NT â = â NT â 
Moreno et 
al. (1993) 
 
90 21–39, 40–59, 
60–81 
 
20 posed faces (Ekman 
& Friesen, 1976b) 
MC, verbal 
labels 
 
NT = NT á â = NT 
Phillips et 
al. (2002) 
 
60 20–40, 60–80 
 
24 posed faces (Ekman 
& Friesen, 1976b) 
MC, verbal 
labels 
 
â = = = â = NT 
Sullivan & 
Ruffman 
(2004a, 
Study 1) 
 
61 20–38, 60–84 
 
Eight animated morphs 
of posed faces (Ekman 
& Friesen, 1976b) 
 
MC, verbal 
labels 
 
â NT = = â NT NT 
Sullivan & 
Ruffman 
(2004a, 
Study 2a) 
56 18–29, 63–79 
 
24 pairs of morphs of 
posed faces (Ekman & 
Friesen, 1976b) 
 
MC, 
emotion 
matching 
task  
 
â = â = â = NT 
Sullivan & 
Ruffman 
(2004a, 
Study 2b) 
56 18–29, 63–79 
 
24 emotional voices  
(verbal and nonverbal, 
Hobson, Ouston, & 
Lee, 1988) 
 
MC, posed 
faces; 
 
â â = = â = NT 
Sullivan & 
Ruffman 
(2004b) 
 
48 20–46, 60–82 
 
24 posed faces (Ekman 
& Friesen, 1976b) 
MC, verbal 
labels 
 
â â = = = = NT 
Williams et 
al. (2009) 
1000 6-9, 10-19, 20-
29, 30-39, 40-
49, 50-59, 60-
69, 70-79, 80-91 
 
72 posed faces (Gur et 
al., 2002) 
MC, verbal 
label 
â â â â â â â 
Zhao et al. 
(2016) 
60 19-27, 68-78 56 posed faces 
(Tottenham et al., 2009) 
MC, verbal 
label 
 
â â â = â â NT 
 
Note. A = Anger; D = Disgust; F = Fear; H = Happiness; Sa = Sadness; Su = Surprise; N = Neutral; NT 
= Not tested; MC = Multiple choice. 
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1.2.5 Theoretical explanations for age-related expression recognition deficits 
Age-related deficits in the recognition of facial expressions are commonly discussed in the 
context of three theoretical approaches: the socio-emotional selectivity theory, the cognitive 
aging view, and the neuropsychological approach of aging. These three perspectives will be now 
presented in more details.  
 
According to the socio-emotional selectivity theory, aging emphasizes positivity 
effects (Carstensen, Fung, & Charles, 2003; Carstensen & Mikels, 2005; Mill et al., 2009; 
Ruffman et al., 2008), leading elderly people to preferentially attend and process positive 
emotional information as compared to negative one. These positivity effects have been attributed 
to an enhanced ability to avoid social conflicts with age, adapt to negative situations, and control 
and regulate emotions (Carstensen et al., 2003; Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 2003). This 
theory posits that increasing age leads people to gain awareness of their own mortality, 
encouraging them to change their goals and motivation and direct their attention towards the 
emotionally positive aspects of their life. In fact, when pairs of photographs of negative (sadness 
and anger) and positive (happy) emotional faces were shown to young, middle, and old adults, 
the older participants exhibited an attentional bias against negative images and towards positive 
ones (Figure 1.23) (Charles et al., 2003).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.23. Positivity theory. Left: Number of positive, negative, and neutral expressions recalled 
by young, middle, and normal aging people. Right: Amygdala activation to positive, negative, and 
neutral expressions in young and elderly people. The average signal change indicates amygdala 
activation while participants were viewing each kind of expression. Adapted from Carstensen and 
Mikels (2005).  
 
 
Consistent with these findings, Carstensen and Mikels (2005) have revealed a 
significantly greater activation of the amygdala in elderly people in response to positive as 
compared to negative images in relation to younger adults, although the amygdala had been 
previously presented as being central to the processing of both positive and negative stimuli 
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(Hamann et al., 2002). While the socio-emotional selectivity theory has been proposed as a 
potential explanation for older adults’ perseveration in the recognition of positive emotional 
information, this approach has been limited by findings revealing that the recognition of certain 
positive expressions is not spared in elderly people. For instance, recognition deficits for 
happiness have been discovered in some previous studies (Brosgole & Weisman, 1995; Horning 
et al., 2012). Furthermore, this theory is not consistent with previous findings exhibiting 
increased recognition performance for the negative expression of disgust in elderly people (Calder 
et al., 2003; Suzuki et al., 2006). In light of these findings, Calder et al. (2003) have suggested 
that the attentional bias towards positive expressions should be reinterpreted as a reduced ability 
to process certain negative expressions, rather than an enhanced ability to regulate emotions with 
age. Additionally, Sullivan et al. (2007) have suggested that age differences in the recognition of 
positive and negative expressions can be explained by the distinct eye movement patterns 
employed by younger and older adults to process facial expressions. As shown in Figure 1.24, these 
authors have noted that elderly people sub-optimally used the diagnostic information provided by 
the eye region, focusing more on the mouth. This suboptimal use of the eyes is of particular 
interest, as negative expressions provide overall more information from the eye region (Sullivan 
et al., 2007; Wong, Cronin-Golomb, & Neargarder, 2005). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.24. Eye movement patterns in young and elderly people. Time spent (in seconds) by 
young and older adults on the mouth and eye region for each emotion category. Reprinted from 
Sullivan et al. (2007).  
 
 
According to the cognitive aging theory, a series of cognitive faculties, such as fluid 
intelligence (e.g., Horning et al., 2012; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004a), processing speed (e.g., 
Orgeta & Phillips, 2007), verbal memory (e.g., MacPherson et al., 2002), or discrimination of 
visual information (e.g., Mill et al., 2009), are critical for the recognition of human facial 
expressions. These different cognitive abilities are known to decrease with age, independently 
or in combination with each other (Mill et al., 2009; Salthouse, 2004). Although age-related 
cognitive decline becomes greater and broader from the age of 50 onwards, previous evidence 
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has proven that the decline is already significant in adults between 18 and 50 years of age 
(Verhaeghen & Salthouse, 1997). For instance, relevant empirical evidence has revealed that 
processing speed as well as fluid intelligence gradually deteriorate in adults over 30 years, 
whereas the decline for memory linearly decreases from the age of 40 onwards (e.g., Salthouse, 
Atkinson, & Berish, 2003). Decreases in processing speed may affect expression recognition by 
reducing the number of facial features extracted from the emotional faces, if the faces are 
presented for a limited amount of time (e.g., Orgeta & Phillips, 2007; Suzuki & Akiyama, 2013; 
West et al., 2012; Zhao et al., 2016). Other faculties, however, such as verbal memory, 
vocabulary, or lexical knowledge have been noted to reach their performance peak later, 
between 40 and 60 years of age (e.g., Salthouse, 2004). 
 
Although there is a general consensus among researchers that aging leads to a decline 
in facial expression recognition, previous reports have not provided compelling evidence 
supporting that these age-related impairments result from general cognitive decline (e.g., 
Horning et al., 2012; MacPherson et al., 2002; Ruffman et al., 2008). For instance, Horning et 
al. (2012) revealed that different cognitive faculties, such as processing speed, fluid intelligence, 
or memory contributed to the recognition of facial expressions in older adults, especially above 
the age of 45, but did not fully account for the gradual decline observed with increasing age. 
Furthermore, research by Keightley et al. (2007) and Vicari et al. (2000) indicated a relative 
independence between cognitive functions and emotion recognition, as participants’ 
performance on various cognitive tests did not predict younger and older adults’ accuracy scores 
on facial expression recognition tasks. Additionally, the general cognitive decline does not seem 
to be solely responsible for older adults’ impairments in facial expression recognition, as these 
impairments would otherwise be expected to emerge earlier, as gradual declines are already 
observed beginning from the age of 30. Aside from the general cognitive decline, other factors, 
such as neuropsychological changes within the social brain may provide alternative, stronger, 
and more compelling explanations for the observed deficits.   
 
According to a third theory, the neuropsychological approach, substantial evidence 
from patients and neuroimaging studies suggests that distinct brain regions underlie the 
processing of different emotions. For instance, the amygdala plays a critical role for the 
processing of fear (e.g., Adolphs & Tranel, 2004; Adolphs et al., 1994; Adolphs et al., 1995; 
Adolphs et al., 1999; Calder, Lawrence, & Young, 2001b; Phan et al., 2002; Phillips et al., 2003; 
Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 2007; Zhao et al., 2017), whereas the basal ganglia and insula underlie 
the processing of disgust (e.g., Calder et al., 2003). Other studies indicate that the cingulate 
cortex and the lateral orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) in combination with the amygdala are 
responsible for the decoding of anger (e.g., Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, & 
Lawrence, 2003; Ruffman et al., 2008), while the recognition of happiness involves the amygdala 
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(e.g., Killgore & Yurgelun-Todd, 2004; Yang et al., 2002), frontal areas (e.g., Ruffman et al., 
2008; Salloum et al., 2007), as well as the fusiform gyrus (e.g., Surguladze et al., 2005; 
Surguladze et al., 2003). Identifying sad faces increases and decreases neural responses in 
different brain regions within the limbic system, such as the amygdala (e.g., Adolphs & Tranel, 
2004; Lennox et al., 2004; Ruffman et al., 2008), medial prefrontal cortices (Murphy et al., 
2003), as well as the anterior cingulate cortex (e.g., Lennox et al., 2004; Murphy et al., 2003; 
Salloum et al., 2007). Finally, viewing surprised faces elicits activation in the amygdala and 
para-hippocampal gyrus as well as in the insula and post-central cortices (e.g., Zhao et al., 2017).  
 
There is a general consensus among researchers that normal aging leads to structural 
changes in the brain. Some have argued that the pattern of expression recognition deficits 
observed in elderly people may be related to the pattern of age-related structural changes occurring 
in the brain areas subserving the processing of individual emotions (e.g., Calder et al., 2003; 
Ruffman et al., 2008). For instance, several studies have demonstrated that brain volume losses 
occur earlier in frontal areas, with evidence suggesting that among these frontal regions, the 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) might be even more vulnerable to aging, with more rapid and severe 
changes in this particular region. As reported by Ruffman et al. (2008), impairments of older 
adults in the recognition of anger may be primarily due to a degradation of the OFC, considering 
that this region is critical for the processing of angry faces (see above). Similarly, the marked 
deficits for the recognition of fear in the older adults (e.g., Calder et al., 2003; Horning et al., 
2012) may be related to structural changes in the amygdala. Research has indeed revealed that 
this brain region undergoes atrophy with age (Mather et al., 2004; Ruffman et al., 2008) and 
becomes less reactive to negative stimuli with increasing age (Mather et al., 2004). In contrast, it 
is frequently argued that other brain regions, such as the insula or basal ganglia, critical for the 
processing of disgust, are less vulnerable to age-related degeneration. As reported by previous 
studies, preservation of these brain regions may be partially responsible for the intact ability of 
older adults in recognizing disgust (Calder et al., 2000; Horning et al., 2012; Ruffman et al., 2008; 
Suzuki et al., 2006).  
 
Finally, previous fMRI studies comparing younger and older adults’ abilities to 
categorize expressions did not only find differences in recognition performance but also 
differential brain activation patterns during the processing of emotional faces (e.g., Fischer, 
Nyberg, & Bäckman, 2010; Fischer et al., 2005; Gunning-Dixon et al., 2003; Tessitore et al., 
2005). For instance, Gunning-Dixon et al. (2003) observed that the temporo-limbic areas, 
including the amygdala and surrounding regions, were activated in younger adults, while the 
anterior cingulate cortex, bilateral prefrontal, and parietal regions were selectively recruited in 
older adults for processing emotional faces. As suggested by the authors, reduced activity in the 
limbic areas in older adults may mirror age-related structural and functional changes within 
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these regions, an explanation that is consistent with the aforementioned behavioral and 
neuropsychological studies (e.g., Calder et al., 2003; Ruffman et al., 2008), with other fMRI 
studies (Fischer et al., 2010; Fischer et al., 2005; Raz, 2000), as well as with post-mortem reports 
evidencing age-related losses of brain volume and neuronal atrophy in the amygdala and 
surroundings regions (e.g., Geinisman et al., 1995; West, 1993). Importantly here, the neural 
responses observed in older adults to emotional faces (i.e., bilateral prefrontal and parietal 
activations) may imply an age-related reorganization of the neural substrates subtending 
emotional processing. Along this line, more recent research revealed decreased amygdala 
activation, but increased cortical activity (frontal and insular) in response to fearful faces in 
older compared to younger adults (Figure 1.25, Table 1.3) (Fischer et al., 2010). This age-related 
medial-temporal to neocortical shift may imply that negative emotional information (i.e., a 
fearful face) is processed more consciously with increasing age, as neocortical regions underpin 
the processing of regulatory and attentional mechanisms (e.g., Fischer et al., 2010; Ochsner et 
al., 2004).  
 
Table 1.3. Differences in brain activation between young and old adults during 
the processing of fearful faces. Reprinted from Fischer et al. (2010). 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1.25. Brain activation to fearful faces in young and old adults. Left: Increased activation 
in (A) the right amygdala and (B) the bilateral hippocampus in young compared to old adults during 
the processing of fearful faces. Right: Increased activation in (A) the left insula and (B) the right 
prefrontal cortex in old compared to young adults during the same task. Adapted from Fischer et al. 
(2010). 
 
After this developmental overview, we will subsequently note that putting motion into 
emotion can, in some specific situations, facilitate their recognition.  
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1.2.6 Adding motion to emotion: the role of dynamic cues in facial expression 
recognition  
Our ability to rapidly detect changes in the facial composure of our conspecifics is key to the 
regulation of even the most basic social interactions. Most studies investigating facial expression 
recognition have relied on static images displaying the apex or highest state of an emotional 
expression. In everyday life however, natural expressions are dynamic events that evolve over 
time in some particular ways and convey critical information for adapted behaviors. As our 
visual system is steadily stimulated by dynamic cues, it appears reasonable to assume that we 
are adapted to more readily recognize expressions from moving faces. Although pioneering 
works in the field of emotion recognition have clearly demonstrated that we can infer other 
people’s emotional state from static images (Ekman & Friesen, 1976b; 1978), the evidence is less 
consistent when it comes to determine whether we gain any perceptual advantage while viewing 
dynamic expressions.  
 
This section will provide an overview of previous studies designed to evaluate the 
influence of facial motion on behavioral responses, such as recognition accuracy, response time, 
or perceived emotional intensity. Studies from the neuropsychological and clinical literature 
will be also briefly presented. The processing of static and dynamic faces in the brain will be 
approached in section 1.3.4.  
 
Suboptimal situations. Over the last two decades, several studies have furnished evidence for 
a dynamic advantage in the recognition of facial expressions, particularly in suboptimal 
situations, when the information presented is limited, such as when the faces are presented as 
point-light displays, blurred, schematized, or degraded (for a recent review, see Krumhuber, 
Kappas, & Manstead, 2013). In his pioneering work, Bassili (1978) investigated observers’ ability 
to recognize expressions from point-light moving faces (Figure 1.26). His findings revealed that 
participants were more effective in recognizing facial affects from moving than static displays. 
These results were further corroborated by Bruce and Valentine (1988) in a similar study 
investigating gender, identity, and emotion categorization using biological motion. Results 
revealed that the recognition of facial expression was much more accurate with biologically 
moving faces as compared to static displays.  
 
More recently, relying on computer-animated faces, Wallraven et al. (2008) revealed 
that motion cues enhanced the recognition of facial affects when texture or shape information 
were systematically degraded or blurred. If dynamic cues were not provided, degrading face 
information significantly affected expression recognition, suggesting that temporal properties 
compensate or even eliminate the deleterious effects of degrading or diminishing shape and 
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texture information. A dynamic advantage for facial expression recognition was also found when 
synthetic images drawing depictions of facial muscle movements, were used (Wehrle et al., 
2000). Interestingly, by comparing expression recognition using schematized and natural faces, 
Kätsyri and Sams (2008) and Ehrlich, Schiano, and Sheridan (2000) discovered a dynamic 
advantage only when synthetic expressions were presented; no significant differences in 
recognition accuracy when natural expressions were shown. Correspondingly, Cunningham and 
Wallraven (2009b) investigated participants’ ability to recognize facial expressions using images 
with varying spatial resolutions (point-light faces, wireframe frames, and animated full-surface 
faces). Recognition performance was overall higher with dynamic expressions as compared to 
static ones, particularly for point-light faces, with the lowest spatial resolution. Moreover, 
reducing geometry or connectivity information did not affect the recognition of naturally 
evolving dynamic events; whereas this procedure strongly impacted the recognition of static 
expressions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.26. Point-light static displays. The left panel represents a neutral expression, whereas 
the right panel shows a happy face. As shown in early studies (Bassili, 1978; Bruce & Valentine, 
1988), identifying facial expressions from static point-light displays is particularly difficult. 
Reprinted from Anderson and Fisher Anderson (2007).  
 
 
Dynamic cues do not only mitigate the negative effects of degraded information, but 
also provide critical information when subtle expressions are presented (Ambadar et al., 2005; 
Bould et al., 2008). For instance, Ambadar et al. (2005) investigated the role of motion in the 
recognition of subtle facial expressions, by comparing the identification rates of healthy 
observers in four different experimental conditions (dynamic, static, multi-static, and first–last 
frame). The main aim of the study was to examine whether differences in recognition rates 
between static and dynamic conditions were due to motion itself or other properties such as 
temporal information (perception of change), additional information carried by dynamic events 
(multi-images), or motion-based processing strategies (configural vs. featural). The four 
experimental conditions started all with a mask presented for 200 seconds and then followed 
by either a static expression (static condition); a sequence of three to six frames at a rate of 30ms 
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per frame (dynamic condition); dynamic frames presented for 500ms, but with each frame 
interspersed by a 200ms noise mask to disrupt the perception of motion (multi-static condition); 
or the first and last image of the sequence (first-last condition) (Figure 1.27). The results revealed 
a robust effect of motion on the recognition of subtle facial expressions, for all expressions 
except for happiness. By designing a multi-static condition, presenting the same frames as the 
ones displayed in the dynamic condition, but interspersed with 200ms noise masks to attenuate 
the perception of motion, researchers ruled out the possibility that the major role played by 
dynamic stimuli was due to additional information provided by multiple images. Rather, the 
authors suggested that the beneficial effects of dynamic expressions stemmed from the 
properties of the moving faces themselves. This was further evidenced in the fourth 
experimental condition of the study (first-last frame condition), presenting only the first and 
last image of the sequence, a procedure that induced the perception of motion in participants. 
The recognition rates were significantly higher in both dynamic conditions (dynamic and first-
last frame conditions) relative to the static ones (static and multi-static conditions). These 
findings enabled the researchers to conclude that the temporal characteristics inherent to the 
properties of the dynamic stimuli themselves explain the beneficial effects of motion, by 
facilitating the observers to perceive the direction of change.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.27. Investigating the recognition of subtle expressions with static and dynamic 
stimuli. Schematic representation of the stimuli used in the four experimental conditions. 
Reprinted from Ambadar et al. (2005).  
 
 
Along the same line, Bould, Morris, and Wink (2008) further investigated the role 
played by dynamic temporal information in recognizing subtle emotional expressions. Three 
conditions were tested. In the first condition, dynamic sequences beginning from a neutral state 
and evolving into a subtle emotion were presented. In the second condition, nine static frames 
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taken from the dynamic sequences were displayed. The third condition presented only the first 
neutral and the last fully articulated frames. Results revealed that expression recognition rates 
were significantly higher in the first condition, presenting naturally evolving subtle expressions, 
than in both the second and third conditions. The authors then further examined the role of 
temporal dynamics by disrupting the naturally unfolding speed of the expressions (e.g., speeding 
up, slowing down). These methodological manipulations had an impact on performance, 
lowering significantly the recognition rates. Overall, this research revealed that both the 
perception of change as well as the speed of activation of the different facial muscles involved 
in the production of natural dynamic expressions enhance the recognition of subtle emotions. 
Contrary to Ambadar et al.’s (2005) assumption, Bould, Morris, and Wink (2008) revealed that 
the dynamic advantage may not only be due to an enhancement of the perception of directional 
change (first-last < dynamic) but may also stem from the perception of the temporal progression 
of information (i.e., the progressive activation of the specific muscular movements associated 
with the unfolding of a specific expression). This study, therefore, suggests that the temporal 
information may be more important than what was initially assumed by Ambadar et al. (2005).  
 
Interestingly, a number of other studies have evidenced that the specific temporal 
properties inherent to the unfolding speed (Bould & Morris, 2008; Bould et al., 2008; Kamachi 
et al., 2001) or rise time of an expression (Recio, Schacht, & Sommer, 2013) provide some 
crucial information for its recognition. For instance, Kamachi et al. (2001, Experiment 2) and 
Recio et al. (2013) evidenced that some expressions were more accurately identified when they 
developed rapidly, whereas others (e.g., sadness) were better recognized from slow sequences or 
from their static versions (Recio et al., 2013). In a recent study, Recio and colleagues (2013) 
investigated whether the speed of onset and evolution of an expression had an influence on 
recognition performance by using artificially generated computer-morphs unfolding at three 
different speeds: 200, 500, and 900ms. The results revealed an overall beneficial effect of 
dynamic expressions, particularly for disgust, better recognized in fast and moderate sequences, 
and happiness, being better classified in all three sequences. In contrast, recognition rates for 
sadness were higher in the static condition. The latter finding supports previous evidence 
revealing that this expression is better recognized in slow sequences or static presentations 
(Bould et al., 2008; Kamachi et al., 2001). All other expressions (anger, fear, and surprise) were 
well recognized across all three velocities. Unfolding speeds between 200 and 500ms appear to 
be therefore optimal for the recognition of all expressions, excepting sadness. 
 
Finally, by distorting the temporal direction of an expression unfolding over time (i.e., 
presenting the expression in the random or reverse order), Cunningham and Wallraven (2009a) 
revealed that the mere presence of motion signals did not trigger the dynamic advantage. This 
evidence suggests that human observers are sensitive to the temporal information embedded in 
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the contiguous progression of an expression unfolding over time (but see, Gold et al., 2013) and 
that the dynamic advantage may not only be due to the perception of directional change as 
suggested by Ambadar et al. (2005), but also to the temporal characteristics conveyed by 
naturally unfolding expressions (Bould et al., 2008; Recio et al., 2013).  
 
Clinical and neuropsychological conditions. Dynamic cues not only offer processing benefits 
in suboptimal situations, but also lead to a noticeable improvement in clinical and 
neuropsychological conditions. For instance, previous studies have demonstrated that dynamic 
presentations significantly facilitated expression recognition in depressive and schizophrenic 
patients (e.g., Atkinson et al., 2004; Kan et al., 2004; Schaefer et al., 2010), patients suffering 
from pervasive developmental disorder (Uono, Sato, & Toichi, 2010), children with mental 
retardation (Harwood, Hall, & Shinkfield, 1999), autistic patients (Back, Ropar, & Mitchell, 
2007; Gepner, Deruelle, & Grynfeltt, 2001; Tardif et al., 2007), as well as brain-damaged patients 
(Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 2003; Humphreys, Donnelly, & Riddoch, 1993; Richoz et al., 
2015).  
 
  In an early neuropsychological study, Humphreys, Donnelly, and Riddoch (1993), 
reported the case of an agnosic patient, HJA, with severe lesions to the ventral, occipital, and 
temporal lobes. HJA was considerably impaired when asked to judge identities and expressions 
from still images. In contrast, his recognition performance was within the normal range when 
exposed to a subset of facial expressions (i.e., smiling, frowning, or surprise) depicted as moving 
light-dots. Correspondingly, Adolphs, Tranel, and Damasio (2003) investigated the ability of a 
single case of acquired agnosia, patient B – with multiple and extensive bilateral brain lesions 
– to categorize static faces displaying one of the six basic expressions. The results revealed that 
he was greatly impaired in categorizing all the static expressions, with the exception of 
happiness (Figure 1.28A). When asked to categorize the dynamic expressions executed by an 
experimenter, the patient correctly labelled with maximum accuracy, every emotion excepted 
disgust (Figure 1.28B). As suggested by the authors, this latter impairment may be accounted 
for by his set of lesions, including the insula, a brain structure that has been proven to be 
critical for the recognition of disgust (Calder et al., 2000). Critically, this neuropsychological 
evidence suggests a functional dissociation between static and dynamic face discrimination tasks 
and supports the assumption that different neural substrates underpin the processing of static 
and dynamic stimuli (Duchaine & Yovel, 2015; Pitcher, Duchaine, & Walsh, 2014; Tomlinson 
et al., 2006) (for more details on the different brain regions involved in the processing of static 
and dynamic faces, see section 1.3.4).  
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Figure 1.28. Neuropsychological evidence for a dynamic advantage. Patient B and healthy 
controls’ recognition performance for the static and dynamic expressions of “happy”, “surprise”, 
“afraid”, “anger”, “disgust”, and “sad” (Adolphs et al., 2003). (A) Mean accuracies for the static 
images. (B) Proportion of dynamic expressions correctly labelled by the patient and healthy controls. 
Adapted from Adolphs et al. (2003).  
 
 
Optimal situations. While several studies have revealed a dynamic advantage for the 
recognition of facial expressions in suboptimal situations and clinical conditions, others have 
suggested that the beneficial effects of motion are minimal or non-existent when static 
information is readily available (Fiorentini & Viviani, 2011; Gold et al., 2013, for a summary, 
see Table 1.4) or when the expressions presented are of higher intensity (Bould & Morris, 2008; 
Kamachi et al., 2001, Experiment 2).  
 
For instance, Fiorentini and Viviani (2011) investigated the dynamic advantage 
hypothesis by using linearly morphed graded blends of pairs of dynamic expressions (e.g., anger-
fear, fear-sadness, happiness-disgust) unfolding from a neutral state to the apex. An additional 
set of static stimuli was generated by taking the apex of the dynamic movies. In a two-alternative 
forced-choice task, participants were asked to determine which expression the blended stimulus 
corresponded more to (i.e., which expression was predominant). The results revealed that the 
response accuracy was similar in both conditions, whereas reaction times were shorter in the 
static condition, although most responses in the dynamic condition were given before the 
blended expressions reached their highest state. According to the authors, this latter finding 
may suggest that the temporal information conveyed by dynamic stimuli may compensate for 
their incomplete presentations. 
 
In another study, Gold et al. (2013) relied on a Bayesian integrator, an ideal observer 
model, to measure the amount of information carried by static, dynamic, and shuffled 
(temporally randomized) stimuli over time. Their results revealed that moving faces did not 
facilitate expression recognition when the amount of discriminative information conveyed by 
the expressions was considered. In other words, dynamic stimuli did not offer processing 
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advantages to the observers as compared to static images (Gold et al., 2013, for more details, see 
CHAPTER 2 and CHAPTER 5).  
 
  The non-rigid muscular movements associated with the temporal unfolding of an 
expression provide additional cues that are unavailable from static faces, allowing observers to 
perceive the direction of change and disentangle the ambiguity triggered by insufficient or 
subtle information. In optimal situations and with expressions of high intensity, the visual 
system seems to be powerful enough to efficiently categorize static emotional expressions, 
leaving only little scope for improvement when dynamic movies are shown. However, dynamic 
cues are beneficial only when static information is insufficient or lost, compensating for the 
deleterious consequences of degraded or subtle information. In clinical conditions, suboptimal 
(and sometimes slower) processing takes place and dynamic expressions may force patients to 
shift their attention to different facial features, helping them to constantly reassess and modify 
their original hypothesis as supplementary information is added over the course of time. As a 
consequence, an advantage for dynamic faces is observed in those populations.   
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Table 1.4. Main studies comparing the recognition of static and dynamic expressions. 
Adapted from Alves et al. (2013).  
Study Participants Method Stimuli Main findings 
 
Adolphs et 
al. (2003) 
 
 
Brain damage  
(acquired 
agnosia) 
 
Behavioral 
 
 
36 posed faces (Ekman & Friesen, 
1976b), 6 basic expressions); the 
dynamic expressions were 
performed by an experimenter 
 
 
Dynamic > Static  
(with the exception of disgust) 
 
Ambadar et 
al. (2005) 
 
Healthy 
participants 
Behavioral 
 
6 basic expressions in their subtle 
form; expressions were taken from 
the Cohn-Kanade facial expression 
database (Kanade, Cohn, & Tian, 
2000) 
 
Dynamic > Static  
(the important role of motion in 
the perception of change) 
 
 
Biele and 
Grabowska 
(2006) 
 
Healthy 
participants  
Behavioral 
 
Anger and happiness, 4 posed faces 
from the Montreal set of facial 
expression of emotion (Beaupré & 
Hess, 2005) 
Dynamic > Static  
(higher intensity ratings for 
dynamic vs. static expressions 
and anger vs. happy 
expressions) 
 
Fiorentini 
and Viviani 
(2011) 
 
Healthy 
participants  
Behavioral/ 
Threshold 
model 
 
6 basic expressions from a database 
of stimuli created by the authors 
Dynamic = Static  
 
Gold et al. 
(2013) 
Healthy 
participants 
Behavioral/Ideal 
observer 
approach 
 
6 basic expressions, 48 posed faces; 
database of stimuli created by Gold 
et al. (2013) 
 
Dynamic = Static  
(for efficiency and thresholds) 
 
Humphreys 
et al. (1993) 
 
Brain damage 
(visual object 
agnosia) 
 
Behavioral 
 
Static condition: 30 posed faces 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1976b) 
displaying the expressions of 
happiness, worried and angry.  
Dynamic condition: moving light-
dots displaying the expressions of 
frowning, smiling and surprise 
 
Dynamic > Static  
 
Kamachi et 
al. (2001) 
 
Healthy 
participants  
Behavioral 
 
Morphed expressions (7 different 
expressions) from the ATR face 
database (Kamachi et al., 2001) 
Dynamic ≠ Static (influence of 
the unfolding speed on 
expression recognition. 
Happiness and surprise were 
better recognized with dynamic 
stimuli while sadness was 
better recognized from slow 
sequences or static images).  
 
Kätsyri et 
al. (2008) 
 
Asperger 
Syndrome 
 
Behavioral  16 posed faces, 4 expressions 
(anger, disgust, fear, happiness) 
from a database created by 
(Kätsyri, 2006) 
 
Dynamic = Static  
 
Krendl & 
Ambady 
(2010) 
 
Elderly people Behavioral Static condition: 4 expressions 
(happiness, sadness, anger, fear) 
Dynamic condition: 2 s video-clips 
of positive/negative dominant 
expressions 
 
Dynamic > Static  
Recio et al. 
(2011) 
 
Healthy 
participants  
Behavioral/EEG 50 posed faces, neutral, anger and 
happiness 
Dynamic > Static  
(dynamic vs. static expressions 
were recognized faster and 
more accurately)  
 
Richoz et 
al. (2015) 
Brain damage 
(acquired 
prosopagnosia) 
Behavioral  Static and dynamic reconstructed 
mental models of the six basic 
expressions of the prosopagnosic 
patient (Yu, Garrod, & Schyns, 
2012) 
 
Dynamic > Static  
(for all the expressions with the 
exception of fear)  
 
Uono et al. 
(2010) 
 
Pervasive 
Development 
Disorder 
 
Behavioral 
 
Neutral, fearful and happy faces 
from Ekman and Friesen (1976)  
standard set of facial expressions  
 
Dynamic > Static  
(dynamic expressions were 
perceived as being more intense 
that static images).  
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1.3 FACE PROCESSING IN THE BRAIN 
In the last section, I gave an overview of some aspects of facial expressions of emotion, the way 
we perceive them throughout lifespan, and whether the dynamic properties of human faces 
offer significant processing advantages for their recognition. Here onwards, I will present 
electrophysiological, neuropsychological, and functional neuroimaging studies elucidating the 
neural bases of human face processing. I will also describe some of the most influential models 
of face processing that have guided more than two decades of research and discuss recent work 
(Duchaine & Yovel, 2015; Rossion, 2015), suggesting modifications to these prominent models 
in light of more recent findings.  
1.3.1 A distributed neural network  
Human face processing is an extremely complex ability that involves a vast number of cortical 
regions in the brain. Electrophysiological studies in monkeys as well as neuropsychological 
reports from brain-damaged patients have provided critical knowledge and important insights 
into the distributed neural network involved in face perception.  
 
Electrophysiological and fMRI studies in non-human primates. In 1969, pioneering work 
based on single-cell recordings have evidenced face-selective neurons in the inferior temporal 
visual cortex (IT cortex) of rhesus macaques (Gross, Bender, & Rocha-Miranda, 1969). 
Commonly known as IT cells, these neurons, displaying stronger responses to faces than to any 
other objects, have been subsequently identified in many other studies providing compelling 
evidence in support of the existence of face-selective areas in the non-human primate brain 
(Baylis, Rolls, & Leonard, 1987; Desimone et al., 1984; Gross, Rocha-Miranda, & Bender, 1972; 
Perrett, Rolls, & Caan, 1982; Rolls, 1984). Coupling optical imaging (for more details on this 
technique, see Box 1) with single-unit recordings, Wang et al. (1996) further revealed columnar 
organization and regional clustering of these face-selective IT cells in the infero-temporal cortex 
of monkeys. In addition, findings from fMRI studies have evidenced three highly-selective face-
patches in the ventral prefrontal cortex of macaque monkeys (Tsao et al., 2008b), with a face-
selective cluster in the orbito-frontal cortex being particularly tuned to emotional faces as 
compared to non-face objects (Figure 1.29). Other scattered clusters with proportions of face-
selective neurons varying between 20 and 70% have been reported in the upper and lower banks 
of the superior temporal sulcus (STS) of monkey brains (Bell et al., 2011; Tsao et al., 2006), 
with the largest face-selective patch containing up to 97% face-selective neurons (Tsao et al., 
2006). However, although face-selective clusters have been described in the non-human primate 
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Figure 1.29. Three face-selective patches in the ventral prefrontal and temporal cortex of 
macaque monkeys. Left: fMRI findings evidenced three face-selective clusters in the ventral 
prefrontal cortex of four macaque monkeys (Tsao et al., 2008b). Reprinted from Backer (2008). Right: 
(A) Monkey faces displaying either neutral or expressive faces were presented to the macaques. (B) 
Duration of signal change to objects (dark gray); expressive (light gray) or neutral faces (medium 
gray) in the PO (Prefrontal Orbital Cortex), PL (Prefrontal Lateral Cortex), and PA (Prefrontal 
Arcuate) of macaque monkeys. Stronger responses to expressive than to neutral faces were observed 
in all three face-selective patches, with a highly significant difference observed in the PO. Adapted 
from Tsao, Schweers, Moeller, and Freiwald (2008b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.30. A comparison of face-selective clusters in macaque and human brains. Left: (A 
and B) Face-selective patches in two macaques. (C) A lateral view presenting both hemispheres of 
the macaque brain. Center: (A and B) Face-selective areas in the left- and right-sided temporal lobes 
of two human brains. (C) A ventral view presenting both hemispheres of the human brain. Right: 
Pre-frontal face-selective regions were activated bilaterally in the macaque brain (M4, top) while a 
strong right-hemispheric dominance was observed in human brains (S8, S1, S10). Adapted from 
Tsao, Moeller, and Freiwald (2008a).  
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brain, their correspondences to human face-selective areas remain unclear (Figure 1.30) 
(Rossion, 2015; Tsao, Moeller, & Freiwald, 2008a; Yovel & Freiwald, 2013). According to 
Duchaine and Yovel (2015) future research identifying homologies between face-selective 
patches in macaques (i.e., with single cell-recordings) and human face-selective regions are 
needed in order to better understand the neural basis of face perception. The extent to which 
single-cell findings in monkeys are informative for the understanding of human face processing 
remains however debatable.  
 
Prosopagnosia. In human brains, one of the most striking evidence that some cortical areas 
are selectively involved in face perception has been demonstrated by prosopagnosic patients. 
These patients suffer from an inability to recognize familiar faces, despite a relatively preserved 
ability to identify other objects, normal intellectual functioning, and no other perceptual 
impairments (e.g., Farah, 1990; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000; Rossion et al., 2003; Sergent 
& Signoret, 1992). 
 
Although the first clinical observations had already been reported during the 19th 
century (Quaglino, 1867; Wigan, 1844), the term Prosopagnosia, describing this unique clinical 
condition, was introduced by Bodamer in 1947 (Bodamer, 1947). This face deficit is a very rare 
and spectacular condition that can be found in less than 1% of the clinical conditions following 
brain damages (Sergent & Villemure, 1989). Despite its rarity, acquired prosopagnosia has 
attracted great attention in the neuropsychological literature, and an impressive body of work 
has been dedicated to its understanding (Bukach et al., 2006; Bukach et al., 2008; Busigny et 
al., 2010a; 2010b; Busigny & Rossion, 2010; Caldara et al., 2005; Orban de Xivry et al., 2008; 
Ramon, Busigny, & Rossion, 2010; Rossion et al., 2003). Prosopagnosic patients are severely 
impaired in recognizing familiar faces, including faces of relatives, friends, famous people, or 
even their own (Damasio, 1985), despite no other obvious memory or visual deficits and 
unimpaired abilities to discriminate faces from non-face objects (for some case reports, see Box 
7). This spectacular disorder is usually caused by bilateral lesions in the occipito-temporal areas 
(e.g., Damasio, Damasio, & Van Hoesen, 1982; Farah, 1990; Landis et al., 1988; Sergent & 
Signoret, 1992), although unilateral lesions in the right hemisphere are sufficient to trigger the 
syndrome (Figure 1.31) (Landis et al., 1988; Sergent & Signoret, 1992).  
 
The clinical and anatomical conditions of prosopagnosic patients offer new and 
interesting insights into the normal functioning of human face processing. For example, the 
occurrence of a double dissociation between the ability to recognize familiar and unfamiliar 
faces (e.g., Malone et al., 1982) as well as the neurological segregation between face recognition 
and lip reading (Campbell, Landis, & Regard, 1986) clarify the sub-functions and independence 
of key areas within the face processing architecture. 
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Figure 1.31. Five single-cases of acquired prosopagnosia, LR, NS, GG, GD, and PS and their 
corresponding brain lesions. Following a car accident, LR suffers from lesions to the inferior and 
anterior right temporal lobe (Bukach et al., 2006). While on his bicycle, NS got hit by a car leaving 
him with extensive lesions in the occipito-temporal junction bilaterally (Delvenne et al., 2004). GG 
suffers from right unilateral damage to the occipital lobe, fusiform, and para-hippocampal gyrus as 
a consequence of a cerebral vascular accident (Busigny et al., 2010b). GD developed unilateral left 
prosopo-metamorphopsia following the birth of her child. This clinical condition leads to severe 
distortions of the left-half of previously seen or well-known faces (Trojano et al., 2009). PS 
underwent a closed-head injury leading to multiple hemorrhages in the bilateral occipito-temporal 
areas (for a case description, see Box 7) (Rossion et al., 2003). Reprinted from Rossion (2015).  
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Box 7 – Three Cases of Acquired Prosopagnosia – Case Descriptions 
GG. GG is a right-handed retired engineer who suffered from an ischemic infarct in 2002, 
leading to right-hemispheric damages in the occipital lobe, fusiform, and parahippocampal gyrus 
(Figure 1.32A, Box 8). Following his lesions, GG had difficulties in recognizing previously seen 
familiar faces (e.g., neighbors, friends, colleagues), famous faces (e.g., actors, athletes), and 
suffered also from left lateral homonymous hemianospia and topographical disorientation. His 
neuropsychological assessment revealed no perceptual deficits. His ability to recognize objects 
was also preserved, even when holistic-processing or fine-grained analyses were required 
(Busigny et al., 2010b).  
 
NS. NS got hit by a car in 1991 while cycling, causing major lesions in parietal, temporal, and 
occipital areas in the left hemisphere and temporo-occipital areas in the right hemisphere (Figure 
1.32B). After 23 days in a coma, NS’s clinical description evidenced severe deficits in recognizing 
faces and objects. In addition, he also displayed transcortical aphasia, severe dyslexia, apraxia, 
anosognosia, and an anterograde amnesia. Neuropsychological examinations two years after his 
accident revealed important improvements thanks to clinical rehabilitation, although most of his 
performance remained under a healthy control average (Pesenti et al., 2000). More specifically, 
NS was within the normal range for primary visual perception tasks and exhibited good 
performance in calculation and number processing. In contrast, he showed marked deficits when 
asked to name objects based on their verbal description and had striking difficulties in face 
recognition tasks (Delvenne et al., 2004; Pesenti et al., 2000).  
 
PS. PS is a pure case of acquired prosopagnosia, who underwent a closed-head injury 25 years 
ago, leaving her with major lesions in the left mid-ventral and right inferior occipital cortex and 
minor damage to the right middle temporal gyrus and left posterior cerebellum (Rossion, 2008; 
for a complete case report, see Rossion et al., 2003; and for an exhaustive anatomical description, 
see Sorger et al., 2007) (Figure 1.32C). She recovered from cognitive deficits following 
psychological rehabilitation and medical treatment, apart from a severe deficit in recognizing 
familiar faces, including her own and those of her family members. Moreover, as revealed by a 
response classification technique (Bubbles) (for more details, see Caldara et al., 2005; Gosselin 
& Schyns, 2001), PS does not use optimal information from the eye region to identify familiar 
faces, but relies instead on the lower part of the face, including the mouth and external contours 
(Caldara et al., 2005). PS’s low-level vision is well preserved with a good visual acuity in both 
eyes, except from a small right paracentral scotoma. She can categorize a face as a face, 
distinguishes faces from other classes of stimuli, and has normal perception and recognition of 
objects (Rossion et al., 2003). However, as a consequence of her lesions, she is not as good as 
controls in categorizing gender (Rossion et al., 2003) and static facial expressions (Richoz et al., 
2015). As reported by neuropsychological assessments, she is severely impaired on the Benton 
Face Matching Test (Benton & Van Allen, 1972) as well as on the Short Recognition Memory 
Test for Faces (Rossion et al., 2003; Warrington, 1984). PS is a very cooperative patient, without 
cognitive impairments or attention deficits. She therefore represents an exemplary case to 
investigate the underlying architecture of normal face processing. The second experimental 
contribution of this thesis aims to investigate her ability to recognize static and dynamic facial 
expressions of emotion (CHAPTER 4). 
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Face-selective brain regions. The first face-selective brain region located in the middle, 
fusiform gyrus and commonly named Fusiform Face Area (FFA), has been identified by fMRI 
in 1997 using a face localizer approach (Kanwisher et al., 1997). Nevertheless, it is worth 
emphasizing that early PET studies had already identified this region at the functional level in 
1992 (Sergent et al., 1992), even if its activations were broader compared to those isolated with 
fMRI. This area, representing a key module for efficient face processing (Grill-Spector, Knouf, 
& Kanwisher, 2004), has been noted to elicit stronger response to faces than houses, hands, or 
scrambled depictions of faces (Kanwisher et al., 1997; McCarthy et al., 1997). Substantial 
evidence has also suggested that this region is involved in the processing of objects of expertise 
(i.e., objects for which one has an extensive expertise) (Bilalic et al., 2011; Gauthier et al., 2000a; 
Gauthier et al., 1999; Grill-Spector et al., 2004). Another region located in the lateral inferior 
occipital gyrus, referred to as the Occipital Face Area (OFA), also represents a key area for the 
processing of face information (Gauthier et al., 2000b; Haxby et al., 1999). As reported by 
neuropsychological evidence, both the right FFA, and the right OFA appear to be necessary for 
normal face processing (Gauthier et al., 2000b; Rossion et al., 2003). Finally, the posterior part 
of the Superior Temporal Sulcus (pSTS) has been further defined as another face-selective brain 
area, playing a crucial role in human face processing (Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Kanwisher et 
al., 1997; Puce et al., 1998). According to Haxby et al. (2000), these core regions are connected 
to an extended system, including the amygdala, the auditory cortex, and the intraparietal sulcus, 
Box 8 – Three Cases of Acquired Prosopagnosia – Lesion Localizations 
A 
 
 
B 
 
C 
 
 
Figure 1.32. Lesion localizations. (A) GG’s MRI images reveal brain damages to the 
occipital lobe, fusiform and parahippocampal gyrus in the right hemisphere. Reprinted 
from Busigny et al. (2010b). (B) NS’s structural MRI showing lesions in the 
occipitotemporal junction. Reprinted from Delvenne et al. (2004). (C) T1-weighted MRI 
based reconstructions of PS’s lesions. Reprinted from Sorger et al. (2007).  
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contributing to the processing of different aspects of faces. As stated by Rossion et al. (2012), 
there is a large inter-individual variability in the localization of face-selective brain regions. In 
fact, single-subject analyses have evidenced numerous face-selective clusters in the inferior 
occipital lobe, fusiform gyrus, and superior temporal sulcus of individual brains (Figure 1.33).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.33. Numerous face-selective clusters in individual brains. Top: Four face-selective 
clusters were identified in the ventral stream of one participant. Bottom left: Two face-selective clusters 
were observed in the inferior occipital lobe of another participant. Bottom right: Three face-selective 
clusters were identified along the left dorsal face-selective pathway of an additional subject. 
Reprinted from Rossion et al. (2012).  
 
 
 
Additional face-selective brain regions have also more recently been evidenced by 
electrophysiological studies in monkeys (Tsao et al., 2008a; 2008b) and fMRI studies using 
dynamic localizers (Fox, Iaria, & Barton, 2009a; Pitcher et al., 2011). As reported by Duchaine 
and Yovel in 2015 (see also, Bernstein & Yovel, 2015), a few of these supplementary areas 
include the Anterior Temporal Lobe (ATL), the anterior Superior Temporal Sulcus (aSTS), and 
the Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG) (Figure 1.34). Another face-selective area in the posterior 
fusiform gyrus (pFus), distinct from the face-selective region located in the middle fusiform 
gyrus, was recently identified by Weiner and Grill-Spector (2012) as well as a region in the 
anterior part of the fusiform gyrus, referred to as the antFus was reported by Rossion et al. 
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(2012) (Figure 1.33). Intracranial stimulation of the latter region in an epileptic patient 
implanted with cerebral electrodes led to distorted face perception as well as face recognition 
impairments (Jonas et al., 2015).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.34. Face-selective brain regions. Left: The dorsal face-selective stream includes the 
posterior part of the Superior Temporal Sulcus Face Area (pSTS-FA), the anterior Superior 
Temporal Sulcus Face Area (aSTS-FA), and the Inferior Frontal Gyrus Face Area (IFG-FA). Right: 
The ventral stream involves the Occipital Face Area (OFA), the Fusiform Face Area (FFA), and the 
Anterior Temporal Lobe Face Area (ATL-FA). Reprinted from Duchaine and Yovel (2015).  
 
 
 
Right-hemisphere dominance. Early lesion studies and positron emission tomography (PET) 
scans on face processing have reported a strong right-hemispheric dominance for face perception 
(e.g., Meadows, 1974; Sergent et al., 1992). These findings were supported by later fMRI studies 
in the field (e.g., Kanwisher et al., 1997; McCarthy et al., 1997; Puce et al., 1996) and by 
behavioral studies that showed human observers being faster when instructed to process faces 
presented in the left visual field (Hilliard, 1973). A significant body of literature on 
prosopagnosia has also evidenced a right-hemisphere superiority for face processing. Although 
lesion locations in prosopagnosic patients vary across individual brains (Figure 1.31), unilateral 
damages to the right-sided occipital and temporal lobes have been extensively observed in single-
case studies (e.g., Barton et al., 2002; Bouvier & Engel, 2004; Busigny et al., 2010b; Rossion, 
2014) with the first reports by Hecaen and Angerlergues dating back to 1962 (Hecaen & 
Angelergues, 1962; in Rossion, 2014). In contrast, unilateral left-hemispheric posterior damages 
were reported in only five prosopagnosic patients. As mentioned by Rossion (2014), as four of 
them were left-handed, atypical left-hemispheric cerebral lateralization could be responsible for 
the face perception deficits observed (see also, Bukowski et al., 2013). In the healthy brain, more 
recent fMRI studies have evidenced face-selective regions in both hemispheres, although the 
right-hemispheric regions have been reported as being more critical for face processing and 
broader compared to the left-hemispheric regions (Bukowski et al., 2013; Rossion, 2014). Event-
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Related Potential (ERP) studies also reported larger early face-sensitive ERPs over the right-
hemisphere as compared to the amplitude observed in the left-hemisphere in response to faces 
(Bentin et al., 1996). In addition, Rangarajan et al. (2014) recently evidenced that electrical 
brain stimulations of the right fusiform gyrus, one of the most critical face-selective area, 
affected face perception, while brain stimulations of the left fusiform gyrus led only to visual 
changes that were unrelated to face perception (Figure 1.35). These findings together provide a 
strong support for a right-hemispheric lateralization of the human face processing network. 
Previous research in macaques have yielded more equivocal results, with some studies reporting 
right-hemisphere dominance for face perception in non-human primate brains (e.g., Hauser, 
1993; Pinsk et al., 2009; Vermeire, Hamilton, & Erdmann, 1998), while others have not (Tsao 
et al., 2003; Tsao et al., 2008a). Interestingly, a very recent study implementing methods from 
optogenetics and pharmacology revealed that macaque monkeys were impaired in 
discriminating face-gender when neural suppression was applied to face-selective areas in both 
the right and the left-hemispheres (Afraz, Boyden, & DiCarlo, 2015).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.35. Electrical brain stimulations applied to face-selective regions in the right- and 
left-sided fusiform gyrus. Stimulation of the fusiform gyrus in the right-hemisphere (R) affected 
face perception (Subject 1, 2, 3), while stimulation of face-selective fusiform regions in the left 
hemisphere (L) only caused visual effects that were not related to faces (Subject 8, 9, 10). Adapted 
from Rangarajan et al. (2014).  
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1.3.2 Prominent models of face processing  
The Bruce and Young model of face recognition. Based on neuropsychological and 
behavioral evidence, Bruce and Young (1986) have formulated a cognitive functional model of 
face processing taking into account identity, expression, and semantic information. As presented 
in Figure 1.36, during the first processing step, a view-centered description of the face is 
generated, which serves as a basis for separating the processing of more advanced features, such 
as expression or facial speech analysis. Face recognition involves the comparison of the 
generated face description with stored face recognition units (FRUs). A match between the 
description generated during the structural encoding and face recognition units results in the 
activation of identity-specific semantic nodes and ultimately, the retrieval of name codes. The 
directed visual processing pathway, for its part, directs attention towards a certain face.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.36. Bruce and Young’s cognitive model of face processing (see text for description). 
Reprinted from Bruce and Young (1986).   
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1.36, this cognitive model involves independent parallel routes 
for the processing of identity and expression. Neuropsychological findings displaying spared 
facial expression recognition abilities in prosopagnosic patients despite severe deficits in 
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recognizing face identities (for a recent review, see Bate & Bennetts, 2015; Bruyer et al., 1983; 
Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1988; Young et al., 1986), cognitive studies (e.g., Young et al., 
1986), as well as studies in non-human primates (e.g., George et al., 1993) were taken as evidence 
for this independence. However, in the light of more recent behavioral (e.g., Campbell & Burke, 
2009; Ganel, Goshen-Gottstein, & Ganel, 2004), computational (Calder et al., 2001a), and 
neuroimaging evidence (e.g., Fox & Barton, 2007; Fox et al., 2009b), some authors have cast 
doubts on the segregation between identity and expression processing, suggesting that the 
division might rather be partial than absolute (Calder, 2011; Calder & Young, 2005; Lander & 
Butcher, 2015, see also CHAPTER 2 and CHAPTER 4 of this thesis).  
 
Because this cognitive model did not propose a comprehensive view of the neural 
substrates involved in face perception, other models based on fMRI and neuropsychological 
evidence were subsequently developed. One of the most prominent neuroanatomical model was 
proposed by Haxby and colleagues in 2000, guiding the research on face processing over the 
last decades.  
 
The distributed neural model proposed by Haxby et al. (2000). The neuroanatomical model 
proposed by Haxby and colleagues in 2000 was motivated by findings from electrophysiological 
research with macaques, neuropsychological reports from brain-damaged patients, and human 
functional neuroimaging studies. According to this model, three core regions, divided into two 
functionally distinct cortical pathways, underlie the processing of different facial aspects (Figure 
1.37). The ventral pathway, subtending the processing of invariant facial aspects, such as 
individual face identity, involves the lateral fusiform gyrus (Fusiform Face Area – FFA), 
whereas the dorsal pathway, preferentially responding to changeable aspects of faces such as 
emotional expression or eye-gaze direction, includes the superior temporal sulcus (STS) (for a 
review see, Calder & Young, 2005; Pessoa, 2008). Critically, the inferior occipital gyrus 
(Occipital Face Area – OFA) is considered to be the entrance to the face processing system for 
both cortical pathways, despite their functional disparities (Figure 1.38).  
 
Haxby et al. (2000) further suggest that an extended face network, comprising areas 
connected to the core regions, is specialized in the processing of distinct facial features. Three 
areas are connected to the STS – the intraparietal sulcus, which directs attentional resources 
towards specific spatial locations according to eye-gaze direction; the amygdala and limbic 
system, involved in the processing of the emotional aspects of faces; and the auditory cortex 
specialized in the processing of prelexical speech (Figure 1.38). An additional area in the 
anterior temporal cortex, connected to the FFA underlies the processing of semantic 
information about a person, such as identity or name (Haxby et al., 2000).  
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Figure 1.37. The three core regions of the face processing system. Single-subject fMRI data 
displaying the inferior occipital gyri, the superior temporal sulcus, and the lateral fusiform gyrus. 
Reprinted from Haxby et al. (2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.38. The influential neural model of human face processing proposed by Haxby and 
colleagues in 2000. The inferior occipital gyri, the superior temporal sulcus, and the lateral 
fusiform gyrus are the three face-selective regions involved in the core system. These areas are 
connected to an extended system. Reprinted from Calder and Young (2005). 
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1.3.3 A critical review of early influential models of face perception  
The dissociation between invariant vs. changeable aspects of faces is less clear than 
initially presumed. According to Haxby et al. (2000), two functionally distinct cortical 
pathways, a ventral and a dorsal stream, are responsible for the processing of invariant and 
changeable aspects of faces. Bernstein and colleagues (2017) very recently challenged this 
prevalent view by conducting an fMRI study in which the neural responses to invariant (gender) 
and changeable (expression) facial features were measured for both static and dynamic stimuli. 
The aim of this study was to assess the nature of the segregation between dorsal and ventral 
pathways in order to establish whether the division between both streams impacts the processing 
of changeable vs. invariant facial aspects or dynamic vs. static face information. The results 
revealed that the pSTS in the dorsal stream exhibited a stronger sensitivity to changeable aspects 
of faces (expression > gender) and face motion (dynamic > static), while the OFA and FFA in 
the ventral stream showed similar responses to static and dynamic information and changeable 
and invariant facial features (Figure 1.39). Critically, these findings do not support the clear-
cut neuroanatomical functional division between invariant and changeable aspects of faces 
suggested by Haxby et al. (2000), as the ventral stream processes information from faces 
regardless of the type of feature extracted (invariant vs. changeable) and their temporal 
properties (static vs. dynamic). 
 
 
Figure 1.39. The processing of invariant vs. changeable aspects of faces in dorsal and ventral 
streams. Dorsal face areas are selectively more sensitive to motion and changeable aspects of faces, 
whereas ventral face areas extract similar information from dynamic and static faces for both 
invariant and changeable facial aspects. Adapted from Bernstein et al. (2017).  
 
 
 
Several routes are connecting early visual areas to face-selective regions. Inconsistent with 
the neural model proposed by Haxby et al. (2000), recent findings have provided evidence 
supporting the idea that several routes connect the primary visual cortex to the core regions 
involved in the face processing network. For instance, by combining thetaburst transcranial 
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magnetic stimulation (TBS) with fMRI, Pitcher and colleagues (2014) recently observed a causal 
engagement of the right inferior occipital gyrus (rOFA) in the processing of static face images, 
whereas the processing of dynamic faces (Pitcher et al., 2014) was supported by the posterior 
superior temporal sulcus (pSTS). Delivering TBS over the rOFA affected the BOLD responses to 
static but not dynamic faces in the pSTS, while TBS disruptions of the pSTS affected the neural 
responses to dynamic but not static faces in the pSTS (Figure 1.40A, Figure 1.41). These findings 
suggest that static and dynamic properties of human faces are processed via distinct cortical 
pathways, originating in the early visual cortex and not in the rOFA, as predicted by Haxby and 
colleagues (2000) (Figure 1.40B). An fMRI study using a diffusion tensor probabilistic tractography 
to identify white matter connections between different face-selective brain regions has recently 
provided further evidence for multiple routes connecting early occipital areas to the core regions 
of the face processing system (Gschwind et al., 2012). The authors revealed that the OFA and FFA 
were tightly connected, with white-matter connections being stronger in the right-hemisphere. 
Conversely, no connections were found between the OFA and pSTS or FFA and pSTS (but see 
Pitcher et al., 2014), implying that the neural computations occurring in the pSTS are distinct 
and functionally independent from those occurring in the FFA and OFA. Similar findings were 
reported in two subsequent studies (Bernstein et al., 2017; Pyles et al., 2013). Finally, 
neuropsychological evidence revealing brain activations in the pSTS or FFA of prosopagnosic 
individuals with lesioned OFA underpins the notion that cortical projections bypassing the 
inferior occipital gyrus directly connect early visual areas to the fusiform face area or the posterior 
section of the superior temporal sulcus (Dalrymple et al., 2011; Sorger et al., 2007; Yang, Susilo, 
& Duchaine, 2015). These latter findings have led Rossion (2008; 2014) to propose a reverse 
OFA/FFA hierarchical framework of the face processing system.  
 
A 
 
B 
 
 
Figure 1.40. Distinct cortical pathways for static and dynamic face information. (A) Pitcher 
et al. (2014) delivered thetaburst transcranial magnetic stimulations (TBS) over the rOFA and rpSTS 
while participants viewed dynamic and static faces and objects. (B) By adopting this virtual lesion 
approach, the authors probed the existence of a direct pathway connecting the early visual areas to 
the pSTS. Adapted from Pitcher et al. (2014).
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Figure 1.41. The size of the TBS disruption effect in the right pSTS, rOFA and rFFA for 
static and dynamic faces and objects. A positive value indicates a reduction in the signal caused 
by the TBS stimulation. (A) TBS applied over the right rOFA reduced the response to static but not 
dynamic faces in the right pSTS, while TBS applied over the right pSTS reduced the response to 
dynamic but not static faces in this region (asterisks indicate significant differences). (B) TBS applied 
over the rOFA reduced the response to static, but not dynamic faces in the rOFA. (C) Delivering 
TBS over the rOFA reduced the response to static, but not dynamic faces in the rFFA. (diamonds 
indicate a significant difference after Bonferroni adjustment). Delivering TBS over the right pSTS, 
the rOFA and rFFA did not affect neural responses to dynamic and static objects. Reprinted from 
Pitcher et al. (2014).  
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Rossion’s reverse hierarchical view of face perception. According to the hierarchical view 
proposed by Haxby and colleagues (2000), the OFA is the first processing locus in the face 
cortical network, transmitting visual inputs to the FFA and pSTS, two areas that perform more 
advanced processes associated with invariant and changeable aspects of faces. Observations from 
brain-damaged patients, however, have called into question this serial staged hierarchy, by 
showing activations of the FFA or pSTS, despite lesions to the inferior occipital gyrus (OFA) 
(Figure 1.42). For instance, the acquired prosopagnosic patient PS with extensive brain lesions 
to the right inferior occipital cortex, encompassing the rOFA, exhibits face-selective activations 
in the rFFA and right pSTS comparable to those observed in controls (Rossion et al., 2003; 
Sorger et al., 2007). Further observations from two other brain-damaged patients revealed that 
lesions to the rOFA and rFFA did not prevent face-selectivity in the ipsilateral pSTS (Dalrymple 
et al., 2011; see also Yang et al., 2015). Moreover, the findings from patient DF suffering from 
visual form agnosia revealed that intact activations of the FFA and pSTS were not due to the 
transmission of visual inputs from the OFA contralateral to the lesion (i.e., the intact lOFA 
forwarding visual information to the rFFA). In fact, in patient DF, neuroimaging findings 
provided evidence that lesions in the lateral occipital regions enclosing both the rOFA and 
lOFA (Goodale & Milner, 1992) did not prevent bilateral activations of the FFA and pSTS 
(Milner & Goodale, 2008; Steeves et al., 2006). All these findings suggest that cortical routes 
independent from the OFA are connecting early visual areas to the FFA, findings that are in 
line with the results from diffusion tensor imaging studies (DTI, Kim et al., 2006). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.42. A schematic representation of lesioned (r) and preserved ( ) face-selective brain 
regions in four patients. Despite lesioned rOFA, PS (Sorger et al., 2007), R-OIT1, and B-OT/AT1 
(Dalrymple et al., 2011) exhibit normal activations of the rFFA (PS) and right pSTS (PS, R-OIT1, 
B-OT/AT1). In DF, damage to the rOFA and lOFA does not prevent bilateral activation of the FFA 
and pSTS (Steeves et al., 2006). Adapted from Duchaine and Yovel (2015).
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Figure 1.43. The reverse hierarchical view of face perception proposed by Rossion (2008; 
2014). After an initial processing in the early visual cortex, visual information is transmitted to the 
middle fusiform gyrus (MFG) where face-selectivity emerges in the FFA if the transmitted 
information corresponds to the representation of a face. The FFA processes faces as wholes, before 
transmitting the visual information to the more posteriorly located inferior occipital gyrus, where 
the OFA computes finer-grained analyses of the individual facial features. The individual faces are 
finally holistically integrated in the FFA. Reprinted from Rossion (2008).  
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Given these observations, Rossion (2008) reformulated the neuro-functional 
organization of the face processing network, proposing a reverse OFA/FFA hierarchical view of 
human face perception. According to this model, visual information is initially processed in the 
early visual cortex before being transmitted to the middle fusiform gyrus (MFG) via two 
pathways – the first one bypassing the OFA; the second one traversing it (Figure 1.43). In the 
MFG, a face is represented as a whole (holistic face detection), activating the face selectivity of 
this region. In contrast to the neural model proposed by Haxby et al. (2000), visual information 
can reach the FFA independently of the OFA, a prediction that can explain intact activation of 
the FFA despite lesioned ipsilateral (Dalrymple et al., 2011; Rossion et al., 2003; Sorger et al., 
2007) or bilateral OFA (Steeves et al., 2006). The global face representation generated in the 
MFG is then sharpened through re-entrant connections between the MFG (FFA) and IOG 
(OFA), triggering additionally the face preferential neural activation in this lower-level visual 
region (Rossion, 2008). As OFA face-cells have smaller receptive fields than FFA neurons, they 
are tuned to perform fine-grained visual analysis of distinct facial features, such as the eyes, 
nose, and mouth (Rossion, 2008). The refined representations are then sent back to the FFA, 
where a given face is finally holistically represented (individual face percept). 
 
This reverse hierarchical neurofunctional model of face processing is based on fMRI 
evidence revealing that the rOFA is not activated by poorly-defined faces, such as two-tone 
Mooney faces or Arcimboldo’s paintings (Figure 1.44). Because their features are ambiguous 
and difficult to identify individually, Mooney faces or Arcimboldo face-like paintings are 
perceived as faces only when integrated holistically. Interestingly however, these stimuli activate 
the rFFA, even when the face-selectivity in the rOFA is missing, supporting the view that the 
FFA subserves the categorization of faces as perceptual wholes, while the OFA underlies the 
processing of their individual features (Figure 1.44) (Rossion et al., 2011). Consistent with these 
observations, an event-related fMRI study further revealed that coarsely defined faces (low 
spatial frequency (LSF) faces) selectively activated the rFFA, but not the rOFA (Goffaux et al., 
2011). In addition, in an fMRI study investigating the timing of activity in the rFFA and rOFA, 
Jiang and colleagues (2011) observed the earliest face-selective responses in the rFFA and not 
in the rOFA. As shown in Figure 1.45, differential activation to faces and cars emerged earlier 
in the rFFA as compared to the rOFA, where face-selectivity appeared significantly later. 
Finally, another striking evidence from the neuropsychological literature supporting this 
reverse hierarchical view comes with the patient, NS. This patient suffers from prosopagnosia 
following lesions to face-selective fusiform regions encompassing the rFFA. Despite being 
preserved, the rOFA of this patient does not exhibit face-selective neural activation in response 
to faces (Delvenne et al., 2004; Rossion, 2008).  
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Figure 1.44. Face-selective neural activation in the rOFA and rFFA to upright and inverted 
Monney faces and Arcimboldo face-like paintings. Left: (A) Upright and (B) inverted Mooney 
faces. (C) Upright and (D) inverted Arcimboldo’s paintings. (E) Individual parts of the Mooney faces 
are particularly ambiguous and difficult to identify. Right: (A) Differential neural activation was 
observed in the rFFA to upright compared to inverted Mooney faces as indicated by the asterisk. No 
differential activation for upright and inverted Mooney faces was observed in the rOFA. The same 
pattern of result was observed for Arcimboldo’s paintings. Reprinted from Rossion et al. (2011).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.45. Differential neural activation to faces and cars in the rFFA and rOFA. Face-
selectivity emerged earlier in the rFFA compared to the more posteriorly located rOFA. The asterisks 
indicate the onset time at which the face-selective brain regions significantly differ in their 
sensitivity to faces and cars. Reprinted from Jiang et al. (2011).  
 
1.3 FACE PROCESSING IN THE BRAIN 
 
 
 
 
 72 
Duchaine and Yovel’s revised neural framework for face perception. In a similar way that 
is also based on new findings regarding face-selective areas and the discovery of additional face-
selective regions, Duchaine and Yovel (2015) recently proposed a revised neural framework of 
the face processing system. This revised framework suggests that the face processing network 
depends on two distinct pathways, a ventral stream, responding preferentially to form 
information, and a dorsal stream, mainly involved in the processing of dynamic and form 
information.  
 
This framework is primarily based on the aforementioned evidence suggesting that 
several routes project from early visual cortex into the face processing system. Based on 
neuropsychological evidence (e.g., Delvenne et al., 2004; Rossion, 2008; 2014), diffusion tensor 
imaging findings (Gschwind et al., 2012; Pyles et al., 2013), and functional connectivity studies 
(Avidan et al., 2014), the authors suggest that the rOFA is not the only gateway to the face 
processing network.  
 
Second, this framework is also inspired by findings from TMS and combined EEG–
fMRI studies, providing insights into the timing of neural activity in face-selective regions (e.g., 
Pitcher, 2014; Pitcher et al., 2008; Pitcher et al., 2012; Pitcher et al., 2007; Sadeh et al., 2010). 
In a recent study, double-pulse TMS (dTMS) was delivered over the rOFA and over the pSTS 
during a facial expression recognition task, with latencies varying up to 210ms after the stimulus 
presentation. Delivering dTMS over the pSTS impaired expression recognition over a longer 
period (60 to 140ms) than disrupting the rOFA (60-100ms) (Pitcher, 2014). Importantly, dTMS 
delivered at the latencies of 60 to 100ms disrupted recognition performance in both face-
selective regions (Figure 1.46). These findings suggest that the processing of face information in 
the rOFA and pSTS is not as hierarchized as initially presumed (Haxby et al., 2000), but also 
occurs simultaneously. These findings also support the perspective that both face-selective 
regions receive visual inputs from functionally distinct cortical pathways directly connecting 
them to the early visual cortex. 
 
An additional modification to the Haxby model proposed by Duchaine and Yovel (2015) 
concerns the role played by the FFA in the face processing system. According to Haxby and 
colleagues (2000), the FFA preferentially responds to invariant aspects of faces, such as 
individual identity or gender, while the pSTS is involved in the processing of changeable aspects 
of faces, such as emotional expressions or lip movements. However, recent findings have 
suggested that the FFA may also be involved in the processing of changeable aspects of faces. 
As mentioned above, Bernstein et al. (2017), for instance, have demonstrated similar sensitivity 
of the OFA and FFA to both changeable and invariant aspects of faces, while the 
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Figure 1.46. Facial expression recognition occurs simultaneously in the rOFA and pSTS as 
evidenced by a TMS study (Pitcher, 2014). (A) Stimulation sites (rOFA and pSTS) in one 
participant. (B) Disruption of the rOFA impaired recognition performance at the latencies of 60–
100ms, while stimulation of the pSTS impaired recognition performance at both the latencies of 60–
100ms and 100–140ms as compared to a control site (vertex). Adapted from Pitcher (2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.47. The FFA is involved in the processing of emotional faces: Evidence from an 
fMRI adaption study. Left: Coronal slices of the right fusiform face area (rFFA) of three participants. 
Right: Perception-based analysis revealed release from adaptation in the rFFA when observers noticed 
changes in the expression or identity of the faces presented. Adapted from Fox et al. (2009a).  
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pSTS was only sensitive to changeable aspects of faces. Additionally, an earlier fMRI-based 
study by Ganel et al. (2005) revealed an increased activation in the FFA when observers were 
asked to judge facial expressions. Moreover, these findings were observed even when 
participants were asked to explicitly direct their attention to the identity of the presented faces. 
Later, fMRI adaptation studies (fMRIa) also challenged the idea of a distinct separation between 
the processing of changeable and invariant aspects of faces by revealing that changes in facial 
expressions led to a release from adaptation in the FFA (Figure 1.47). These findings imply a 
sensitivity of this face-selective area for the processing of emotional faces and do not support 
anatomic division of emotion and identity processing (Cohen-Kadosh et al., 2010; Fox et al., 
2009b; Xu & Biederman, 2010).  
 
  Finally, Duchaine and Yovel’s revised framework also considers recent findings 
showing larger activation to dynamic faces as compared to static ones in the pSTS, the aSTS 
and IFG (Bernstein et al., 2017; Fox et al., 2009a; Pitcher et al., 2011) 1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.48. The revised neural framework of the face processing system proposed by 
Duchaine and Yovel (2015). The model involves the core areas suggested by Haxby et al. (2000), 
the OFA, pSTS, and FFA, connected with the aSTS, IFG, and ATL. This framework suggests that 
face processing relies on two separate streams, a ventral stream involving the OFA, FFA, and ATL 
and responding preferentially to form information; and a dorsal stream, involving the pSTS, aSTS, 
and IFG specifically tuned to the processing of dynamic information. Reprinted from Duchaine and 
Yovel (2015).  
 
 
 
1Because this thesis investigates the processing of static and dynamic faces, these recent findings revealing increased 
responses to dynamic faces as compared to static ones in dorsal face-selective brain areas will be approached in more 
details in the next section.  
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As shown in Figure l.48, the revised framework proposed by Duchaine and Yovel (2015) 
comprises the three core regions suggested by Haxby et al. (2000), the OFA, the FFA, and the 
pSTS, connected with the recently discovered additional face-selective areas, the aSTS, the IFG, 
and the ATL. Based on evidence from TMS (Pitcher et al., 2014), fMRI (Fox et al., 2009a; 
Pitcher et al., 2011), and connectivity studies (Gschwind et al., 2012; Pyles et al., 2013), this 
framework is divided into two distinct, but functionally connected, cortical pathways. 
 
As described by Duchaine and Yovel (2015), the ventral pathway, which involves the 
OFA, FFA, and ATL, preferentially responds to invariant form information, such as age, gender, 
or identity and also performs the processing of emotional expressions. Located in the most 
posterior part of the ventral area, the OFA face-selective cells, characterized by their very small 
receptive fields (Hemond, Kanwisher, & De Beeck, 2007; Rossion, 2008, 2015), process 
individual face parts in a view-specific manner. Importantly, although the OFA is linked to the 
pSTS, little is known regarding the nature of this functional connection (Duchaine & Yovel, 
2015; see also, Pitcher et al., 2014; Pitcher et al., 2017). Positioned at a higher stage of the 
hierarchy, the FFA receives visual inputs from both the OFA and early visual areas (Rossion, 
2008; 2014; 2015) and accomplishes the processing of face symmetry (e.g., Axelrod & Yovel, 
2012; Caldara & Seghier, 2009; Caldara et al., 2006). As the FFA is involved in the processing 
of symmetry and form information, it also contributes to the processing of emotional faces 
(Cohen-Kadosh et al., 2010; Ganel et al., 2005; Xu & Biederman, 2010). Finally, the anterior 
temporal lobe face area (ATL), the face-selective area located in the most anterior part of the 
ventral pathway, receives visual inputs from both the OFA and FFA (Gschwind et al., 2012; 
Pyles et al., 2013). This area is considered to play a central role in the processing of invariant 
aspects of faces, such as individual identity (Anzellotti, Fairhall, & Caramazza, 2013; Yang et 
al., 2015) and the processing of semantic information. As mentioned by Duchaine and Yovel 
(2015), this region most probably corresponds to the neuroanatomical locus of the stored face 
recognition units proposed by Bruce and Young (1986) in their cognitive model of face 
processing.  
 
The dorsal pathway, which involves the pSTS, the aSTS, and the IFG, contributes to 
the processing of form and dynamic information. As revealed in recent studies, this dorsal 
pathway elicits stronger responses to dynamic faces when compared to static ones (e.g., Bernstein 
et al., 2017; Fox et al., 2009a; Pitcher et al., 2011, see also section 1.3.4), which is consistent 
with the notion that it contributes to the processing of changeable aspects of faces, such as 
emotional expressions, lip movements, or eye-gaze direction. In an earlier study, O’Toole et al. 
(2002) also suggested that this dorsally-based stream is involved in the processing of facial 
identity and the recognition of familiar faces when dynamic cues are provided (see also, Lander 
& Butcher, 2015; O'Toole & Roark, 2010). In addition, Arsalidou et al. (2011) reported increased 
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sensitivity of the superior temporal sulcis to dynamic as compared to static emotional faces (see 
also, LaBar et al., 2003), an observation that is consistent with findings reported by a later study 
revealing an involvement of the right pSTS in the integration of social signals conveyed by both 
faces and voices (Watson et al., 2014; see also, Hasan et al., 2016; Yovel & O’Toole, 2016). 
Altogether, these results suggest that the dorsal pathway plays a dedicated role in the processing 
and interpretation of socially and emotionally relevant stimuli.  
1.3.4 The processing of static and dynamic faces 
Over the course of social interactions, our visual system is steadily stimulated by dynamic cues, 
yet most studies investigating face processing have relied on static images and only little 
evidence has been accumulated on the processing of dynamic faces. However, more recently, 
fMRI studies have addressed the question as to whether differential neuroanatomical bases 
underlie the processing of static and dynamic faces (Fox et al., 2009a; Pitcher et al., 2011; 
Pitcher et al., 2014). For instance, Pitcher et al. (2011) compared neural activation to static and 
dynamic stimuli in different face-selective regions including the rFFA, rOFA, and pSTS. They 
used a dynamic localizer and two independent sets of data, the first one to localize the face-
selective brain regions and the second one to systematically examine whether static and dynamic 
faces, bodies, scenes, and objects differentially affect neural responses in these face-selective 
regions. While the neural response to static and dynamic stimuli did not differ in the rOFA 
and rFFA, the activation elicited by the pSTS to dynamic faces was nearly three times stronger 
than that to static faces. Moreover, as shown in Figure 1.49, the aSTS, a face-selective region 
located in the anterior superior temporal sulcus responded only to dynamic faces. It is worth 
noting that the activation to dynamic faces in the pSTS and aSTS was larger than the activation 
observed to moving bodies or objects, implying that these two regions are not only tuned to 
process motion, but particularly driven by dynamic face information (Pitcher et al., 2011).  
 
  In another study, Fox, Iaria, and Barton (2009a) investigated whether the presentation 
of dynamic stimuli was more effective in localizing face-selective brain areas. To this aim, the 
authors compared two functional localizers, the first one involving dynamic movies of faces and 
objects, the second one their static versions. Regions within the core face processing system 
(OFA, FFA, STS) were better identified with the functional localizer involving dynamic stimuli 
– the localization efficiency reaching up to 98%, while only 72% of the regions of interest were 
identified with the static localizer. Furthermore, their findings also revealed that the temporal 
properties of the stimuli influenced the cluster size at which the highest face-selectivity 
occurred. The dynamic localizer facilitated the localization of larger face-selective clusters, twice 
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as large in the rFFA and rOFA, nearly nine times larger in the right pSTS (Figure 1.50). Finally, 
neural responses to videos of moving faces or static photographs of faces were not different in 
the rOFA and rFFA – decreasing even when dynamic objects were presented (Figure 1.51). In 
contrast, the pSTS elicited neural responses that were nearly two times larger to dynamic as 
compared to static faces, findings that are consistent with the results reported by Pitcher et al. 
(2011). This study offers a novel insight into the use of dynamic stimuli in functional localizers, 
implying that they provide a sensitive, selective, and consistent approach to identify face-
selective brain regions.  
 
Converging evidence also suggests that dynamic emotional faces elicit larger activations 
in brain areas crucial for the processing of social and emotional information (e.g., Arsalidou et 
al., 2011; Liang et al., 2017). In contrast to static emotional faces, dynamic faces have been 
associated with greater responses in the fusiform gyrus (e.g., Kessler et al., 2011; Sato et al., 
2004; Trautmann et al., 2013; Trautmann, Fehr, & Herrmann, 2009), the superior temporal 
sulcus (e.g., Kessler et al., 2011; Kilts et al., 2003; Trautmann et al., 2009), the inferior frontal 
gyrus (e.g., Trautmann et al., 2009), as well as in the visual motion area, V5, in the occipito-
temporal lobe (Johnston et al., 2013; Kilts et al., 2003; Sato et al., 2004) (Table 1.5). Increased 
activity to dynamic information in the superior temporal sulcus and in the visual motion area 
supports the results of previous studies presenting an involvement of these regions in the 
processing of biological motion (Peelen, Wiggett, & Downing, 2006; Puce & Perrett, 2003; 
Saygin, 2007).  
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Figure 1.49. Percentage of signal change to dynamic and static faces, bodies, scenes, objects 
and scrambled faces in the rFFA, rOFA, right pSTS and right aSTS. While the rFFA and rOFA 
exhibited only a slight increase to dynamic as compared to static faces, the response in the pSTS to 
dynamic faces was nearly three times as strong as that to static faces. In a similar way, the aSTS 
exhibited significantly stronger response to dynamic as compared to static faces. Reprinted from 
Pitcher et al. (2011).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.50. Cluster size with static and dynamic localizers. The presentation of dynamic images 
(gray bars) resulted in the activation of larger clusters in face-selective brain regions as compared to 
the presentation of static images (white bars). Adapted from Fox et al. (2009a). 
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Figure 1.51. Static and dynamic functional localizers. Time course of signal intensity changes 
within the rOFA, rFFA, and right pSTS to faces (black circles) and objects (white circles) presented 
in their static (left column) and dynamic (right column) versions. Reprinted from Fox et al. (2009a).  
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Table 1.5. Neuroimaging studies comparing the processing of static and dynamic facial 
expressions. Adapted from Alves (2013).  
Study Participants Brain recording 
technique 
Main findings 
 
Arsalidou et al. 
(2011) 
 
 
24 healthy 
participants 
 
 
Functional 
neuroimaging (fMRI) 
 
 
Increased neural activity to dynamic expressions was 
observed in brain regions involved in the processing of 
emotional and social signals (STS, middle temporal gyri, 
and amygdala).  
 
Johnston et al. 
(2013)  
28 healthy 
participants 
fMRI Expression recognition was associated with a widespread 
network of regions in the occipito-temporal, parietal, and 
frontal cortex for both static and dynamic stimuli. 
Moreover, portions of the inferior frontal gyrus were more 
activated during the processing of static as compared to 
dynamic expressions suggesting a stronger involvement of 
this brain region in the processing of static face information.  
 
Kessler et al. 
(2011) 
 
30 healthy 
participants  
 
fMRI 
 
Regardless of the emotion presented, dynamic faces 
selectively activated the superior temporal sulcus, visual 
area V5, the fusiform gyrus, the thalamus, and other brain 
regions in frontal and parietal areas. Static expressions of 
happiness selectively elicited greater activity in the medial 
prefrontal cortex.  
 
Kilts et al. (2003) 
 
13 healthy 
participants 
 
Positron emission 
tomography (PET) 
 
Differential neural activation to dynamic as compared to 
static faces was observed in the visual area V5, the STS, the 
periamygdaloid cortex, and the cerebellum for the 
expression of anger. For the expression of happiness, 
dynamic faces evoked increased activation in the visual area 
V5, in the cuneus, lingual, middle, and temporal cortical 
regions.  
 
LaBar et al. 
(2003) 
12 healthy 
participants 
fMRI Stronger activation was observed in the fusiform gyrus, the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the superior temporal 
sulcus for dynamic vs. static expressions.  
 
Liang et al. (2017) 20 healthy 
participants 
Neuroimaging with 
multi-voxel pattern 
analysis (MVPA) 
Compared to static expressions, dynamic stimuli elicited 
higher neural activation in both face-selective and motion-
selective areas. 
 
Trautmann et al. 
(2013) 
19 
undergraduate 
students 
Combined fMRI and 
EEG  
The processing of static emotional expressions elicited 
higher neural activation in the fusiform gyrus for anger and 
disgust as compared to neutral. Dynamic stimuli activated a 
more widespread of regions in posterior brain regions and 
in anterior brain areas.  
 
Trautmann et al. 
(2009) 
 
16 healthy adults 
 
fMRI 
 
Dynamic expressions elicited enhanced activation in the 
parahippocampal gyrus (PG), including the amygdala 
(AMG), fusiform gyrus (FG), superior temporal gyrus (STS), 
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), occipital, and orbito-frontal 
cortex (OFC).   
 
Recio et al. (2011) 
 
21 healthy adults 
 
EEG Early and late emotion-related ERPs were enhanced with 
the dynamic expressions. Moreover, dynamic stimuli 
increased processing in early visual brain areas.  
 
Sato et al. (2004) 
 
22 health 
participants 
 
fMRI 
 
Greater activation to dynamic vs. static expressions was 
observed in the inferior occipital gyri, middle temporal gyri, 
and fusiform gyri over the right hemisphere.  
 
Sato et al. (2010) 
 
21 healthy adults  
 
fMRI 
 
Higher activity in the left amygdala was observed in 
response to dynamic but not static emotional expressions 
and this activity was modulated by the intensity of the 
emotional expressions presented.  
 
Schultz and Pilz 
(2009) 
 
10 healthy 
students 
 
fMRI Dynamics expressions were associated to increased 
activation in lateral temporal areas, in the visual area V5 
and the superior temporal sulcus. Brain regions usually 
associated with the processing of static face information 
(bilateral fusiform gyrus and left inferior occipital gyrus) 
also exhibited higher neural responses to dynamic faces.  
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Although in everyday life we are continuously stimulated by dynamic cues, the use of dynamic 
stimuli is not prominent in the face processing literature. Most studies on face perception relied 
on static images and only a little is known about how moving faces are processed. In a paper 
published in 2009, Cunningham and Wallraven critically reported the following statement: 
“Any attempt to understand how humans use their eyes, face, and head to communicate that 
only uses static photographs – whether it is a single photograph or a series of photographs seen 
one after another – will never be able to explain the perception of expressions. Likewise, any 
system designed to describe facial expressions that does not explicitly allow for the description 
of dynamic information will prove ultimately to be inadequate” (2009a, pp. 13–14).  
 
Moreover, as pointed out in very recent reviews by Duchaine and Yovel (2015) and 
Yovel and O’Toole (2016), there is an important need to investigate face processing with dynamic 
stimuli, as in our daily life, we are mainly exposed to dynamic faces evolving in natural and 
unconstrained environments.  
 
Considering the above, the main goal of my thesis was to use dynamic faces to 
investigate different aspects of face processing in different populations and age groups. The 
experimental contributions will be briefly introduced in this chapter and then presented in the 
form of three papers in the following chapters. A general discussion, summarizing the main 
findings will follow.  
2.1 A developmental study 
The first experimental contribution of this thesis, presented in CHAPTER 3, aimed to 
investigate how 6-, 9-, and 12-month-old infants extract multisensory gender information from 
faces and voices. More specifically, the main goal was to address the following question: Is the 
extraction of gender from dynamic faces and voices influenced by the nature of speech 
signal, namely by infant- or adult-directed speech? 
 
As mentioned in the developmental part of CHAPTER 1, studies exploring the 
multisensory perception of gender have yielded inconsistent findings regarding the age of 
emergence of this ability. Methodological considerations, such as the auditory or visual stimuli 
presented, the task complexity, or the speech manner, may be partly responsible for this lack 
of consistency across studies. In order to address a few of these methodological limitations, we 
decided to conduct a new study using dynamic stimuli, rather than static images of frozen faces 
(Poulin-Dubois et al., 1998; Poulin-Dubois et al., 1994), because they are richer and ecologically 
more valid signals of how infants perceive faces in their daily life. Moreover, in order to 
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investigate whether the extraction of gender from faces and voices is modulated by the very 
nature of speech signals, we decided to include the two different speech manners to which 
infants are daily exposed, namely infant- and adult-directed speech.  
 
Infant-directed speech (IDS), in contrast with adult-directed speech (ADS), is a 
speech manner that is commonly used by parents to communicate with their infants. This 
speech manner is characterized by both prosodic and linguistic variations (Cooper & Aslin, 
1990) used to attract and hold infants’ attention. Several studies have revealed that infants 
exhibit a spontaneous preference for infant-directed over adult-directed speech (Figure 2.1) 
(Cooper & Aslin, 1990). Slower rhythm, vowel hyper-articulation, frequent breaks, higher pitch, 
exaggerated facial affects, and the use of special words are all characteristics of IDS (e.g., Cooper 
& Aslin, 1990; Pegg, Werker, & McLeod, 1992; Trainor, Austin, & Desjardins, 2000). Previous 
studies have reported that this language has a positive influence on the cognitive (Zangl & 
Mills, 2007) and early socio-emotional development of infants (Figure 2.2) (Schachner & 
Hannon, 2011). IDS facilitates, for instance, language acquisition, segmentation of words in a 
sentence, as well as lexical comprehension (e.g., Aslin, 2000; Fernald et al., 1998; Thiessen, 
Hill, & Saffran, 2005).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Infants preference for infant-directed speech (IDS). Cooper and Aslin (1990) 
demonstrated that both newborns, and 1-month-old infants exhibited auditory preference for IDS 
over ADS based on visual fixation duration. The authors concluded from their findings that infants’ 
preference for IDS already present at birth might be influenced by prenatal experience. Reprinted 
from Cooper and Aslin (1990).  
 
 
 
Interestingly, in an event-related potential study, Peter et al. (2016) very recently 
evidenced differential neural activation to ADS and IDS in both infant and adult brains. More 
specifically, their findings revealed that the neural responses to IDS, but not to ADS, were 
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mature in 9-month-old infants. When presented with an IDS sequence embedded in an ADS 
sequence, infants’ brains detected the difference, while this was not the case in the reverse 
situation (i.e., an ADS sequence in an IDS sequence). Importantly, the differential neural 
responses observed were interpreted to primarily result from the acoustic salience of the IDS 
stimuli, such as the exaggerated articulation, the high-pitched intonation, or other phonetic 
characteristics. In another recent study using fNIRS, Naoi et al. (2012) also observed differential 
neural responses to IDS and ADS in pre-verbal infants. Higher neural responses to IDS as 
compared to ADS were found in left- and right-sided temporal regions, varying as a function of 
age. 
 
 
 
A 
 
B 
 
 
Figure 2.2. IDS conveys cues for social selection. After hearing an individual speak in IDS 
during a familiarization phase, infants attend more to that individual than to a new person. This 
social preference is not found in the situation where an individual speaks in ADS during the 
familiarization phase. Adapted from Schachner and Hannon (2011).  
 
 
 
In this first study, we adopted the preferential looking paradigm (Fantz, 1961, 1964, 
1965) to investigate infants’ ability to integrate multisensory information from faces and voices. 
This procedure has been intensively used over the last decades to gain insights into the 
development of human face perception. In preferential looking tasks, two stimuli stemming 
from different categories (e.g., female vs. male faces; own vs. other race faces) are simultaneously 
presented to infants. When these two exemplars are exhibited together, they compete for infants’ 
gaze and attention. The infants’ preference for one category over the other is inferred by 
measuring looking behavior, the time spent on each stimulus directly reflecting the level of 
interest. We decided to apply this paradigm, rather than another method, because it has been 
proven to be a reliable and robust technique (e.g., Pascalis et al., 1995) that has been successfully 
used in the past to assess infants’ preference for own vs. other race faces (Bar-Haim et al., 2006), 
for attractive vs. less-attractive faces (Langlois et al., 1987; Quinn et al., 2008a; Van Duuren, 
Kendell-Scott, & Stark, 2003), or female vs. male faces (Quinn et al., 2002).  
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2.2 A neuropsychological study 
The second experimental contribution of this thesis presented in CHAPTER 4 aimed to clarify 
the following question: Are the dynamic internal representations of the six basic 
expressions in a prosopagnosic patient similar to those of healthy controls? Further, are 
these dynamic expressions better recognized by patient PS than static images? 
 
In their influential cognitive model of human face processing, Bruce and Young (1986) 
proposed that the processing of identity and expression occurs independently. This 
independence was motivated by findings from the prosopagnosia literature, indicating that 
patients with severe deficits in recognizing familiar faces demonstrated preserved abilities in 
categorizing facial expressions (Tranel et al., 1988), and by findings from cognitive studies, 
suggesting that emotion identification is independent of face familiarity (Young et al., 1986). 
However, more recent fMRI and neuropsychological studies have led some authors to question 
the degree of independence between these two processes. By using a principal-component-
analysis (PCA) approach, Calder et al. (2001a) for instance evidenced that expression and 
identity were coded by separate dimensions within a single multidimensional system, implying 
that the independent perception of facial identity and expression may not necessarily involve 
separate visuo-perceptual pathways at all stages of face processing. In line with this suggestion 
and more recently, Palermo and colleagues (2013) have proposed a first common pathway for 
the processing of both identity and expression, with a separation occurring at a later stage.  
 
In a review published in 2005, Calder and Young have also called into question the 
independence hypothesis by underlining clinical, statistical, and methodological limitations in 
patient-based evidence. As pointed out by the authors, more evidence from neuropsychological 
research is required to advance our understanding of the processing of these different facial 
aspects. The second experimental contribution of this thesis re-examined this debated issue with 
four behavioral experiments investigating the ability of a single-case of acquired prosopagnosia 
to recognize static and dynamic emotional faces. In Experiment 1, we assessed patient PS’s 
ability to categorize static expressions. In Experiment 2, we used an exciting and innovative 4D 
technique developed by Yu, Garrod, and Schyns (2012, see below) to map out the facial features 
used by patient PS when instructed to categorize random facial muscle activations into the six 
basic emotions. Facial information used for identity has been previously investigated in this 
patient with the Bubbles technique (for more details on this technique, see Box 6). These 
findings have reported that the patient used facial features in a suboptimal way when asked to 
recognize the identity of previously seen faces, focusing on the mouth and the external contours 
(Caldara et al., 2005). An optimal use of all facial features for the categorization of dynamic 
emotional faces would sharply contrast with her suboptimal way of extracting information in 
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identity recognition tasks (Caldara et al., 2005), favoring the view of independence between both 
processes. Finally, in Experiment 3 and 4, we assessed patient PS’s ability to categorize the 
static and dynamic random facial activations that she and healthy controls categorized as 
expressions in Experiment 2.   
 
The technique applied in our second study, an innovative 4D technique coupled 
with a reverse correlation technique, is a perception-driven platform, developed by Yu, 
Garrod, and Schyns in 2012. This technique modulates the activation of actions units from the 
Facial Action Coding System (FACS) to flexibly synthesize 3D facial expressions. More 
specifically, a subset of action units with specific temporal parameters is selected by a FACS-
based generator on each trial. In the example presented in Figure 2.3, AU9, AU10L, and AU19 
are selected (with specific colored labels). The colored curves represent the amplitude of 
acceleration and deceleration of movement for each specific AU over time. The random facial 
muscle activations are then applied to a neutral-face identity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3. FACS synthesis. Random facial muscle activations were presented to human observers 
who were asked to categorize them according to the six basic expressions (H = Happiness, Su = 
Surprise, F = Fear, D = Disgust, A = Anger, Sa = Sadness, Oth = Other). By reverse correlating the 
randomly presented AUs with human observers’ responses, Yu et al. (2012) reconstructed the 
internal representations of the six basic expressions for each observer. Reprinted from Yu et al. 
(2012).  
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Following this synthesis, human observers are instructed to categorize the parametrized 
facial movements in a 7-Alternative-Forced-Choice (7AFC) facial expression recognition task (6 
basic expressions plus an “Other” response) and further rate the perceived emotional intensity 
on a five-point scale (‘‘Very Weak’’, ‘‘Weak’’, ‘‘Medium’’, ‘‘Strong’’, and ‘‘Very Strong’’). In the 
example displayed in Figure 2.3, observers interpreted the randomly presented facial animation 
as a meaningful expression of disgust at medium intensity, because the action units activated 
corresponded to their internal mental representation of that expression. 
 
The following step uses methods from human psychophysics and computer graphic 
techniques to reverse correlate human observers’ answers with the perceptually relevant 
expression parameters (Figure 2.4). This procedure enables the reconstruction of 3D dynamic 
models of the internal representations of the six basic expressions for each observer. The six 
expressions presented at the lower part of Figure 2.3 correspond to the internal representations 
of one human observer (Yu et al., 2012).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. The procedure used by Yu et al. (2012) to reconstruct the internal representations 
of the six basic expressions in human observers. Reprinted from Yu et al. (2012). 
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2.3 A cross-sectional study 
Dynamic faces transmit a wealth of visual signals that are critical for the optimal categorization 
of facial expressions of emotion. Unlike static snapshots that are used in most experiments, 
naturally evolving dynamic expressions provide observers with richer and ecologically more 
valid signals that should facilitate their processing. While results obtained from healthy 
observers are equivocal, an advantage for dynamic expressions has been previously reported in 
several clinical conditions (Back et al., 2007; Uono et al., 2010) as well as in brain-damaged 
patients (Adolphs et al., 2003; Humphreys et al., 1993). Consistent with these results, in the 
second experimental contribution of this thesis (CHAPTER 4), we found that our prosopagnosic 
patient PS performed on a comparable level to healthy controls on a facial expression 
recognition task when dynamic stimuli were presented, but exhibited impairments in 
recognition with static images.  
 
Following on from this previous work, the last experimental contribution of this thesis 
presented in CHAPTER 5 examined the following question: Besides prosopagnosic 
individuals, do other populations with immature (i.e., young children) or fragile (i.e., 
elderly adults) face processing systems, also benefit from the presentation of dynamic 
emotional signals?  
 
To this aim, we conducted a large sample cross-sectional study (N = 412) in order to 
investigate whether the recognition of facial emotional expressions changes from childhood to 
old age and whether dynamic information facilitates their processing at any given point in 
development. We assessed participants’ abilities to categorize expressions presented as dynamic, 
static, or shuffled (temporally randomized) events. In this third study, we relied on a database 
of stimuli created by Gold et al. (2013), who adopted an ideal observer approach to objectively 
measure whether the amount of information provided by static, dynamic, and shuffled stimuli 
was identical in all three conditions. We decided to rely on this database to rule out the 
possibility that differences in recognition abilities across ages are modulated by differences in 
the amount of discriminative information provided by the expressions. By using this approach, 
Gold et al. (2013) compared human expression recognition thresholds and efficiencies to the 
performance of a statistically optimal observer. The ideal observer model is based on an optimal 
Bayesian rule that takes into account all the information available to maximize the probability 
to get an accurate response. This model has been frequently used in psychophysics tasks to 
measure the physical or perceptual properties of the stimuli presented (Lai et al., 2014). This 
approach enabled Gold et al. (2013) to reveal that their dynamic stimuli did not provide 
additional information to human observers than their static images (Figure 2.5A). Moreover, 
when the information physically available was considered, the corresponding human 
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efficiencies for recognizing the expressions were nearly the same across all three conditions 
(dynamic = static = shuffled) (Figure 2.5B).  
 
 
 
 
A 
 
B 
 
 
Figure 2.5. The recognition of static and dynamic expressions using an ideal observer 
approach. (A) Contrast energy thresholds for recognizing static, dynamic, and shuffled expressions 
in ideal and human observers. (B) The corresponding efficiencies were nearly identical across 
conditions. Adapted from Gold et al. (2013).  
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CHAPTER 3  
 
AUDIO-VISUAL PERCEPTION OF GENDER BY 
INFANTS EMERGES EARLIER FOR ADULT-
DIRECTED SPEECH  
 
 
 
Richoz, A.R., Quinn, P.C., Hillairet de Boisferon, A., Berger, C., Loevenbruck, H., Lewkowicz, 
D.J., Lee, K., Dole, M., Caldara, R., & Pascalis, O. (2017). Audio-visual perception of gender 
by infants emerges earlier for adult-directed speech. PLoS One, 12(1), 1-15. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research highlights 
 
à Speech manner (IDS vs. ADS) affects multisensory perception of gender in infants 
à Infants from 6 months of age matched female faces and voices with ADS 
à Infants from 9 months of age matched female faces and voices with IDS 
à Early multisensory abilities are shaped by the circumstances of social interaction 
 
 
Keywords: Gender-speech matching, Infants, Multisensory, Speech manner, Infant-
directed speech, Adult-directed speech 
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3.1 Abstract 
Early multisensory perceptual experiences shape the abilities of infants to perform socially-
relevant visual categorization, such as the extraction of gender, age, and emotion from faces. 
Here, we investigated whether multisensory perception of gender is influenced by infant-
directed (IDS) or adult-directed (ADS) speech. Six-, 9-, and 12-month-old infants saw side-by-
side silent video-clips of talking faces (a male and a female) and heard either a soundtrack of a 
female or a male voice telling a story in IDS or ADS. Infants participated in only one condition, 
either IDS or ADS. Consistent with earlier work, infants displayed advantages in matching 
female relative to male faces and voices. Moreover, the new finding that emerged in the current 
study was that extraction of gender from face and voice was stronger at 6 months with ADS 
than with IDS, whereas at 9 and 12 months, matching did not differ for IDS versus ADS. The 
results indicate that the ability to perceive gender in audiovisual speech is influenced by speech 
manner. Our data suggest that infants may extract multisensory gender information 
developmentally earlier when looking at adults engaged in conversation with other adults (i.e., 
ADS) than when adults are directly talking to them (i.e., IDS). Overall, our findings imply that 
the circumstances of social interaction may shape early multisensory abilities to perceive gender. 
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3.2 Introduction 
Human faces provide multisensory inputs to infants, exposing them not only to visual 
information but also to the voice and language of their caregivers. This perceptual experience 
shapes early multisensory abilities that are critical for the development of social categories 
related to vocalizing and talking human faces.  
 
One social category to which infants have extensive exposure is gender. The ability of 
humans to process male and female faces has been widely studied over the last two decades 
(e.g., Brown & Perrett, 1993; Bruce et al., 1993). Adults reliably and rapidly identify facial 
gender, even when relying only on individual facial features, such as eyebrows, jaw, chin, or 
mouth (Brown & Perrett, 1993; Bruce et al., 1993; O'Toole et al., 1998). In infants, the ability 
to categorize face gender develops between three months and one year of age (e.g., Cohen & 
Strauss, 1979; Cornell, 1974; Fagan & Singer, 1979; Leinbach & Fagot, 1993; Younger & Fearing, 
1999). Even though some research suggests that infants form categories for both female and 
male faces (Cornell, 1974; Younger & Fearing, 1999), other studies point to a developmental 
asymmetry in the acquisition of gender categories: when infants are presented with a category 
of male faces, they subsequently prefer female over novel male faces, but when infants are 
presented with a category of female faces, they do not subsequently prefer male over novel 
female faces (Leinbach & Fagot, 1993). The asymmetry has been further shown to reflect a 
spontaneous preference for female over male faces when the primary caregiver is female (e.g., 
Liu et al., 2015; Quinn et al., 2002; for a review see, Ramsey, Langlois, & Marti, 2005). These 
studies also suggest that infants develop more structured representations for female faces than 
for male faces. The processing advantages for female over male faces are in turn believed to 
reflect experiential differences between female and male faces. Infants reared by a female 
primary caregiver experience over 70% female faces and less than 30% male faces in the first 
months of life (Liu et al., 2015; Rennels & Davis, 2008; Sugden, Mohamed-Ali, & Moulson, 
2014).  
 
Even though gender processing is mainly based on visual properties of the face, vocal 
cues also play an important role. Adults perceive faces and voices as coherent entities (e.g., 
McGurk & MacDonald, 1976; Rosenblum, 2008) and face-voice associations can be the basis 
for gender identification, e.g., long hair and thin and softly curved eyebrows associated with 
high-pitched voice (Barenholtz et al., 2014). Although infants perceive audiovisual coherence 
of speech syllables as early as 2 to 4 months of age (Kuhl & Meltzoff, 1988; Patterson & Werker, 
1999, 2002), their ability to use audio-visual correspondences to respond to gender emerges in 
the second half of the first year of life, and consistent with the work on visual categories, is 
restricted to female faces (Hillairet de Boisferon et al., 2015; Poulin-Dubois et al., 1994). For 
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example, the work of Walker-Andrews et al. (1991) has revealed that 6-month-old infants were 
able to reliably match synchronous faces and voices when presented with gender information. 
However, to ensure perfect synchrony between faces and voices, Walker-Andrews et al. (1991) 
asked each actor to dub their voice onto the video-recordings of their own face. This procedure 
made it difficult to tease apart whether infants genuinely matched faces and voices based on 
gender information or whether they made the match based on idiosyncratic relations between 
faces and voices. This latter possibility is supported by a more recent study demonstrating that 
6-month-old infants are able to link idiosyncratic cross-modal identity cues of unfamiliar faces 
(Trehub, Plantinga, & Brcic, 2009). Subsequent studies have reported that the emergence of 
audio-visual perception of gender can vary from 6 months to 8 months to even later (Hillairet 
de Boisferon et al., 2015; Patterson & Werker, 2002; Poulin-Dubois, Serbin, & Derbyshire, 
1998; Poulin-Dubois et al., 1994; for a review see, Ramsey et al., 2005, pp. 219-229; Walker-
Andrews et al., 1991).  
 
The specific timing of the emergence of the ability to perceive the multisensory 
coherence of gender might depend on the different types of visual and auditory stimuli used 
across the different studies and the methodology of the tasks (Ramsey et al., 2005). Some studies 
investigating perception of multisensory gender coherence have presented dynamic faces 
(Hillairet de Boisferon et al., 2015; Patterson & Werker, 2002; Walker-Andrews et al., 1991), 
whereas others have relied on static images (Poulin-Dubois et al., 1994). Use of dynamic faces 
provides a more ecologically valid approach to investigate multisensory perception of gender, as 
our natural environment is surrounded with dynamic multisensory cues (Xiao et al., 2014). 
Dynamic facial cues also seem to play a critical role in the way faces are encoded (Xiao et al., 
2015) and recognized (Otsuka et al., 2009). Moreover, dynamic faces seem to influence facial 
scanning, prompting infants to shift their fixations to different facial features (Xiao et al., 2015). 
Multiple fixation shifts on major facial areas are likely to benefit gender processing given that 
the visual cues for gender can be found throughout the face (Brown & Perrett, 1993; Bruce et 
al., 1993; O'Toole et al., 1998). The auditory stimuli used to investigate multisensory perception 
of gender have also varied across different studies. Some studies have presented isolated vowels 
(Patterson & Werker, 2002), whereas others have played recordings of fluent and continuous 
speech (Poulin-Dubois et al., 1998; Poulin-Dubois et al., 1994; Walker-Andrews et al., 1991). 
The latter may facilitate the detection of the gender of the speaker via additional cues such as 
intonation, stress, duration, respiratory patterns, and vocal breathiness (Klatt & Klatt, 1990; 
Van Borsel, Janssens, & De Bodt, 2009). 
 
It is additionally possible that the manner of speech (infant- or adult-directed) 
influences the perception of multisensory gender coherence. In daily life, parents or siblings 
interact with infants using infant-directed speech (IDS), varying at both prosodic and linguistic 
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levels (Cooper & Aslin, 1990). Infants are particularly sensitive to prosody (Fernald, 1985; Kim 
& Johnson, 2014; Nakata & Trehub, 2004) and largely prefer IDS to adult-directed speech 
(ADS) (Cooper & Aslin, 1990). IDS is characterized by better articulation, higher pitch, slower 
rhythm, many breaks, and the use of special words (e.g., Cooper & Aslin, 1990; Pegg, Werker, 
& Mcleod, 1992; Trainor, Austin, & Desjardins, 2000). 
 
Several studies have shown that the manner of speech has an influence on the cognitive 
(Zangl & Mills, 2007) and social development of infants (Schachner & Hannon, 2011) with IDS 
promoting, for example, language acquisition, inclusive of word segmentation and lexical 
comprehension (e.g., Aslin, 2000; Fernald et al., 1998; Thiessen, Hill, & Saffran, 2005). Based 
on this prior evidence, it could be reasoned that IDS might also facilitate the extraction of 
gender information from face and voice. However, even though IDS facilitates lexical learning 
and word segmentation (e.g., Aslin, 2000; Thiessen et al., 2005), its facilitating role in perceiving 
multisensory gender coherence might be minimal or non-existent. Indeed, the high pitch of 
IDS, which brings male voices closer to the daily frequencies of female voices, might even 
impede the ability of infants to perceive multisensory gender coherence. Consistent with this 
suggestion, Trainor and Desjardins (2002) demonstrated that the high pitch of IDS negatively 
affected vowel discrimination in 6- to 7-month-old infants. The authors concluded that rather 
than being a facilitator of vowel learning, the primary role of high pitch in IDS is to attract 
attention and communicate intention and emotion.  
 
Using dynamic stimuli and exaggerated prosodic nursery rhymes characteristic of IDS, 
Hillairet de Boisferon et al. (2015) recently investigated the developmental emergence of the 
ability to perceive the coherence of auditory and visual attributes of gender in 6- and 9-month-
old infants. Infants viewed two side-by-side video clips of a man and a woman reciting a nursery 
rhyme and heard a synchronous male or female soundtrack. Infants did not associate audible 
and visible gender attributes until the age of 9 months, and only for female faces. The authors 
interpreted these findings as evidence that a combination of different factors (e.g., stimulus and 
task complexity, and amount of perceptual experience) influence the multisensory 
responsiveness of infants.  
 
Because Hillairet de Boisferon et al. (2015) only investigated IDS and not ADS, we 
conducted a new study to clarify whether and how the manner of speech may influence the 
perception of multisensory gender coherence. The experiment consisted of four 12-s trials, 
during which infants saw two side-by-side silent video-clips of actors (a male and a female) 
reciting a nursery rhyme; they were the same video-clips used by Hillairet de Boisferon et al. 
(2015). A soundtrack with a female or a male voice telling a story in IDS or ADS was played at 
the same time. Infants participated in only one condition, either IDS or ADS, and heard a male 
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voice on half of the trials and a female voice on the other half of the trials. If the infants could 
detect the gender of the audio-visual correspondence, we expected them to look longer at the 
face whose gender matched the gender of the accompanying voice than at the face that did not 
match it. We decided to use dynamic video recordings rather than static faces because dynamic 
stimuli provide observers with richer and ecologically more valid signals of the sorts of events 
that infants experience in their daily lives (e.g., Knight & Johnston, 1997; O'Toole, Roark, & 
Abdi, 2002; Xiao et al., 2014).  
 
We reasoned that if IDS affects the extraction of gender from face and voice in the 
same way that it affects word segmentation and lexical comprehension, then the perception of 
multisensory gender coherence would emerge earlier with IDS than with ADS. However, if 
IDS draws attentional resources to the prosodic features and the linguistic content of the speech 
rather than to the gender of the talking face (Hillairet de Boisferon et al., 2015), then the 
perception of multisensory gender coherence might emerge later with IDS than with ADS. 
Moreover, the high-pitched intonation characteristic of IDS might bring male voices closer to 
the usual daily life frequencies of female ADS, which might make it more difficult for infants 
to match an IDS utterance to either a male or female face.  
 
An additional expectation was that the perception of multisensory gender coherence 
might be specific to female faces. This prediction is supported by results from previous 
intersensory matching studies (Hillairet de Boisferon et al., 2015; Poulin-Dubois et al., 1994), 
and findings that infants exhibit a spontaneous preference for female over male faces (Liu et 
al., 2015; Quinn et al., 2002), as well as findings that infants possess a more advanced category 
representation for female than male faces (Quinn et al., 2002; Ramsey et al., 2005).  
3.3 Materials and Method 
Participants 
6-month-olds (11 females) (Mage= 195 days, SD = 4 days), 9-month-olds (12 females) (Mage = 283 
days, SD = 5 days), and 12-month-olds (13 females) (Mage = 379 days, SD = 6 days) were included 
in the analyses (n = 31 per age category). Infants were healthy, full-term participants, recruited 
from the maternity of the Centre Hospitalier Universitaire of Grenoble in France. They were 
all Caucasians and living in a French speaking environment. Eighteen additional infants were 
tested, but excluded from the analyses because they did not complete the procedure due to 
crying (n = 6) or fussiness (n = 12).  
 
Stimuli 
We used the same visual stimuli as those used by Hillairet de Boisferon et al. (2015), although 
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we did not use the soundtracks presented in that study. Instead, we presented new soundtracks 
that are described below. The video recordings consisted of six Caucasian adult faces (3 females) 
reciting a nursery rhyme in French while maintaining a neutral facial expression. During the 
video recordings, actors were asked to look directly at the video camera and to recite at the same 
tempo as a model whose video was played as a template before the recordings. The videos in 
each pair were edited to ensure that they started with the same opening of the mouth (Hillairet 
de Boisferon et al., 2015). The faces were recorded against a green background and neither of 
the actors wore gender-specific visual information, such as makeup or jewelry. The faces 
subtended a visual angle of 19.09° (vertical) and 14.32° (horizontal).  
 
As in previous studies (e.g., Hillairet de Boisferon et al., 2015; Patterson & Werker, 
2002), two adults (1 male) who were different from those seen in the videos were selected to 
record the soundtracks. The content of the soundtracks differed from the nursery rhyme told 
by the actors in the videos (i.e., the speech did not correspond with the articulatory motions of 
the actors). This was done to ensure that infants were genuinely representing gender across face 
and voice (i.e., extracting the amodal invariance of gender per se) and not simply responding to 
the co-occurrence of the two streams of information or making the match based on speaker 
idiosyncrasies in visible and audible articulatory or respiratory patterns. We registered the 
audio-recordings with a high-quality audio microphone in a special soundproof recording room. 
We asked the two speakers to provide four recordings: each of two stories was recorded in both 
ADS and IDS. The short “stories” (each a 12-s long utterance) were as follows:  
 
Story 1: “Moi je trouve que c’est une belle journée aujourd’hui. Je vois le soleil qui 
brille. C’est vraiment super que tu sois venu me voir”.  
(English translation: “It’s a beautiful day today. I see the sun shining. It’s really nice that you 
came to see me.”)  
 
Story 2: “Tu es venu de loin pour me voir aujourd’hui. C’est vraiment super de t’avoir 
rencontré. J’espère que c’est le cas aussi pour toi. Je trouve que tu es un très beau bébé.”  
(English translation: “You came from far away to see me today. It’s really nice to meet you. I 
hope it is also the case for you. You are a beautiful baby.”) 
 
The semantic content of both stories was very similar. In order to have 12-s length 
stories, the second story included four sentences instead of three as in the first story. The 
number of words in each sentence was, however, similar. Twenty French-speaking adults were 
asked to categorize the stories as adult or infant-directed. Results revealed strong agreement 
between observers as indicated by the Fleiss’ kappa of 0.73.   
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The utterances were acoustically analyzed using Praat (Boersma & Weenink, 2011). 
Pitch level was computed as the mean of the fundamental frequency (f0) values for each 
utterance as a whole. Pitch span was computed by subtracting the minimum from the maximum 
f0 value for each utterance as a further index of pitch variation. The acoustic analyses of the 
voices heard by the infants in our study revealed the following fundamental frequencies: For 
IDS, the male voice varied between 102 and 289 Hertz (Hz) and the female voice varied between 
158 and 502 Hz. For ADS, these fundamental frequencies ranged between 87 and 178 Hz for 
the male voice and between 158 and 338 Hz for the female voice. When converted to semitones 
(st), the difference between the maximum f0 value for the male voice in IDS and the maximum 
for the female voice in ADS was less than 3 st. The average values for the female and male IDS 
and ADS voices are reported in Table 3.1 in Hertz and Table 3.2 in semitones (relative to 100 
Hz). 
 
 
Table 3.1 Fundamental frequency characteristics in hertz (Hz). Average pitch level, pitch 
minimum, pitch maximum, and pitch span of the fundamental frequencies (Hz) of the ADS and 
IDS male and female voices. 
Voice Condition  Pitch level (Hz)  Pitch min (Hz)  Pitch max (Hz)  Pitch span (Hz)  
Female   IDS 255.27 158.20 502.48 344.28 
Male  IDS 166.43 102.86 289.98 187.12 
Female  ADS 210.69 158.40 338.74 180.34 
Male ADS 116.47 87.71 178.19 90.47 
 
 
 
Table 3.2. Fundamental frequency characteristics in semitones (st). Average pitch level, pitch 
minimum, pitch maximum, and pitch span of the semitones (st) of the ADS and IDS male and 
female voices. 
Voice Condition  Pitch level (st)  Pitch min (st)  Pitch max (st)  Pitch span (st)  
Female IDS 15.79 7.87 27.95 20.07 
Male IDS 8.23 0.48 18.41 17.93 
Female ADS 12.70 7.95 21.13 13.17 
Male ADS 2.41 -2.26 9.92 12.18 
 
 
Apparatus and Procedure 
Infants were seated on the lap of a parent in a dimly illuminated room, 60 cm away from a 22-
inch computer screen. Parents were asked not to intervene, interact, or speak with their infant 
during the experiment. All parents signed a written consent form for their infant prior to the 
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experiment. The Ethical Committee of the Centres d’Investigation Clinique de l’inter-région 
Rhône-Alpes-Auvergne (authorization number IRB 2010-21) approved the study reported here.  
 
The experiment consisted of four 12-s trials for each condition (i.e., IDS or ADS) with 
two different sets of faces and corresponding soundtracks. Infants participated in only one 
condition, either IDS or ADS. We divided the infants of each age category into two groups (n 
= 15 or 16 participants per group). On each trial, infants were presented with two side-by-side 
silent video-clips of faces (one male and one female) reciting a nursery rhyme. The faces were 
separated by a 15-cm gap. We used the same video-clips on Trials 1 and 3, and on Trials 2 and 
4, but with switched left-right locations of the faces, so that each face was seen on the right and 
the left side of the screen (Figure 3.1). The side of gender presentation (male or female) was 
counterbalanced across infants on the first trial and reversed on the following trials (on Trials 
3 and 4, see Figure 3.1). A soundtrack with a female or a male voice telling a story either in 
IDS or ADS was played at the same time as the video-clips. On each trial, infants listened to 
either a male or female voice, with the woman’s voice presented twice over the four trials (i.e., 
for a given infant, across trials, the two female-male face pairings were presented once with a 
female voice and once with a male voice).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Schematic representation of the procedure. Infants saw two side-by-side silent video-
clips presenting a male and a female face reciting a nursery rhyme. A soundtrack with a female or 
a male voice telling a story in IDS or ADS was played at the same time. The video-clips were 
repeated twice throughout the four trials, with left-right reversal for the positioning of the faces. 
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We used the E-prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, USA) 
to conduct the experiment. Two loudspeakers (Dell A225) placed behind the screen, halfway 
between the two faces, transmitted the audio stimuli. A low-light video camera, located above 
the stimulus-presentation monitor, was used to record infant looking behavior. The video 
recordings were subsequently digitized and analyzed with a frame-by-frame coding procedure. 
We used a preferential looking technique to test multisensory gender perception of faces and 
voices and measured the total duration of looking time directed to each face. 
3.4 Results 
We performed analyses on the mean proportion of total looking time (PTLT) that each infant 
directed at the matching faces over the four test trials. For this calculation, we divided the 
amount of looking at the matching face by the total amount of looking at both faces during 
each trial and then averaged the two proportions for each gender over the four test trials. If 
infants perceived multisensory gender coherence, then they should direct more looking time to 
the face that matched the heard voice. The data were collapsed over story number (1 vs. 2) 
because it did not affect looking behavior, F(1, 91) = .26, p = .60, η2 p = .003. Preliminary analysis 
of participant gender revealed no significant main effect or interaction of this factor, F(1, 91) = 
2.52, p = .13, η2 p = .02. This factor was therefore not included in the subsequent analyses.   
 
  A three-way mixed ANOVA was first conducted on the PTLTs directed at the matching 
face with condition (IDS, ADS) and age (6-, 9-, 12-months) as between-subjects factors and 
gender of the voice (male, female) as a within-subjects factor. Results first revealed that gender 
of the voice affected infant responsiveness, F(1,87) = 9.82, p < .005, η2 p = .10. As expected, infants 
looked longer at the matching face in the presence of a female (M = 56.30%, SD = 10.99%) than 
a male voice (M = 51.26%, SD = 10.93%). A one-sample t-test against the chance value of 50% 
revealed that the PTLTs directed at the female matching faces were significantly different from 
chance, t(92) = 5.52, p < .001 (two-tailed), Cohen’s d = .57. This was not the case for the PTLTs 
directed at the male matching faces, t(92) =1.11, p = .27, Cohen’s d = .11. Results further showed 
that condition (IDS vs. ADS) affected responsiveness, F(1, 87) = 6.33, p < .05, η2 p = .06, reflecting 
the fact that the PTLTs directed at the face that matched the heard voice were higher in the 
ADS (M = 55.73%, SD = 7.80%) than IDS condition (M = 51.86%, SD = 7.51%). There was also 
a statistically significant two-way interaction between condition and age, F(2, 87) = 3.73, p < .05, 
η2 p = .07, indicating that the total amount of time spent on the face that matched the heard 
voice was not the same for the three age groups in each condition (Figure 3.2).  
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Figure 3.2. Mean proportion of total looking time to the face that matched the heard voice 
in each condition (IDS, ADS) and for each age group (6-, 9-, 12-month-olds). Note. *p < .05; 
Error bars represent SDs. 
 
 
Post-hoc t-tests revealed that this effect was driven by the 6-months-olds who gazed 
significantly longer at the matching face in the ADS (M = 57.32%, SD = 9.98 %) than in the 
IDS condition (M = 48.06%, SD = 8.40%), t(29) = 2.80, p < .05, Cohen’s d = .51. For this age 
group, one-sample t-tests against the chance value of 50% revealed that the PTLTs directed at 
the face that matched the heard voice were significantly different from chance in the ADS 
condition, t(14) = 2.84, p < .05, Cohen’s d = .75, but not in the IDS condition, t(15) = - .92, p = 
.37, Cohen’s d = - .23. In 9-month-olds, no differences were found between the IDS and ADS 
condition, t(29) = .45, p = .65, Cohen’s d = .08. In this age group, the PTLTs directed at the face 
that matched the heard voice were different from the chance value of 50%, t(30) = 3.20, p < .005, 
Cohen’s d = .58. The same pattern of results was found for 12-month-olds, showing no 
differences between both conditions, t(29) = -1.54, p = .13, Cohen’s d = - .28, but a statistically 
significant difference from the chance value of 50% for the PTLTs directed at the matching 
face, t(30) = 4.42, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .80. The three-way interaction between condition, gender 
of the voice, and age was not statistically significant, F(2, 87) = .19, p = .82, η2 p = .004. 
3.5 Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether infant- (IDS) or adult-directed (ADS) 
speech influences the perception of multisensory gender coherence. There were two possibilities. 
Given the facilitative effects of IDS observed for language acquisition, it might be the case that 
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IDS could facilitate the extraction of gender from face and voice. However, as a language 
facilitator, it is also possible that IDS draws attentional resources to the prosodic features and 
the linguistic content of speech rather than to the gender of a talking face (Hillairet de Boisferon 
et al., 2015). Based on this possibility and on the idea that the higher pitch in IDS is likely to 
reduce gender differences in the voices of speakers, one might observe a later emergence of 
multisensory perception of gender with IDS than with ADS. Our data are consistent with the 
latter possibility. Infants gazed longer at the face that matched the heard voice in the ADS than 
in the IDS condition. Furthermore, our results showed a significant interaction between age 
and condition (ADS, IDS) reflecting the fact that the time spent by each age group on the face 
that matched the heard voice was not the same in each condition. At 6 months, infants were 
more likely to match gender across face and voice with ADS than with IDS. At the two older 
age groups, there was no difference in matching performance between ADS and IDS. An 
additional expectation was that the perception of multisensory gender coherence might be 
specific to female faces. Our findings supported this prediction as they revealed that the gender 
of the voice affected infant responsiveness. Infants displayed advantages in matching female 
relative to male faces and voices.  
 
On one hand, our findings that the perception of multisensory gender coherence 
emerges between 6 and 9 months of age when associated with IDS are in line with previous 
studies. For example, Patterson and Werker (2002) found that 8-month-old infants were able 
to match faces and voices when presented with infant-directed vowels. Similarly, Hillairet de 
Boisferon et al. (2015) previously demonstrated that the perception of multisensory gender 
coherence emerges between 6 and 9 months of age when infants were exposed to faces reciting 
a nursery rhyme. On the other hand, our findings differ somewhat from the findings reported 
by Walker-Andrews et al. (1991) who reported successful matching of auditory and visible 
attributes of gender by 6 months of age when infants were presented with infant-directed 
nursery rhymes. The earlier emergence of matching observed by Walker-Andrews et al. (1991) 
may be due to the fact that the voices heard by the infants were the actual voices of the two 
speakers presented in the videos, raising the possibility that idiosyncratic relations between 
faces and voices might have facilitated matching. Prosodic bits of information, such as acoustic 
parameters, intensity, lip motion, and jaw movement are known to differ across individuals 
(e.g., Kelso et al., 1985; Loevenbruck, 1999; Loevenbruck, 2000) as is the pronunciation of 
segmental and suprasegmental information (e.g., Dohen, Loevenbruck, & Hill, 2009; Keating 
et al., 1994). Given that the actors in Walker-Andrews et al. (1991) were asked to dub their voice 
onto their own video recordings to ensure perfect synchrony, the possibility that they produced 
idiosyncratic articulatory or respiratory patterns which facilitated auditory and visual gender 
matching cannot be ruled out.  
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To control for possible idiosyncratic intersensory relations, speaker identity cues, or 
individually-specific respiratory patterns, we selected different voices that belonged to none of 
the actors presented in the video recordings. In this way, and as in previous studies (Hillairet 
de Boisferon et al., 2015; Patterson & Werker, 2002), we ensured that infants were genuinely 
representing gender across face and voice. Also, the auditory and visual information differed in 
that the auditory information was a different utterance than the one told by the actors in the 
videos. We chose these types of stimulus materials so to ensure that the common information 
across the auditory and visual modalities was gender. It is additionally worth noting that in the 
Walker-Andrews et al. (1991) procedure, infants saw only one pair of female and male faces. In 
contrast, in our study as well as in previous ones (Hillairet de Boisferon et al., 2015; Poulin-
Dubois et al., 1998; Poulin-Dubois et al., 1994), infants were exposed to two pairs of female and 
male faces. As different identities were included rather than only one prototypical exemplar of 
a specific category (e.g., long-haired blond woman with blue eyes), which probably facilitated 
specific matching, our procedure more likely tested more general infant perception of 
multisensory gender coherence.  
 
There are several differences between IDS and ADS that may contribute to the 
developmentally earlier matching of audible and visible cues in infants listening to ADS. 
Substantial evidence has shown that IDS influences the cognitive development of infants, 
promoting language acquisition, inclusive of lexical comprehension (Thiessen et al., 2005), word 
recognition (Fernald et al., 1998), and segmentation in a sentence (e.g., Aslin, 2000; Thiessen 
et al., 2005). As noted, these characteristics might suggest that IDS should facilitate infant 
perception of multisensory gender coherence. However, IDS may not facilitate all aspects of 
language acquisition. For example, Trainor and Desjardins (2002) reported that the high pitch 
typical of IDS impaired vowel discrimination in 6- to 7-month-olds, because of acoustic 
parameters and the space between harmonics in high-pitched sounds (Trainor & Desjardins, 
2002). Moreover, when using exaggerated infant-directed nursery rhymes, Hillairet de 
Boisferon et al. (2015) recently demonstrated that infants did not match audible and visible 
attributes of gender until the age of 9 months, and only for female faces. As observed by Hillairet 
de Boisferon (2015), a combination of various factors, including attentional resources, and 
stimulus and task complexity, might account for the later age estimate of emergence for 
multisensory gender coherence. IDS is characterized by slower tempo, shorter utterances, longer 
pauses, better articulation, as well as higher pitch (e.g., Fernald, 1992; Lewkowicz, 1998; Trainor 
et al., 1997; Trehub & Nakata, 2001-2002). Critically, the typically higher pitch of IDS 
(Andruski & Kuhl, 1997; Fernald & Simon, 1984; Papousek, Papousek, & Haekel, 1987) may 
affect the perception of multisensory gender coherence in infants. The usual fundamental 
frequency of a male voice varies between 90 and 140 Hz and that of a female voice between 170 
and 290 Hz for ADS (Fernald et al., 1989). For IDS, this fundamental frequency can range 
 
 3. AUDIO-VISUAL PERCEPTION OF GENDER BY INFANTS 
 
 
 
 
 105 
from 120 to 190 Hz for male voices and from 250 to 450 Hz for female voices (Fernald et al., 
1989). The acoustic analyses of the particular voices heard by the infants in our study revealed 
similar fundamental frequencies for ADS and IDS (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). The higher pitch in 
IDS thus brings male voices closer to the usual daily life frequencies of female ADS, which 
might create a possible basis for why younger infants have more difficulty matching gender 
when presented with an IDS utterance corresponding to either the male or female face.  
 
Compared to ADS, IDS has also been argued to be effective for attracting and holding 
infant attention (e.g., Fernald & Simon, 1984; Rose, Feldman, & Jankowski, 2003). It has been 
associated with higher social responsiveness as compared to ADS (Dunst & Hamby, 2012). 
Again, one might expect that increased attention would lead to stronger perception of 
multisensory gender coherence in infants. However, as IDS also promotes learning (e.g., Csibra 
& Gergely, 2006; Kaplan et al., 2002; Kaplan, Bachorowski, & Zarlengo-Strouse, 1999) and 
language acquisition (e.g., Liu, Kuhl, & Tsao, 2003; Thiessen et al., 2005; Werker et al., 2007), 
one can speculate that greater attentional resources are allocated to the meaning of the speech, 
to the extraction of segmental and suprasegmental information (Dohen et al., 2009), and to the 
acquisition of new words, rather than to the gender of the face. Our results might therefore 
suggest that with IDS, the attention of younger infants is driven away from the gender of the 
talking face and towards the linguistic content of the speech. Further studies using, for example, 
eye-tracking would be necessary to verify this suggestion. Whatever findings such future work 
might yield, a potential implication of the difference in findings with ADS versus IDS is that 
younger infants may not be able to extract multisensory gender information when adults are 
directly talking to them (as is typical with IDS), and are more likely to do so when looking at 
adults engaged in conversation, using ADS with one another. Another implication would be 
that when addressed with IDS, younger infants may be able to extract multisensory gender 
information, but only when provided with additional facilitative cues such as articulatory 
patterns or body-related information. This latter implication is in accord with the study of 
Walker-Andrews et al. (1991), showing that from 6 months of age, infants are able to match 
faces and voices when presented with synchronous speech. Different from the Walker-Andrews 
et al. study, idiosyncratic cues or physical information such as gender-related clothing or make-
up, were not available in our study.    
 
Finally, Schachner and Hannon (2011) have shown that IDS conveys cues for social 
selection, guiding the preferences of 5-month-olds towards potential partners. After hearing an 
individual speak in IDS, infants attend more to that individual than to a novel person. This 
social preference is not found in the situation where an individual speaks in ADS (Schachner 
& Hannon, 2011). An adult using IDS transmits affective components that may relate to safety 
(Fernald & Kuhl, 1987; Papousek, Papousek, & Symmes, 1991). Interestingly, Kim and Johnson 
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(2013) recently reported that infant preference for infant-directedness is not only restricted to 
speech but also extends to ID faces and that this preference might be mediated by the emotion 
conveyed by the face (Kim & Johnson, 2014). Based on these findings, our results suggest that 
the attention of younger infants is directed to IDS cues related to learning, emotion, and safety, 
rather than to the gender of the talking face.  
 
It is additionally worth noting that we did not observe any differences between IDS and 
ADS conditions for 9- and 12-month-old infants. Correspondingly, Newman and Hussain (2006) 
found a decrease in infant preference for IDS over ADS during the second half of the first year 
of life, with no preference observed at the age of 9 months. This latter outcome is in accord 
with the finding that only younger infants in the present study were affected by speech manner. 
It may be that IDS engages the attention of younger infants to the extent that it interferes with 
processing of other attributes of the interaction including the gender of the speaker’s face and 
voice.  
 
Like in previous studies (Hillairet de Boisferon et al., 2015; Poulin-Dubois et al., 1998; 
Poulin-Dubois et al., 1994), our results reveal an asymmetrical responsiveness to female versus 
male faces and voices. Infants looked longer to female faces in the presence of a female voice, 
but not longer to male faces in the presence of a male voice. The most likely explanation for 
this result is that infants typically have predominant experience with female faces (e.g., Ramsey-
Rennels & Langlois, 2006; Rennels & Davis, 2008; Sugden et al., 2014). Even though infants 
are from birth able to match individual voice characteristics with particular faces (Coulon, 
Guellai, & Streri, 2011; Guellai, Coulon, & Streri, 2011), and perceive multisensory coherence 
of visible and audible speech syllables from 2 to 4 months of age (Kuhl & Meltzoff, 1988; 
Patterson & Werker, 1999, 2002), our results provide further evidence that it is not until the 
middle of the first year of life that they acquire the necessary skills to perceive more complex 
attributes such as gender. It may be that increased experience is needed before multisensory 
coherence emerges for such attributes (Hillairet de Boisferon et al., 2015; Lewkowicz et al., 
2015; Poulin-Dubois et al., 1998). More extensive experience with women may lead to an earlier 
emergence of the category knowledge of female faces because infants are exposed to multiple 
exemplars of the relevant attributes for categorization, e.g., long hair, thin and soft curved 
eyebrows, rounded cheeks, longer eye-to-eyebrow distance, and high-pitched voice (Homa, 
Sterling, & Trepel, 1981). Complex categorization skills seem to be therefore highly dependent 
on the degree of perceptual experience, inclusive of daily life experiences with relevant 
exemplars of a category. The association between male faces and voices would similarly require 
learning of particular correlations, e.g., deeper voice with prominent Adam’s apple (Rosch et 
al., 1976). These associations may be more difficult to acquire because infants typically spend 
less time with male as compared to female faces during the first year of life (Rennels & Davis, 
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2008). Poulin-Dubois et al. (1998) found that it was not until the age of 18 months that infants 
were able to perceive multisensory gender coherence for male faces and voices. Given that 
Poulin-Dubois et al. (1998) used static images in their study, it would be informative to clarify 
whether the perception of multisensory gender coherence for male faces and voices also emerges 
around 18 months of age with dynamic faces. Future research could also investigate whether 
infants raised with fathers as primary caregivers would exhibit the opposite pattern of 
asymmetrical responsiveness to male versus female faces and voices. This possibility is raised 
by the Quinn et al. (2002) findings showing that infants raised primarily by male caregivers 
attend more to male faces than to female ones, suggesting that daily experience with a particular 
gender affects face processing.   
 
Finally, the finding that infants only matched the gender of female faces and voices 
does not seem to reveal an overall preference for female faces, but rather a true matching of 
audible and visible gender attributes. If there were an overall preference for female faces, 6-
month-old infants should also have looked longer to female faces in the IDS condition. 
Interestingly, Liu et al. (2015) recently demonstrated a preference for female own-race faces in 
3- and 6-month-old infants, but no such gender preference in 9-month-olds, suggesting a 
decrease in the female face preference in older infants. The results of Liu et al. (2015) were 
taken as evidence that by 9 months of age, male face experience has accumulated to the point 
where there is no longer a preference for female faces. That reasoning would suggest that 12-
month-olds would also show no baseline preference, an observation that would need to be 
confirmed with additional evidence.   
3.6 Conclusions 
The present study used dynamic faces coupled with infant- or adult-directed speech to test 
multisensory gender perception in 6-, 9- and 12-month-old infants. The results revealed that by 
the middle of the first year of life, infants are able to perceive multisensory gender coherence 
for female faces and voices in the case of ADS. However, this ability emerges later with IDS. 
Altogether these results indicate that the ability to efficiently perceive gender in audiovisual 
speech is influenced by speech manner and emerges earlier for female faces. Our data imply 
that younger infants may be less likely to extract multisensory gender information when adults 
are directly talking to them in IDS than when looking at adults engaged in ADS with another. 
Overall, our findings imply that the circumstances of social interaction as well as predominant 
experience with female faces and voices, shape early multisensory abilities to perceive gender. 
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CHAPTER 4  
 
RECONSTRUCTING DYNAMIC MENTAL MODELS OF 
FACIAL EXPRESSIONS IN PROSOPAGNOSIA 
REVEALS DISTINCT REPRESENTATIONS FOR 
IDENTITY AND EXPRESSION 
 
 
 
Richoz, A. R., Jack, R. E., Garrod, O. G., Schyns, P. G., & Caldara, R. (2015). Reconstructing 
dynamic mental models of facial expressions in prosopagnosia reveals distinct representations 
for identity and expression. Cortex, 65, 50-64. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research highlights 
 
à Reconstruction of dynamic mental models of facial expressions in prosopagnosia 
à Contrary to face identity, the patient’s mental models were normal for expression 
à Categorization deficit in the patient for static but not for dynamic expressions 
à Evidence of distinct representations/cortical pathways for face identity and 
expression 
à Evidence of a direct and sufficient cortical pathway to process dynamic facial 
expressions in the pSTS 
 
 
Keywords: Prosopagnosia, Facial expressions of emotion, Reverse correlation 
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4.1 Abstract 
The human face transmits a wealth of signals that readily provide crucial information for social 
interactions, such as facial identity and emotional expression. Yet, a fundamental question 
remains unresolved: does the face information for identity and emotional expression 
categorization tap into common or distinct representational systems? In order to address this 
question, we tested PS, a pure case of acquired prosopagnosia with bilateral occipitotemporal 
lesions anatomically sparing the regions that are assumed to contribute to facial expression 
(de)coding (i.e., the amygdala, the insula, and the posterior superior temporal sulcus – pSTS). 
We previously demonstrated that PS does not use information from the eye region to identify 
faces but relies on the suboptimal mouth region. PS’s abnormal information use for identity, 
coupled with her neural dissociation, provides a unique opportunity to probe the existence of a 
dichotomy in the face representational system. In order to reconstruct the mental models of the 
six basic facial expressions of emotion in PS and the age-matched healthy observers, we used a 
novel reverse correlation technique of tracking information use on dynamic faces. PS was 
comparable to controls, using all facial features to (de)code facial expressions. PS’s normal 
(de)coding of dynamic facial expressions suggests that the face system relies either on distinct 
representational systems for identity and expression or on dissociable cortical pathways to access 
them. Interestingly, PS showed a selective impairment for categorizing many static facial 
expressions, which could be attributed to her lesion in the right inferior occipital gyrus. PS’s 
advantage for dynamic facial expressions might instead relate to a functional and sufficient 
cortical pathway that directly connects the early visual cortex to the spared pSTS. Altogether, 
our data provide critical insights into the healthy and impaired face systems, question evidence 
of deficits obtained from patients using static images, and offer new routes for patient 
rehabilitation.  
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4.2 Introduction 
The human face transmits a wealth of visual signals that are relevant for the identification and 
the categorization of facial expressions of emotion. The brain, as a decoder, flexibly filters the 
incoming visual information transmitted by a face in order to rapidly achieve complex 
perceptual categorizations (Schyns, Petro, & Smith, 2009). For example, the uniqueness of the 
facial features characterizing a given individual and their overall organization in the face 
constitute the core information for identification and also for the differentiation of familiar 
faces from unfamiliar ones. Other signals can also be extracted from faces, which include the 
cues disclosing age (e.g., George & Hole, 1995), gender (e.g., Brown & Perrett, 1993; Ekman & 
Friesen, 1976; 1978; Schyns, Bonnar, & Gosselin, 2002; Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1988), 
race (Caldara & Abdi, 2006; Caldara et al., 2004; Vizioli et al., 2010a; Vizioli, Rousselet, & 
Caldara, 2010b), and emotional state (e.g., Bruce & Young, 1986; Calder & Young, 2005; Ekman 
& Friesen, 1976; 1978; Smith, Cottrell, Gosselin, & Schyns, 2005). Overt emotional states can 
also be extracted from face signals; they are mostly conveyed through facial expressions of 
emotion. The basic signals (i.e., “happiness”, “surprise”, “fear”, “disgust”, “anger”, and “sadness”) 
are only weakly correlated with one another in order to minimize confusions for their decoding 
(Smith et al., 2005), and we recently reported cross-cultural tunings in the way the emotion 
signals are transmitted and decoded (Jack, Blais, Scheepers, Schyns, & Caldara, 2009; Jack, 
Caldara, & Schyns, 2012; Jack, Garrod, Yu, Caldara, & Schyns, 2012). Yet, a primary question 
remains unanswered: does the face information used to recover identity and emotional 
expressions tap into common or distinct representational systems? 
 
According to the influential cognitive (Bruce & Young, 1986) and the neuroanatomical 
(Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000) models of face processing, two distinct functional and 
neural systems carry out the recognition of facial identity and facial expression. The first system 
– performing facial identification (Haxby et al., 2000) – has been proposed to mainly involve 
the inferior occipital gyri and the lateral fusiform gyrus, whereas the second system – 
performing facial expression categorization – has been proposed to involve the inferior occipital 
gyri, the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), and the amygdala (for a review, see Calder 
& Young, 2005; Pessoa, 2008). However, some authors have questioned the idea of 
independence among these systems by mainly relying on the results from computational 
modelling and neuroimaging evidence (Calder, 2011; Calder & Young, 2005). A single model 
based on a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) can achieve independent coding of facial 
identity and facial expression, which suggests the possible existence of a multidimensional 
system wherein the independence is more partial than absolute (Calder, Burton, Miller, Young, 
& Akamatsu, 2001). These simulations have thus challenged the view that an independence 
exists between the coding for identity and expression, or at least suggests that these models are 
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less strongly supported than what is often assumed (Calder & Young, 2005). Complementary to 
this position, Palermo and colleagues (2013) have recently put forward the idea of a first 
common step in the processing of expression and identity and the occurrence of a splitting at a 
later stage – a view that is in agreement with the functional involvement of the inferior occipital 
gyrus as the entry level for both tasks (Calder & Young, 2005; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 
2000; Pitcher, 2014). However, although a neural dissociation for the processing of identity and 
emotional expression is supported by electrophysiological studies in primates (e.g., Hasselmo, 
Rolls, & Baylis, 1989), functional neuroimaging in humans (e.g., Winston, Henson, Fine-
Goulden, & Dolan, 2004) and brain-damaged patients (Haxby et al., 2000), recent evidence 
suggests that the neural computations occurring in the inferior occipital gyrus and the right 
pSTS are functionally distinct and have a causal involvement in the processing of facial 
expressions (Pitcher, 2014). To summarize, more evidence is necessary to clarify this debate 
and, as acknowledged by Calder and Young (2005), further studies with brain-damaged patients 
are necessary in order to probe the hypothesis of distinct visuo-perceptual systems for facial 
identity and facial expression categorization. 
 
As a consequence of brain lesions, some patients lose the ability to detect facial identity, 
despite having no other obvious impairments of the visual system and a preserved identification 
through other modalities (e.g., voice, gait, and so forth). The specificity of this face recognition 
deficit is spectacular and rare and has elicited considerable attention within the 
neuropsychological literature since the first clinical observations (Quaglino, 1867; Wigan, 1844) 
and the introduction of the term “prosopagnosia” by Bodamer (1947). Acquired prosopagnosia 
typically follows brain damage to bilateral occipitotemporal areas (e.g., Damasio, Damasio, & 
Van Hoesen, 1982; Farah, 1990; Landis, Regard, Bliestle, & Kleihues, 1988; Sergent & Signoret, 
1992). Anatomical descriptions of prosopagnosia endorse the necessary and sufficient role of the 
right hemisphere (Landis et al., 1988; Sergent & Signoret, 1992) in the occipitotemporal 
pathway of face processing (for a review, see Bouvier & Engel, 2004). The clinical and 
anatomical conditions of prosopagnosia have always received a considerable amount of interest 
in the domain of cognitive neuroscience, as they clarify the neurofunctional mechanisms of 
normal face processing. The different sub-functions of the cognitive architecture of face 
processing have been isolated by the occurrence of distinct double dissociations in brain-
damaged patients, for instance, a functional segregation between the ability to recognize 
unfamiliar and familiar faces (e.g., Malone, Morris, Kay, & Levin, 1982) and between lip 
reading and face identification (Campbell, Landis, & Regard, 1986). Yet, the neuropsychological 
literature remains controversial on the spared ability of prosopagnosic patients to identify facial 
expressions despite their inability to recognize facial identity, and on patients showing impaired 
facial expression recognition with preserved facial identity recognition (for a detailed review, 
see Calder, 2011). Some acquired prosopagnosic patients displayed a marked impairment in the 
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categorization of facial expressions (Bowers, Bauer, Coslett, & Heilman, 1985; De Gelder, 
Pourtois, Vroomen, & Bachoud-Levi, 2000; De Renzi & Di Pellegrino, 1998; Humphreys, 
Donnelly, & Riddoch, 1993). Other studies reported preserved recognition of emotion in 
acquired prosopagnosia (Bruyer et al., 1983; Cole & Perez-Cruet, 1964; Mattson, Levin, & 
Grafman, 2000; Sergent & Villemure, 1989; Shuttleworth, Syring, & Allen, 1982; Tranel et al., 
1988; Young, Newcombe, de Haan, Small, & Hay, 1993). In addition, as pointed out by Calder 
and Young (2005) and Calder (2011), the decoding of face identity and facial expressions of 
emotion activates a similar network of regions in the occipito-temporal cortex. Facial expression 
impairments in patients are often correlated with an inability to decode emotions from other 
modalities, which suggests a general, multi-modal deficit in these patients, instead of a selective 
impairment of facial expression representations. In addition, a better understanding of the 
patients’ information use (i.e., representations) for both tasks is necessary in order to clearly 
understand the very nature of the deficits in the face processing system (Calder and Young 
2005; Calder et al., 2011). Consequently, the question of dissociation between identity and 
expression systems in acquired cases of prosopagnosia remains unclear. 
 
In order to address this issue, we tested PS – a pure case of acquired prosopagnosia. PS 
is a 67-year-old woman (born in 1950), who sustained a closed-head injury in 1992. PS shows 
normal object recognition (e.g., Busigny, Graf, Mayer, & Rossion, 2010; Rossion et al., 2003) 
and relies on atypical cues to determine the identity of a person, which include voice, clothes, 
or other salient non-face features (e.g., glasses, haircut, beard, posture). She has major lesions 
on the left mid-ventral and the right inferior occipital cortex. Minor lesions on the left posterior 
cerebellum and the right middle temporal gyrus were also detected (for a complete anatomical 
description, see Rossion, 2008; Sorger, Goebel, Schiltz, & Rossion, 2007), whereas the regions 
that are assumed to be critical for the decoding of emotional expressions (i.e., the amygdala, the 
insula, and the pSTS) are anatomically spared. Note that even if the occipital temporal regions 
do not play a central role for facial expression decoding, the right inferior occipital gyrus is 
damaged in PS and represents the entry level for expression and identity in posited 
neuroanatomical models (Haxby et al., 2000; Pitcher, 2014). Thus, it remains to be clarified 
whether these lesions in the patient also have an impact on the processing of facial expressions. 
Of interest, we previously used a response classification technique – Bubbles – to reveal the 
diagnostic information used by PS for face identification (Caldara et al., 2005). Bubbles is a 
response classification technique, which samples the information in a 3D space (2D image x 
spatial frequencies) to present sparse versions of the faces as stimuli (Gosselin & Schyns, 2001, 
for more details, see Box 6). Observers categorize the sparse stimuli, and Bubbles keep track of 
the samples of information that lead to the correct and the incorrect identification responses. 
From this information, we can establish the way in which each region of the input space 
contributes to face identification performance and depict the diagnostic information that is used 
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to effectively decode the stimulus. In contrast to healthy observers, PS did not use information 
from the eye region to identify familiar faces, but instead used the lower part of the face, 
including the mouth and the external contours. In summary, PS’s well-established bias to use 
information from the mouth to identify faces and her anatomical neural dissociation provide a 
unique opportunity to probe the existence of a dichotomy in the representations used for facial 
identity and expression categorization.  
 
Here, we have first assessed her categorization performance of the six facial expressions 
of emotion, using the classical Ekman and Friesen (1976) FACS (Facial Action Coding System) 
static face database. The FACS provides an anatomical taxonomy of the human muscles that 
are activated during the transmission of facial expressions of emotion (Ekman & Friesen, 1978), 
by quantifying facial movements for every expression in terms of so-called action units (AUs), 
each of which relate to a particular muscle. We then modelled PS’s 3D dynamic mental 
representations of the six classic facial expressions by using a dynamic FACS-based generative 
face grammar (GFG) (see Figure 4.1, the methods section, and Yu, Garrod, & Schyns, 2012) on 
the AUs, combined with a reverse correlation technique (see the methods and also Jack et al., 
2012). The use of dynamic facial expressions provides a more ecologically valid approach for 
studying the perception and processing of facial expressions, as our natural environment is 
surrounded by dynamic, temporal, and multimodal information (Johnston, Mayes, Hughes, & 
Young, 2013). Pertinently, it has also been recently demonstrated that there is a causal 
involvement of the right pSTS in the processing of dynamic facial information (Pitcher et al., 
2014), a region anatomically spared in the case of PS. 
 
The main goal of our study was to test whether the representations for identity and 
facial expressions are distinct or common. Mapping out the facial features used by a 
prosopagnosic patient to perform facial expression categorization is necessary to achieve this 
goal (Calder & Young, 2005). As PS shows a sub-optimal use of facial information for identity 
(i.e., by using the mouth region and the external contours), we put forward the hypothesis that 
if she adequately uses all facial features for expression categorization, this observation would 
support the hypothesis of distinct sets of representations for identity and emotion recognition. 
4.3 Participants 
PS’s Case Report 
PS is a 67-year-old case of acquired prosopagnosia with normal object recognition. Despite the 
multiple and extensive brain lesions in the occipitotemporal cortex, PS recovered well in the 
months following her accident and with support from neuropsychological rehabilitation, she 
restarted working as a kindergarten teacher. PS’s low-level vision is well preserved with a good 
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visual acuity in both eyes, except for a small right paracentral scotoma. She reads normally 
(although slowly) and has normal object perception and recognition, even for subordinate-level 
discriminations (Rossion et al., 2003). However, as a consequence of the lesions, she reports 
that her face recognition is severely impaired, even for close relatives (husband, children, 
mother, father) and herself. PS can categorize a face as a face and discriminate faces from 
objects and from a complex scene background, even at brief presentations (Schiltz et al., 2006). 
Her ability to categorize gender is impaired, in terms of both accuracy and sensitivity (Rossion 
et al., 2003). Her performance in categorizing facial expressions is not as good as those of 
controls. In a 3AFC expression categorization task where the stimuli were presented for a 
maximum of 10 seconds, PS’s reaction times were significantly slower than those of the controls 
and her response accuracy was below the range for the first block of expressions comprising 
happiness, fear, and anger. However, her performance was collapsed across the expressions 
presented within a block and she was normal for the second block that tested disgust, sadness, 
and surprise (Rossion et al., 2003). Therefore, we had to assess PS’s categorization accuracy of 
static facial expressions properly through the use of a 7AFC task (Experiment 1). PS is able to 
correctly draw a schematic face and perfectly point out all the single features and estimate age 
in the normal range. This latter result contrasts her inability to recognize previously seen or 
familiar faces and to match unfamiliar faces, including changes in viewpoints (Rossion et al., 
2003). As reported by Rossion and colleagues (2003), she is ranked as highly impaired on the 
Benton Face Matching Test (Benton & Van Allen, 1972) scoring 27/54 (percentile 1). She is also 
impaired on the Short Recognition Memory Test for Faces, a set of the Camden Memory Tests 
(Warrington, 1984), scoring 18/25 (percentile 3). When confronted with the pictures of 60 
famous people (all known by the patient), she was able to classify 14 of them as familiar and 
correctly classified all the unfamiliar ones (Rossion et al., 2003). Nevertheless, when asked to 
report the individual names of the faces classified as familiar, as well as their semantic 
information, she was correct regarding only four of them. Finally, PS has been tested extensively 
with simultaneous and delayed face and non-face (cars and novel objects) matching tasks in 
previous studies (Rossion et al., 2003). Although she is consistently impaired and slowed down 
for the face conditions, her performance with the non-face objects is in the normal range. Given 
the restriction of her deficit to the face category and the fact that PS is alert, cooperative, and 
without any learning difficulties (Caldara et al., 2005), she represents an ideal case to isolate 
the nature of the facial information extracted by an impaired face system for the processing of 
facial expressions.  
 
Control participants 
The age-matched healthy observers who voluntarily took part in our experiments had normal 
or corrected to normal vision with no neurological or psychiatric history. The number of healthy 
observers and their age is reported in the method section of each experiment. For all our 
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experiments, PS and the control participants signed a consent form describing the main goals 
of our experiments. The Ethical Committee of the Department of Psychology of the University 
of Fribourg approved all the studies reported here. 
4.4 Experiments 
4.4.1 Preliminary experiment: Categorization of the six classic facial expressions of emotion  
We first assessed the categorization accuracy of static facial expressions using a standard set of 
posed facial expression stimuli – the Pictures of Facial Affect series (POFA) (Ekman & Friesen, 
1976; 1978). 
 
4.4.1.1 Material and methods 
Control participants 
Twelve age-matched healthy control subjects (eight females) participated in the experiment (Mage 
= 59.41; SD = 3.98).  
 
Stimuli 
We selected seven posed facial expression images from 22 identities (11 females) – one per 
emotion category (happiness, surprise, fear, disgust, anger, sadness, and neutral) – from the 
Pictures of Facial Affect (POFA) database (Ekman & Friesen, 1976; 1978). The pictures were in 
grayscale and were not cropped. 
 
Procedure 
Observers categorized each stimulus according to one of seven possibilities (happiness, surprise, 
fear, disgust, anger, sadness, and neutral) in a 7AFC task using a computer keyboard in which 
we labelled the keys accordingly. Each image was presented for 2000 ms in random order in 
the center of the observers’ visual field with 30 repetitions of each expression, resulting in a 
total of 210 trials. Faces subtended a visual angle of 9.54° (vertical) and 8.11° (horizontal) on the 
screen. 
 
4.4.1.2 Results and discussions 
In order to determine whether PS’s average accuracy is significantly different from that of the 
age-matched healthy participants, we used a modified independent samples t-test for single case 
studies (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002). The statistical level of significance is p < 0.05. As shown 
in Table 4.1, PS’s categorization of static, posed, FACS-coded facial expressions is significantly 
impaired for anger (t(11) = –4.38, p < 0.05), fear (t(11) = –2.41, p < 0.05), surprise (t(11) = –2.69, p 
< 0.05), and sadness (t(11) = –3.27, p < 0.05), compared to the age-matched healthy controls. 
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Table 4.1. Recognition accuracy of PS and age-matched controls on Ekman and Friesen’s 
facial expression recognition test 
PS showed impaired recognition of anger, fear, surprise, and sadness, compared to healthy controls.  
 
* p < 0.05 
 
 
 
4.4.2 Experiment 1: Reconstructing PS’s dynamic mental models of facial expressions of 
emotion  
Using a novel method, we modelled the 3D dynamic mental representations of the six facial 
expressions plus the neutral of PS and control participants, by using the FACS-based generative 
face grammar (GFG) computer graphics platform and a reverse correlation technique.  
 
4.4.2.1 Material and methods 
Control participants 
Five healthy age-matched controls (three women) participated in the experiment (Mage = 60.2; 
SD = 3.27).  
 
Stimuli 
Using the GFG (Jack, Garrod, et al., 2012; Yu et al., 2012), we synthesized a series of 
photorealistic facial animations by randomly selecting a subset of groups of muscles that move 
in synergy on the face – action units (AUs) (Ekman & Friesen, 1976; 1978). Practically, they 
were measured and modelled in 4D (3D face plus time) from the mapping of actors trained by 
Ekman to produce them. Existing as mathematical models in the GFG, we can animate each 
AU over time independently, using six temporal parameters (onset, acceleration, peak 
amplitude, peak latency, deceleration, offset) (see Figure 4.1 and Movie 1 for an example 
stimulus).
 
 
PS  Age-matched controls 
Score % Modified t-test Mean % SD % 
Ekman and Friesen (1978)     
Anger 36.33 –4.38* 71.95 8.46 
Disgust 88.55 1.53 79.45 6.16 
Happiness 97.78 0.55 96.11 3.12 
Neutral 79.17 1.47 72.40 4.77 
Fear 45.67 –2.41* 67.22 9.30 
Surprise 48.89 –2.69* 70.00 8.16 
Sadness 47.22 –3.27* 70.00 7.24 
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Figure 4.1. FACS-based generator of random facial muscle activations. Left: Stimulus 
generation – On each trial, the generative face grammar (GFG) randomly selected a subset of action 
units (AUs; AU17, AU10L, and AU9 are shown here with color-coded labels) and values for six 
temporal parameters (see the color-coded AU curves that illustrate the amplitude and acceleration 
or deceleration of movement over time). The color-coded vector at the bottom of the figure represents 
the three (of 41) randomly selected AUs that make up the stimulus on this illustrative experimental 
trial. We then applied the random facial animation to one of eight neutral-expression face identities 
using the procedure described in Yu, Garrod, and Schyns (2012). Right: Mental representations – 
Observers categorized each random facial animation according to the six basic emotion categories 
(plus “don’t know”) and rated the emotional intensity on a five-point scale. Observers will interpret 
the random facial animation as a meaningful facial expression (here, “disgust,” “medium intensity”) 
when the facial movements correspond to the observer’s mental representation of that facial 
expression. 
 
4. FACIAL EXPRESSION RECOGNITION AND PROSOPAGNOSIA 
 
 
 
 
 120 
Each animation is displayed on one of eight unfamiliar 3D photorealistic white 
Caucasian face identities (four females), which were acquired with a 3D photorealistic capture 
system (Dimensional Imaging). In any given trial, the GFG selects a subsample of AUs amongst 
the 41 core AUs using a binomial distribution (n = 5, p = 0.6, median = 3). The mental 
representation of each facial expression was then modelled for each observer by reverse 
correlating the random AUs and their temporal parameters with the observer’s emotion 
responses. This technique has been validated in previous studies (Gill, Garrod, Jack, & Schyns, 
2014; Caldara et al., 2012; Garrod et al., 2012).  
 
Procedure 
The experiment consisted of 12 sessions of four blocks that ran on a computer with the use of 
a code written with Adobe Flash. Each block included 50 trials, consisting of 4D facial 
animations (3D + time), displaying a random subset of AUs movements. All the observers 
categorized a total number of 2400 of such animations, comprising 30 frames (24 frames/second) 
of 1.25 seconds duration. The facial animations subtended approximately 9.54° (vertically) and 
6.68° (horizontally) of visual angle. For each trial, observers viewed the facial animation and 
categorized it according to the six basic emotions: happiness, surprise, fear, disgust, anger, and 
sadness and a “don’t know” response. Furthermore, observers rated the intensity of the perceived 
emotion on a five-point rating scale (“Very weak” to “Very strong”). We adapted the response to 
our senior population using the Geneva Emotion Wheel (GEW), which was introduced by 
Scherer (2005). We labelled the emotion categories in the outer boundaries of a circle, with the 
“don’t know” response option in the center. Additionally, we used five circles gradually 
increasing from the center towards the respective emotional category placed on the border in 
order to allow participants to report the intensity of the perceived facial expression. Observers 
navigated with a mouse to select the basic emotion and its intensity. We did not provide feedback 
and did not place any time pressure on participants (including PS) to respond. All of the 
observers were familiar with using a computer and did not have difficulty with this interface. 
The whole experiment lasted for about six hours, over a period of six weeks. 
 
4.4.2.2 Results 
Representation of the six basic emotions. For each participant, we modelled the mental representations 
of the six basic emotions, by reverse correlating the Action Units (AUs) randomly selected for 
each trial with the responses of the observers. For each observer, this resulted in a 41-
dimensional (one dimension per AU) ON/OFF vector, with ON AUs being significantly 
correlated with an emotion category. The p-value of 0.05 was used to determine whether the 
correlation coefficient between each AU’s presence or absence and the participant’s emotional 
response was significantly larger than zero. For the final models, only those AUs whose 
correlation coefficient was significantly larger than zero were displayed, but the regression 
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coefficients for each AU were not affected by whether or not other AUs were deemed 
significantly correlated or not. We then regressed for each ON AU, the six temporal parameters 
with the intensity responses of observers in order to model the activation dynamics (Jack et al., 
2012; Garrod et al., 2012; Yu et al., 2012). Figures 4.2 and 4.3 report the results. Figure 4.2 
illustrates the static version of the dynamic stimuli, computed by collapsing the highest 
amplitude of each AU involved in the models of the “Very Strong” intensity judgment. Figure 
4.3 represents a static rendering of the facial parts that move (with the amplitude of movement 
represented in millimetres). 
 
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 indicate that the models of PS are within the range of those of 
controls. That is, for each individual expression, at least one control is very similar to that of 
PS (e.g. as Figure 4.3 reveals, PS’s “happiness” is similar to all controls’ “surprise” to control 5, 
“fear” to 5 again, “disgust” to at least control 3, “anger” to control 4, and “sadness” to control 
number 3). Movie 2 presents the 4D dynamic version of the mental models of PS and Movies 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, those of the five control subjects. In order to test whether the patients’ AUs 
preferences for each emotion fell within the normal range of the population, we computed 
Pearson correlations between each of the patient’s AUs ON/OFF vectors and the corresponding 
vectors for the control group (Table 4.2, column 1). 
 
 
Table 4.2. PS’s AUs preferences fell within the normal range of controls. For each expression, 
Pearson correlations fell between PS’s ON/OFF AU vectors and age-matched controls (column 1). 
Permutations of one control with other controls produced the expected correlations (column 2). Z-
score difference between patient-controls correlations and the expected correlations (column 3). None 
of those differences was significant. 
 
 
A permutation test confirmed that the 95% confidence interval of the expected 
correlation (between any control and the remaining controls, Table 4.2, column 2) for the null 
hypothesis (Patient = Controls) contained the correlation between the patient and the controls 
for each of the six emotions. Table 4.2, column 3 contains the difference between the patient-
 
 
 
PS vs. Age-matched controls,  
Pearson Correlations 
 
PS vs. Controls Expected Correlation Z-scored difference 
 
Static reconstructed model 
 
   
Anger 0.3028 0.2020 0.9096 
Disgust 0.4131 0.3585 0.3630 
Happiness 0.5027 0.5679 0.8744 
Fear 0.0175 0.0745 0.4265 
Surprise 0.4185 0.3638 0.5040 
Sadness 0.1040 0.1053 –0.0096 
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controls correlations and the mean of the permutation test correlations expressed as Z-scores. 
PS fell in the normal range for the AU preference. 
 
4.4.2.3 Discussion 
The reconstructed mental models of PS reveal that her representations of facial expressions are 
comparable to those of the age-matched controls. The fact that PS uses information from the 
eye region to represent basic emotions, as demonstrated by the analysis on the deviation maps, 
is of interest. These results conflict with her inability to accurately categorize most of the static, 
posed facial expressions of the Ekman and Friesen (1978) face database (i.e., anger, fear, surprise, 
and sad). How can we reconcile such a discrepancy? 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. PS’s and controls’ reconstructed mental models of happiness, surprise, fear, 
disgust, anger, and sadness. Positive correlation coefficients between active Action Units and 
emotional responses are represented as AU intensity. Active AUs for a given observer and emotion 
correspond to those whose correlation coefficient is significantly greater than zero (p < 0.05, one-
tailed). Rows: Observer (top row PS, bottom rows controls). Columns: Emotion (happiness, surprise, 
fear, disgust, anger, sadness). 
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Figure 4.3. Deviation maps of PS’s and controls’ reconstructed mental models of happiness, 
surprise, fear, disgust, anger, and sadness. Colour scale represents peak magnitude of facial 
movement relative to neutral over the course of the expression at the corresponding position on the 
face. Facial movements are the combinations of active AUs weighted by positive Pearson correlation 
coefficients (negative correlations are not shown) with emotional responses. Active AUs for a given 
observer and emotion correspond to those whose correlation coefficient is significantly greater than 
zero (p < 0.05, one-tailed). Rows: Observer (top row PS, bottom rows controls). Columns: Emotion 
(happiness, surprise, fear, disgust, anger, sadness). 
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4.4.3 Experiment 2: Assessing the categorization of facial expressions of emotion with PS’s 
static and dynamic reconstructed mental models 
In order to clarify our previous observations, we conducted a verification task in which we 
presented PS and a new group of age-matched controls with static and dynamic mental models 
of the patient and asked all observers to categorize the facial expressions of these stimuli. 
 
4.4.3.1 Material and methods 
Control participants 
A new group of 10 age-matched controls (six women) and PS participated in the experiment 
(Mage = 58.4; SD = 4.19).  
 
Stimuli 
Static reconstructed models. This experiment comprised static and dynamic versions of the same 
facial expressions. That is, for each dynamic 4D model (3D + time), we created a static version 
by collapsing time, keeping only the highest amplitude of each AU involved in the model (see 
Figure 4.2 and Movies 2 & 3 for example). We used PS’s mental models of each of the basic 
emotions (happiness, surprise, fear, disgust, anger, and sadness) at three levels of intensity (low, 
medium, and high). The judgment of intensity was only kept to maintain attention and provide 
observers with a fine-grained scale, but its analysis is beyond the scope of the present work. 
This resulted in 18 facial expressions, presented six times, for a given total of 108 images. The 
faces were subtending the same visual angles as in the previous experiment and were presented 
for 1250 ms.  
Dynamic reconstructed models. Each dynamic facial expression consisted of 30 frames (24 
frames/second) and lasted for 1250 ms. The facial animations and their static versions were 
covering the same visual angle of the previous experiment. 
 
Procedure 
Static reconstructed models. The stimuli were presented in a random order, one at a time, on the 
computer screen. PS and the controls were instructed to categorize each stimulus as accurately 
as possible by pressing one of the six labelled keys on the computer keyboard (one per 
expression). No feedback was provided.  
 
Dynamic reconstructed models. We used 12 animations for each emotion (four per intensity) for a 
total of 72 trials. These animations were taken from the same identities used for the static 
presentation. After each presentation, observers categorized the dynamic facial expression 
according to the six classic emotions (i.e., happiness, surprise, fear, disgust, anger, and sadness), 
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as accurately as possible by pressing one of the six labelled keyboard keys (one per expression). 
No feedback was provided.  
 
4.4.3.2 Results and discussion 
Static and dynamic reconstructed models. PS could not categorize the static version of many of her 
own mental models of facial expressions (Figure 4.4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Assessing categorization of facial expressions of emotion with PS’s reconstructed 
mental models. The figure shows PS’s percentage accuracy score for the recognition of happiness, 
surprise, fear, disgust, anger, and sadness, from her static and dynamic reconstructed mental models. 
With the exception of fear, PS showed the maximum accuracy score of 100% for the recognition of 
all the dynamic emotions. 
 
 
As shown in Table 4.3, PS was significantly impaired in the recognition of the static 
images of her own mental models of anger (t(9) = –2.04, p < 0.05), disgust (t(9) = –3.008, p < 0.05) 
and surprise (t(9) = –2.57, p < 0.05). In contrast, the controls categorized the static models of PS 
successfully, with the exception of “fear”. In addition, PS categorized her own dynamic mental 
models (with the exception of fear) without difficulty. She was perfectly accurate for “anger, 
disgust, happiness, surprise, and sadness”. A one-way repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was performed in order to examine whether dynamic presentations facilitated 
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performance for controls in the same way as PS. There was no significant effect of display 
presentation (static vs. dynamic) (F(1,18) = 0.74, p = 0.4) and no significant interaction of emotion 
x display presentation (F(1,18) = 0.14, p = 0.98). 
 
 
Table 4.3. Percentage accuracy score of PS and age-matched controls for PS’s static and 
dynamic reconstructed mental models. The scores are given for the recognition of anger, disgust, 
happiness, fear, surprise, and sadness (Experiment 2).  
 
4.4.4 Experiment 3: Assessing categorization of facial expressions of average static and 
dynamic reconstructed mental models 
In order to verify whether PS’s ability to categorize dynamic emotional expressions is restricted 
to the recognition of the expressions reconstructed from her mental model, we assessed her 
ability to categorize average static and dynamic reconstructed mental models. Given the limited 
number of mental models from the healthy controls in the present experiment, we reconstructed 
an average mental model by using the data of 30 Westerner observers of our previous study 
(Jack et al., 2012). In line with Experiment 2, this comprised the categorization of static and 
dynamic versions of the same facial expressions.  
 
4.4.4.1 Material and methods 
Control participants 
PS and 12 age-matched control subjects (seven women) took part in this experiment (Mage = 59; 
SD = 3.71).  
 
 
PS Age-matched controls 
Score % Modified t-test Mean % SD % 
 
Static reconstructed model 
 
    
Anger 16.67 –2.04* 80.03 32.19 
Disgust 25.00 –3.008* 90.00 22.49 
Happiness 86.11 –1.04 96.67 10.54 
Fear 8.33 –0.05 10.00 31.62 
Surprise 25.00 –2.57* 83.33 23.57 
Sadness 41.67 –0.80 73.33 40.98 
 
 
Dynamic reconstructed model 
 
Anger 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
0.56 
 
 
 
 
81.67 
 
 
 
 
33.75 
Disgust 100 0.49 93.33 14.05 
Happiness 100 0.33 96.67 10.54 
Fear 17 – 0 0 
Surprise 100 0.76 74.97 34.52 
Sadness 100 0.85 68.27 38.95 
*p < 0.05 
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Stimuli 
Average static and dynamic 4D mental models. We used an average of the mental models of 30 
Westerners for each of the basic emotions (Jack et al., 2012), all presenting the highest level of 
intensity. We then rendered these models on 10 Caucasian actors (five females). The faces 
randomly expressed the six basic emotional expressions of fear, happiness, anger, disgust, 
sadness, and surprise. As done in the previous experiment, we created a static version of the 
average models by collapsing the time factor and retaining only the highest amplitude of each 
AU involved in the model (Figure 4.5). All observers were required to categorize both the static 
and dynamic facial expressions of the stimuli. We then randomly sampled all the mental models 
of each of the basic emotions 10 times on each face, which resulted in a total of 60 trials in 
both static and dynamic conditions. The faces subtended the same visual angle as seen in the 
previous experiment, and each stimulus was presented for 1250 ms in random order at the 
centre of the screen.  
 
 
      
HAPPINESS SURPRISE FEAR DISGUST ANGER SADNESS 
 
Figure 4.5. Average static reconstructed mental model for the expressions of happiness, 
surprise, fear, disgust, anger, and sadness. The static version of the average models was created by 
collapsing the time factor and keeping only the highest amplitude of each AU involved in the model. 
 
 
Procedure 
We followed the same procedure as the one in Experiment 2.  
 
4.4.4.2 Results and discussion 
PS was impaired in categorizing the static emotions of fear (t(11) = –2.15, p < 0.05), as well as 
sadness (t(11) = –2.70, p < 0.05) from the average mental models, compared to the age-matched 
healthy control observers (see Table 4.4). However, PS was accurate in categorizing all the 
dynamic emotions. Her performance for decoding fear from the dynamic average of healthy 
mental models was preserved.  
 
For the controls, a repeated-measures ANOVA yielded a statistically significant main 
effect of the presentation (static vs. dynamic) (F(1, 22) = 9.48, p < 0.05), reflecting that the average 
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performance with dynamic presentations was higher (M = 83.61%, SD = 9.55%) than with static 
ones (M = 71.25%, SD = 19.94%). A highly significant emotion x presentation interaction (F(1, 22) 
= 7.45, p < 0.001), indicated that the accuracy scores for dynamic presentations were higher for 
some emotions but not for others. Post-hoc t-tests revealed that this effect was driven only by 
“surprise”, which was significantly higher with the dynamic presentation (M = 89.17%, SD = 
13.79%) than with its static version (M = 39.17%, SD = 17.30%) (t(11) = 7.54, p < 0.001). 
 
Table 4.4. Percentage accuracy score of PS and age-matched controls for average static and 
dynamic reconstructed mental models 
The scores are given for the recognition of anger, disgust, happiness, fear, surprise, and sadness. 
4.5 General discussion 
Influential theoretical (Bruce & Young, 1986) and neuroanatomical (Haxby et al., 2000) models 
of face processing have suggested the existence of distinct cortical pathways for face 
identification and expression categorization, a view that has also been challenged (Calder & 
Young, 2005). The main goal of the present study was to clarify whether the face information 
of identity and emotional expression categorization tap into common or distinct representational 
systems. To tackle this issue, brain-damaged patients can be very informative, as from their 
lesions, their specific behavioural impairments, and information use it is possible to infer the 
critical role played by the damaged regions in the healthy operating system. We first assessed 
the ability of PS – a pure case of acquired prosopagnosia – to categorize static facial expressions. 
 
 
PS Age-matched controls 
Score % Modified t-test Mean % SD % 
Static reconstructed models 
 
    
Anger 53.33 –0.20 60.00 –0.20 
Disgust 76.67 –0.23 80.83 –0.23 
Happiness 90.00 –1.72 97.50 –1.72 
Fear 33.33 –2.15* 71.67 –2.15 
Surprise 40.00 –0.05 39.17 0.05 
Sadness 56.57 –2.70* 78.33 –2.70 
 
 
Dynamic reconstructed models  
 
    
Anger 
Disgust 
90 
100 
0.40 
1.21 
79.17 
73.33 
25.39 
21.03 
Happiness 100 0.41 98.33 3.89 
Fear 90 0.60 75.00 23.93 
Surprise 
Sadness 
100 
100 
0.75 
0.66 
89.17 
86.66 
13.79 
19.23 
*p < 0.05 
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PS was impaired for many facial expressions of the Ekman and Friesen’s faces. Second, we 
modelled her mental representations of happiness, surprise, fear, disgust, anger, and sadness. 
Our overarching goal was thus to map out the facial features used by the patient in order to 
achieve this biologically relevant task, considering the fact that we previously reported a 
suboptimal use of the eye region for face identification in the same patient (Caldara et al., 2005). 
Surprisingly, her dynamic mental models of facial expressions revealed an appropriate use of 
all facial features and Action Units (AUs – facial muscles), for all facial expressions. Since PS 
does not merely use the mouth during this task, these results suggest that the mental 
representations of facial expressions are anatomically separate, or that they are common but 
can be accessed from a distinct (cortical) route from face identification. Regardless of either 
potential explanation, our data support the view of a discrete (neural) coding for expression and 
identity. 
 
The normal representations of dynamic facial expressions in PS, coupled with the 
impairment in the categorization of many of the static Ekman faces, came as a surprise to us 
and raised unexpected novel questions. How could PS have appropriate dynamic models of 
facial expressions and not be able to recognize them when presented in the form of static 
images? We thus designed subsequent verification tasks in which the patient was asked to 
categorize her and average static and dynamic reconstructed mental models of facial expressions 
of emotion. These experiments revealed a clear-cut dissociation. PS was selectively impaired in 
the categorization of many facial expressions of her and the average static reconstructed models. 
In stark contrast, she excelled with the very same dynamic models, a pattern of results that can 
be explained by her particular set of lesions. Moreover, in general, this result points to the use 
of dynamic stimuli as being critical in the assessment of facial expression recognition with 
brain-damaged patients and questions the sole use of static face images towards this aim. We 
now discuss, in turn, each of these findings and their implications. 
4.5.1 Does the face system rely on common or distinct representations for identity and 
expression? 
In order to investigate whether facial identity and expression decoding is tapping into common 
or distinct representational systems, we mapped out the different facial features/AUs used by a 
pure case of acquired prosopagnosia for categorizing facial expressions. PS displayed abnormal 
performance in categorizing most of the classic facial expressions (i.e., anger, fear, surprise, and 
sadness) of the well-known Ekman and Friesen database (Ekman & Friesen, 1976; 1978), 
whereas the age-matched control group displayed a normal range performance (Calder et al., 
2003). The analysis of the reconstructed models clearly revealed that PS is comparable with the 
age-matched control observers and uses similar facial muscles (i.e., AUs) and similar temporal 
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dynamics in order to represent the six classic emotions. Thus, contrary to our previous 
observations for face recognition (Caldara et al., 2005), PS used all facial features/AUs to 
reconstruct facial expressions, favouring the view of distinct representations for expression and 
identity1. In line with these positions, neuroimaging studies have revealed that the fusiform 
gyrus is sensitive both to facial identity and facial expression information (e.g., Cohen Kadosh, 
Henson, Cohen Kadosh, Johnson, & Dick, 2010; Fox, Moon, Iaria, & Barton, 2009; Narumoto, 
Okada, Sadato, Fukui, & Yonekura, 2001). Calder (2011) suggested that the fusiform gyrus 
contributes primarily to the analysis of the visual form of faces for both the tasks, whereas the 
pSTS is involved in the coding of the changeable aspects of faces (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 
2000). PS thus relies on the fusiform gyrus during face identification and the pSTS during 
facial expression recognition. This explanation may be partially accounted by a previous 
neuroimaging study that used a neural adaptation paradigm with the patient. Schiltz and 
colleagues (2006) observed that contrary to normal observers, the neural activations of PS’s 
right fusiform gyrus could not discriminate between the repetition of identical and different 
faces. This result suggests that the fine-grained visual form analysis necessary to effectively 
perform face identification requires the integrity of the face network and/or an optimal use of 
all the facial features. In contrast, the pSTS is anatomically and functionally spared in PS 
(Sorger et al., 2007) and could account for her normal facial information use for facial expression 
categorization. Despite favouring this view, we cannot completely and firmly rule out an 
alternative scenario in which the face system has a common set of representations, and the 
access may occur from distinct cortical pathways – one for face identification (through the 
inferior occipital gyrus) and one for expressions (through the pSTS). Importantly, both 
explanations suggest the existence of a discrete coding for expression and identity, and a future 
neuroimaging study is necessary to provide a clear-cut picture of those scenarios and precisely 
isolate the brain regions dedicated to the decoding of static and dynamic faces in PS, for both 
face identity and expression categorization. 
 
On a general note, the use of dynamic reverse correlation techniques represents a 
unique tool for the understanding of patient impairments and their rehabilitation. For instance, 
a growing number of studies have indicated that schizophrenic patients are impaired in the 
recognition of the six basic facial emotional expressions (e.g., Kohler, Bilker, Hagendoorn, Gur, 
& Gur, 2000; Kohler et al., 2003; Kohler, Turner, Gur, & Gur, 2004; Martin, Baudouin, 
Tiberghien, & Franck, 2005; Sachs, Steger-Wuchse, Kryspin-Exner, Gur, & Katschnig, 2004). 
A selective impairment in recognizing fear and disgust has also been shown for unaffected 
relatives (Mendoza et al., 2011). Revealing the precise (defective) facial information use in these 
                                               
1According to this scenario, it could be possible that there are shared mechanisms represented in a multiple node 
network, with some nodes being responsible for the processing of identity and others for the recognition of facial 
expressions. Some of the nodes related to face identification would be severely damaged in PS. 
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populations might help in tailoring rehabilitation-training programs. Gaze-contingent eye 
tracking paradigms (Caldara, Zhou, & Miellet, 2010; Miellet, Caldara, & Schyns, 2011; Miellet 
et al., 2012) will be well suited for this purpose, as they can force the viewing of a particular 
diagnostic features during a categorization task (see also Adolphs et al., 2005), which hopefully 
improves performance. 
4.5.2 Advantage in decoding dynamic facial expression in prosopagnosia 
Our study clearly points to an advantage in decoding dynamic versus static images for the 
categorization of facial expressions in PS only. Dynamic facial expressions provide observers 
with richer, more unique, and ecologically-valid representations, which should facilitate their 
processing (e.g., Giard & Peronnet, 1999; Johnston, Mayes, Hughes, & Young, 2013; LaBar, 
Crupain, Voyvodic, & McCarthy, 2003; Paulmann, Jessen, & Kotz, 2009; Sato, Kochiyama, 
Yoshikawa, Naito, & Matsumura, 2004; Trautmann, Fehr, & Herrmann, 2009). However, the 
advantage in the processing of the dynamic over the static emotional stimuli in healthy 
observers is controversial (for a review, see Fiorentini & Viviani, 2011). Some studies have 
showed an advantage (e.g., Ambadar, Schooler, & Cohn, 2005; Cunningham & Wallraven, 2009; 
Giard & Peronnet, 1999; Knappmeyer, Thornton, & Bulthoff, 2003; Paulmann et al., 2009; 
Wehrle, Kaiser, Schmidt, & Scherer, 2000), whereas others have revealed that the benefits of 
dynamic properties in processing facial information may be minimal (e.g., Gold et al., 2013) or 
inexistent (e.g., Fiorentini & Viviani, 2011).   
 
Importantly, the dynamic advantage that we observed in PS could be attributed to her 
specific set of lesions. It has been recently noted that the right inferior occipital gyrus – 
anatomically damaged in PS – is causally engaged in the processing of static face images (Pitcher 
et al., 2014) and expressions (Pitcher, 2014). On the contrary, the pSTS – anatomically spared 
in PS – has been related to the processing of dynamic faces (Pitcher et al., 2014) and expressions 
(Pitcher, 2014). Consequently, our data suggest that the inferior occipital gyrus plays a critical 
role in the decoding of static facial expressions (as the patient shows an impairment), but the 
pSTS is sufficient for effectively decoding facial expressions from dynamic visual inputs (for 
which the patient shows a normal performance). Greater responses for dynamic compared to 
static facial expressions have been found in the fusiform gyrus and the pSTS in the right 
hemisphere (e.g., Johnston et al., 2013; Kessler et al., 2011; LaBar et al., 2003; Sato et al., 2004; 
Schultz & Pilz, 2009), as well as the visual motion area in the occipito-temporal regions (more 
commonly referred to as V5/MT) (Johnston et al., 2013). Our observations also reinforce the 
existence of a direct and functionally distinct cortical pathway connecting the early visual cortex 
to the pSTS, which would not require structural information from the right inferior occipital 
gyrus (since this region is damaged in PS) in order to decode expressions effectively. This 
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advantage for directly processing dynamic visual inputs seems to be specific to facial expressions, 
as the patient cannot recover identity through dynamic visual information in everyday life. 
However, this hypothesis remains to be clarified with the help of a future functional 
neuroimaging study that measures the extent to which the activations observed in the pSTS in 
PS (Sorger et al., 2007) would be significantly modulated by the presentation of dynamic as well 
as static facial expressions. 
 
Our results also feed the debate of the dynamic vs. static advantage with new data, by 
suggesting that dynamic information may give an advantage to patients only. In fact, our results 
are in line with those found by Humphreys, Donnelly, and Riddoch (1993) with an agnosic 
patient. This patient was impaired at discriminating facial identity and facial expressions when 
exposed to static images, whereas he performed normally when asked to judge a subset of facial 
expressions (i.e., smiling, frowning, or surprise) and gender from dynamic faces animated by 
light dots. However, whether this agnosic patient could correctly categorize all the basic facial 
expressions and his fine-grained information use was not assessed. Despite these methodological 
and theoretical differences, the observation that emerges from both the studies is that the 
recognition of emotions seems to imply a complex mechanism, which is facilitated by dynamic 
information. In fact, patients suffering from depression or schizophrenia also benefit from 
dynamic presentation of facial emotional expressions (e.g., Atkinson, Dittrich, Gemmell, & 
Young, 2004; Kan, Mimura, Kamijima, & Kawamura, 2004; Schaefer, Baumann, Rich, 
Luckenbaugh, & Zarate, 2010). Dynamic stimuli enclose information that cannot be completely 
rendered by static representations and force the observers to shift their attention to different 
facial features. This may enhance attention and motor simulations particularly in fragile or 
neurologically impaired face systems, which explains the increased performance for dynamic 
faces in those populations. 
 
We should acknowledge that we did not objectively assess whether the amount of 
physical information conveyed by our static and dynamic stimuli is identical or different for the 
categorization of facial expressions. We therefore cannot completely rule out the hypothesis that 
temporal properties provide a considerable amount of information that cannot be completely 
rendered by static facial cues. Interestingly, Gold and colleagues (2013) have observed that 
dynamic stimuli do not seem to provide additional information for the recognition of facial 
expressions than what is already offered by static facial cues in normal observers, by measuring 
the amount of information carried by static and dynamic facial expressions. In our study, we 
created a static version of the stimuli by retaining only the highest amplitudes of each AU 
involved in the model, a procedure that should have led to the representation of “optimal” static 
signals. In fact, by using a comparable approach, Fiorentini and Viviani (2011) have revealed 
the absence of an advantage between the categorization of static and dynamic facial expressions 
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in normal observers. In line with those results, our findings show equal performance for our 
healthy control observers between static and dynamic stimuli, with the exception of surprise. 
Thus, PS’s ability to correctly categorize dynamic facial expressions does not seem to stem from 
the physical information available but rather from an adequate psychological ability to make 
use of this information – a process that most probably occurs in the pSTS. 
4.5.3 The special case of “fear” 
Our results support the hypothesis of a defective processing of fear in brain-damaged patients. 
PS was strongly impaired in recognizing the dynamic facial expression of fear from her mental 
model, the static version from Ekman and Friesen’s faces, and the static version of the average 
mental model. It is worth noting that our age-matched control group displayed an effective 
categorization of emotions from PS’s static and dynamic reconstructed models with respect to 
all facial expressions except for fear. This observation suggests defective internal representations 
for this expression in the patient. However, when PS was stimulated by optimal fear dynamic 
inputs (i.e., the average dynamic mental models), she performed correct categorization. 
 
The impairment for the categorization of fear for static images resonates with the 
findings obtained in the case of another brain-damaged patient. Adolphs and colleagues (2005) 
discovered selective impairment in fear recognition with a patient (SM) presenting bilateral 
damage of the amygdala. SM did not spontaneously use the eyes during fear decoding in static 
images, but rather the mouth, which resulted in impairment in fear recognition. SM was able 
to categorize fear only when forced to look at the diagnostic region for this expression, i.e., the 
eye (Smith et al., 2005). Similarly, the analysis comparing PS’s model for fear with the Ekman 
model showed a clear tendency to emphasize information from the mouth region in PS, as 
compared to the eyes. However, PS’s lesions are anatomically sparing of the amygdala (Sorger 
et al., 2007) and cannot account for this deficit. In fact, Adolphs (2013) suggests that the 
processing of fear involves a complex distributed network featuring interactions among diverse 
cortical regions, rather than a single, localized "fear center". However, little is known regarding 
which structures play a key role in this brain circuit and the way these different regions interact 
together. Thus, PS’s selective impairment in fear recognition could also stem from her brain 
lesions, micro-lesions such as axonal shearing (Sorger et al., 2007), or the missing interactions 
between her lesions and other cortical structures. 
   
  PS’s impairment for fear is inconsistent with results obtained in a previous fMRI study 
investigating her emotional attention (Peelen, Lucas, Mayer, & Vuilleumier, 2009). In this 
study, a target face was presented among an array of distractor faces in a visual search task. The 
target differed from the distractor either in terms of identity, identity and emotional expression 
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(fear or happiness), or identity and colour. PS and the controls showed a faster detection for 
fear and happiness in comparison with the neutral face conditions. PS also displayed a similar 
advantage for fear in a second change detection task, detecting significantly more changes when 
the changed face was fearful, as compared to when it was neutral. This behavioural pattern of 
results was paralleled with according neural response biases that indicate emotional attention 
in the brain areas coding for faces, which suggests a normal processing for fear. However, 
paying attention to a particular facial expression of emotion does not necessarily involve an 
explicit correct categorization for this expression. PS could have reached this pattern of results 
by using low-level cues that distinguish fear from neutral or happy signals, as she is relatively 
preserved for those expressions. PS’s deficit for fear might also be clarified by recording her 
brain activation during the decoding of her and the average models in a future neuroimaging 
study. 
4.6 Conclusions 
The adequate categorization of facial expressions is a critical feature for adaptive social 
interactions. Our general goal was to understand whether face information that is used for 
identity and emotional expression categorization tap into common or distinct representational 
systems. We isolated information use for facial expressions in a pure case of acquired 
prosopagnosia with a lesion encompassing the right inferior occipital gyrus. PS’s reconstructed 
mental models revealed a normal use of all facial features and muscles (i.e., AUs of the FACS) 
for the representation of facial expressions. This is in stark contrast with the suboptimal 
information that she uses for retrieving face identity (i.e., the mouth and the external contours). 
These data suggest that the face system does not rely on a unique representational system to 
code facial features for identity and expression, or at least, it relies on distinct cortical pathways 
to access them, flexibly adapting to visual and task constraints. In addition, our observations 
indicate that these cortical routes are modulated by the use of dynamic information, which 
facilitates the correct categorization of facial expressions in the patient. The inferior occipital 
gyrus plays a critical role for the decoding of static images, and the patient presents a selective 
impairment in the decoding of static expressions. Conversely, the patient displays a normal 
performance in effectively decoding facial expressions from dynamic faces. The posterior 
superior temporal sulcus, which is spared in the patient, would be sufficient to effectively 
achieve this task. This result reinforces the view of the existence of a cortical pathway carrying 
out directly face signals from the early visual cortex to the pSTS, thus providing new insights 
into the normal face operating system. Altogether, our data also question the conclusions 
obtained from patients by using unnatural static images and emphasize the need for a future 
neuroimaging study with the same patient in order to consolidate and provide a fine-grained 
picture of the present findings.  
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4.8 Supplementary movies 
Movie 1. Randomly generated facial animation. An example of 4D stimulus (3D + time) 
generated by the computer graphics platform on one experimental trial is presented here. In this 
example, the platform randomly selected AUs 2L, 7R, 39, and 14L and random values for each of 
the six temporal parameters, and then combined these parameters with the shape and texture 
information of a Western Caucasian male identity. 
 
 
 
 
 
http://perso.unifr.ch/roberto.caldara/cortex/Movie_1.mov
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Movie 2. PS’s dynamic reconstructed mental models of emotions. Rows: happiness, surprise, 
fear, disgust, anger, and sadness. Columns: emotion intensity “very low”, “medium”, and “very high”.  
 
 
 
 
 
http://perso.unifr.ch/roberto.caldara/cortex/Movie_2.mov
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Movies 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. Dynamic reconstructed mental models of emotions of each control 
observer. Rows: happiness, surprise, fear, disgust, anger, and sadness. Columns: emotion intensity 
“very low”, “medium”, and “very high”.  
 
 
 
PS:  
 
http://perso.unifr.ch/roberto.caldara/cortex/control_1.mov 
 
and the other controls: 
 
http://perso.unifr.ch/roberto.caldara/cortex/control_2.mov 
 
http://perso.unifr.ch/roberto.caldara/cortex/control_3.mov 
 
http://perso.unifr.ch/roberto.caldara/cortex/control_4.mov 
 
http://perso.unifr.ch/roberto.caldara/cortex/control_5.mov 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
TRACKING THE RECOGNITION OF STATIC AND 
DYNAMIC FACIAL EXPRESSIONS OF EMOTION 
ACROSS LIFE SPAN  
 
 
 
Richoz, A. R., Lao, J., Pascalis, O., & Caldara, R. (submitted). Tracking the recognition of static 
and dynamic facial expressions of emotion across life span.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research highlights 
 
à Assessing static and dynamic facial expression recognition throughout life span 
à Data-driven estimation of the peak efficiency for every expression 
à Quantification of the steepness of improvement and decline 
à New evidence for a dynamic advantage for facial expression recognition (FER) 
à The use of dynamic faces is critical while assessing FER in young children and 
elderly people 
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5.1 Abstract 
In everyday life, the effective transmission and decoding of dynamic facial expressions of 
emotion is omnipresent and critical for adapted social interactions. Thus, common intuition 
would suggest an advantage for dynamic facial expression recognition (FER) over the static 
snapshots routinely used in most experiments. However, while many studies reported an 
advantage in the recognition of dynamic over static expressions in clinical populations, results 
obtained from healthy participants are contrasted. To clarify this issue, we conducted a large 
cross-sectional study to investigate FER across the lifespan in order to determine if age is a 
critical factor to account for such discrepancies. Over 400 observers (age range 5–96) performed 
recognition tasks of the six basic expressions in static, dynamic, and shuffled (temporally 
randomized frames) conditions, normalized for the amount of energy sampled over time. We 
applied a Bayesian hierarchical step linear model to capture the nonlinear relationship between 
age and FER for the different viewing conditions. While replicating the typical accuracy profiles 
of FER, we determined the age at which peak efficiency was reached for each expression and 
found greater accuracy for most dynamic expressions across lifespan. This advantage in the 
elderly population was driven by a significant decrease in performance for static images, which 
was twice as large as for the young adults. Our data posit the use of dynamic stimuli as being 
critical in the assessment of FER in the elderly population, inviting caution when drawing 
conclusions from the sole use of static face images to this aim. 
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5.2 Introduction 
Human faces convey a wealth of dynamic signals that are critical for an adequate and rapid 
categorization of the emotional states of others. Yet, the vast majority of studies investigating 
expression recognition have relied on static images that commonly display the apex or the 
highest state of a given expression. In everyday life, however, facial expressions are rarely 
transmitted and decoded through static snapshots of internal states. Natural human interactions 
are a highly dynamic (and multimodal) phenomenon, with faces evolving over time while 
transmitting distinct signals to convey diverse emotional states. Dynamic expressions provide 
observers with additional cues related to their inherent temporal properties, such as their 
unfolding speed (slow vs. fast) (Bould & Morris, 2008; Bould et al., 2008; Kamachi et al., 2001), 
rise time (from the neutral to the highest state) (Recio, Schacht, & Sommer, 2013; Jack, Garrod, 
& Schyns, 2014) or intensity (Bould et al., 2008), critical for an adequate categorization. 
Therefore, dynamic faces are richer and ecologically more valid depictions of the way 
expressions are encountered in everyday life compared to static images (e.g., Johnston, Mayes, 
Hughes, & Young, 2013; Paulmann, Jessen, & Kotz, 2009; Trautmann, Fehr, & Herrmann, 
2009). Interestingly, from an evolutionary perspective, humans have had more experience with 
dynamic faces, as static pictures only appeared during the last century with the advent of 
photography and the rapid expansion of digital tools and social networks. The decoding of static 
faces is also a learnt behavior that develops throughout life. As the human visual system is from 
birth on steadily stimulated by dynamic signals from faces with minimal exposure to static faces, 
common intuition would suggest the existence of a particular expertise to decode such events, 
with the presence of an advantage for the recognition of dynamic over static expressions.  
 
Previous studies that have attempted to investigate this question have yielded 
inconsistent findings (for a review, see Alves, 2013; Fiorentini & Viviani, 2011; Kätsyri, 2006; 
Krumhuber, Kappas, & Manstead, 2013). Some behavioral studies have revealed an advantage 
(e.g., Ambadar, Schooler, & Cohn, 2005; Cunningham & Wallraven, 2009; Giard & Peronnet, 
1999; Knappmeyer, Thornton, & Bulthoff, 2003; Paulmann et al., 2009; Wehrle, Kaiser, 
Schmidt, & Scherer, 2000) whereas others have revealed that the benefits of dynamic cues in 
facial expression recognition may be minimal (e.g., Gold et al., 2013) or inexistent (e.g., 
Fiorentini & Viviani, 2011). These contrasting findings suggest that the dynamic advantage for 
facial expression recognition is not as straightforward as it may appear. Rather, it seems that 
the physical properties of the stimuli presented as well as clinical or neuropsychological 
conditions influence the extent to which dynamic displays lead to processing benefits (Ambadar 
et al., 2005; Bould, Morris, & Wink, 2008; Wallraven, Breidt, Cunningham, & Bülthoff, 2008).  
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Several studies have shown that the beneficial effects of dynamic events are particularly 
relevant in suboptimal situations when the physical information available is limited (Ambadar 
et al., 2005; Bould et al., 2008), deteriorated, or blurred (Ehrlich, Schiano, & Sheridan, 2000; 
Kätsyri & Sams, 2008; Wallraven et al., 2008). For example, Wallraven et al. (2008) found that 
dynamic events increased recognition accuracy of computer animated facial expressions whose 
texture or shape were systematically degraded. Similarly, by comparing the ability of observers 
to recognize expressions from schematic and natural faces, Kätsyri and Sams (2008) and 
Ehrlich, Schiano, and Sheridan (2000) discovered a recognition advantage for dynamic 
expressions with schematic but not natural faces. Along the same lines, other studies have 
revealed that dynamic events provide compensatory cues when subtle facial expressions are 
presented (Ambadar et al., 2005; Bould et al., 2008). With subtle expressions, additional 
temporal information may be essential to disambiguate the uncertainty introduced by the lack 
of intensity. 
 
Similarly, an advantage is noticeable when it comes to clinical conditions, as dynamic 
information provides compensatory cues in suboptimal situations. Dynamic presentations 
facilitate the recognition of facial expressions in adults and children with intellectual disability 
(Harwood, Hall, & Shinkfield, 1999), pervasive developmental disorder (Uono, Sato, & Toichi, 
2010), and autism (Back, Ropar, & Mitchell, 2007; Gepner, Deruelle, & Grynfeltt, 2001; Tardif, 
Lainé, Rodriguez, & Gepner, 2007; but see Kätsyri, Saalasti, Tiippana, von Wendt, & Sams, 
2008, for Asperger Syndrom). In neuropsychology, several brain injury studies have shown 
increased recognition performance when dynamic expressions were used (Adolphs, Tranel, & 
Damasio, 2003; Humphreys, Donnelly, & Riddoch, 1993; Richoz, Jack, Garrod, Schyns, & 
Caldara, 2015). For example, Humphreys, Donnelly, and Riddoch (1993) reported the case of 
an agnosic patient who was significantly impaired at identifying facial identity and facial 
expressions when exposed to static images. In contrast, his performance was proficient when 
asked to judge a subset of facial expressions (i.e., smiling, frowning, or surprise) from dynamic 
faces animated by light dots. On the same line, we recently investigated the ability of a 
prosopagnosic patient – the well-studied case of PS – with multiple and extensive brain lesions 
in the occipitotemporal cortex – to recognize facial expressions from static and dynamic faces. 
Our findings revealed that the patient PS was selectively impaired in decoding static 
expressions, while showing normal performance for the decoding of dynamic emotional 
expressions. This observation favours the existence of distinct representational systems for static 
and dynamic expressions, or dissociable cortical pathways to access them (Richoz et al., 2015). 
Noteworthy, the advantage for processing dynamic faces in PS is related to a suboptimal 
information use for static (i.e., bias towards the mouth) compared to dynamic faces (i.e., all face 
features) (Fiset et al., 2017). 
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While several neuropsychological studies have shown that the dynamic properties of 
human facial expressions provide significant processing advantages, other behavioral studies 
involving healthy observers suggest that this might not be the case (Bould & Morris, 2008, for 
expressions of high intensity; Christie & Bruce, 1998; Fiorentini & Viviani, 2011; Gold et al., 
2013; Jiang et al., 2014; Kamachi et al., 2001, Experiment 2). By using a threshold model, 
Fiorentini and Viviani (2011), for example, reported that neither reaction times nor 
identification accuracy were more accurate for the dynamic as compared to the static 
expressions. Similar findings were reported in a later study by Gold et al. (2013). Their results 
revealed that recognition rates were nearly identical when participants were exposed to static, 
dynamic, shuffled (temporally randomized expressions), or reversed expressions. This suggests 
that the temporal properties provided by moving faces are not necessary for observers to reliably 
categorize emotional expressions. Altogether, these studies suggest that a healthy visual system 
seems to be powerful enough to efficiently recognize intense expressions from static faces, 
leaving only a non-significant benefit to the processing of dynamic facial expressions. By 
contrast, in clinical conditions, the muscular movements associated with the temporal unfolding 
of an expression may force the observers to shift their attention to different facial features. This 
may enhance attention and motor simulations in fragile or neurologically impaired face systems, 
which may explain the increased performance with dynamic signals in these populations.  
 
Interestingly, there are stages in healthy observers during which the perceptual system 
is also particularly fragile or immature. For example, from early infancy to late adolescence, 
the brain undergoes a wide array of anatomical and functional changes as it develops (e.g., 
Blakemore, 2012; Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006; Casey, Tottenham, Liston, & Durston, 2005; 
Durston et al., 2001). Similarly, during normal aging, the cognitive functions decline, which is 
induced by age-related loss of synaptic contacts, neural apoptosis (e.g., Raz, 2000; Rossini, Rossi, 
Babiloni, & Polich, 2007), reduction in cerebral blood flow (e.g., Chen, Rosas, & Salat, 2011), 
or volume reduction in different brain regions (e.g., amygdala, hippocampus, frontal cortex, 
Calder et al., 2003; Jack et al., 1997; Navarro & Gonzalo, 2017; Ruffman, Henry, Livingstone, 
& Phillips, 2008). Considering the increased vulnerability of the brain under neural 
architectural changes (Andersen, 2003; Hof & Morrison, 2004), it is possible that healthy young 
children and normal aging adults also benefit from the presentation of dynamic faces. However, 
only a few developmental studies have compared facial expression recognition in children using 
both static and dynamic stimuli (Nelson, Hudspeth, & Russell, 2013; Nelson & Russell, 2011). 
These studies yielded equivocal results, none of them revealing a significant advantage for 
dynamic over static stimuli; two studies even pointed to differences favoring static stimuli 
(Nelson & Russell, 2011; Widen & Russell, 2015). Nevertheless, most of these studies tested 
facial expression recognition with the use of a single actor and provided additional information 
about face, body movements, and vocal intonations, which may have facilitated expression 
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recognition. In the aging literature, a small number of studies examined facial expression 
recognition with static and dynamic faces (Grainger, Henry, Phillips, Vanman, & Allen, 2015; 
Krendl & Ambady, 2010; Sze, Goodkind, Gyurak, & Levenson, 2012). Although most of these 
studies pointed to a dynamic advantage for the recognition of facial expressions, they did not 
use a database of static and dynamic stimuli controlled for the amount of level-level visual 
information carried over time (Grainger et al., 2015; Sze et al., 2012), were limited to a subset 
of emotional expressions (Krendl & Ambaday, 2010), included participants in only one condition 
(Krendl & Ambady, 2010) or relied on dynamic movies that were not displaying natural 
expressions (Grainger et al., 2015). These methodological issues considerably limit firm 
conclusions on the potential benefits of dynamic cues for the recognition of facial expressions 
in elderly people.  
  
 Developmental studies have reported an early tuning to cultural specific expressions 
(Geangu, et al., 2016 – for a review, see Caldara, 2017) and emotion-dependent differences in 
the development of facial expression recognition abilities, with some expressions being 
recognized earlier (e.g., happiness) than others (e.g., fear) (Durand, Gallay, Seigneuric, 
Robichon, & Baudouin, 2007; Gao & Maurer, 2010; Gross & Ballif, 1991; Herba & Phillips, 
2004; Rodger, Vizioli, Ouyang, & Caldara, 2015). Similarly, studies with elderly people have 
shown that the recognition of some expressions decreases with increasing age, while the 
recognition of others remains stable or even improves (Calder et al., 2003; MacPherson, 
Phillips, & Della Sala, 2002; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004b; Zhao, Zimmer, Shen, Chen, & Fu, 
2016). Most of these studies were however conducted with static posed images and only little is 
known about the effects of aging on the recognition of genuine dynamic emotional expressions.  
   
  To fill this gap in the developmental literature, we investigated whether the advantage 
for dynamic stimuli extends to other populations with immature (i.e., young children) or fragile 
(i.e., elderly adults) face processing systems. We conducted a large cross-sectional study involving 
over 400 observers (age range 5–96) in order to investigate facial expression recognition from 
early to elderly age. Observers performed categorization tasks of the six basic expressions (anger, 
disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise) in three conditions: static, dynamic, and shuffled 
(temporally randomized frames, Gold et al., 2013). Importantly, we relied on a specific database 
of static, dynamic, and shuffled stimuli created by Gold et al. (2013). Our experimental choice 
was driven by the fact that these authors also used an ideal observer model to objectively 
measure the amount of low-level physical information carried by the stimuli. It is worth noting 
that most studies investigating the presence of a dynamic advantage (e.g., Ambadar et al., 2005; 
Bould & Morris, 2008; Bould et al., 2008; Cunningham & Wallraven, 2009; Fiorentini & 
Viviani, 2011; Kätsyri & Sams, 2008) directly compared participants’ recognition rates in the 
static and dynamic conditions without controlling the amount of low-level information physically 
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available to the observers. As mentioned by Gold et al. (2013), the absence of an objective 
measure of stimulus information makes it difficult, in most cases, to determine whether 
increased recognition rates are due to adequate categorization skills, to the amount of physical 
information available, or a combination of both the factors. By comparing human expression 
recognition scores with the performance of a statistically ideal observer, Gold et al. (2013) 
reported that their dynamic stimuli did not provide additional low-level information than what 
was already offered by their static snapshots (for additional information, see Gold et al., 2013). 
In addition to this approach, we modelled the relationship between age and facial expression 
recognition by using a hierarchical Bayesian approach, with a step linear model. Our results 
revealed emotion-specific advantages for dynamic stimuli. More specifically, while participants 
displayed nearly identical categorization performance for the static and dynamic expressions of 
fear and sadness, all the other expressions were more readily labelled as correct when featuring 
dynamic displays. Overall, the results of this study provide a comprehensive and detailed view 
of the way in which static and dynamic expressions are recognized across the human life span. 
5.3 Material and methods 
The experiment script, raw data, and analysis codes are open to access on Github 
(https://github.com/iBMLab/Static_dynamic). 
 
5.3.1 Participants 
A total of 444 healthy observers participated in the current study. Subjects who did not respond 
at least once to all expressions on the first condition/block were excluded from the analyses (N 
= 32), leaving a total number of 412 participants. Their exclusion is based on the difficulty to 
determine whether they actually did not recognize the expression presented or did not correctly 
understand the task. A future research paper will investigate the systematic errors of the 
participants that were excluded.  
 
We intended to collect data from 20 participants in each age group ranging from 5 to 
96 years of age. The groups were comprised as follows: 5–6 year old (N = 27, 17 females), 7–8 
year old (N = 24, 17 females), 9–10 year old (N = 22, 11 females), 11–12 year old (N = 22, 14 
females), 13–14 year old (N = 24, 10 females), 15–16 year old (N = 21, 8 females), 17–18 year old 
(N = 21, 16 females), 19–20 year old (N = 31, 27 females). From the age of 21 to the age of 96, 
six different groups were created: 21–30 year old (N = 31, 23 females), 31–40 year old (N = 23, 
13 females), 41–50 year old (N = 33, 22 females), 51–60 year old (N = 30, 18 females), 61–80 year 
old (N = 31, 25 females), and 81–96 year old (N = 40, 30 females). 
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All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision, with no neurological or 
psychiatric history. Children were recruited from primary and high schools in the area of 
Fribourg, Switzerland. Parental consent was required for all children under the age of 16. 
Participants above 16 were recruited at the University of Fribourg, through social networks or 
advertisements. Observers from the University obtained course credits for their participation. 
All participants signed a consent form that described the main goals of our experiment.  
 
Elderly people were recruited and tested in senior housings in the Fribourg region. We 
used the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE, Folstein, 1975) in order to determine the 
eligibility of the elderly people aged 60 and over. This brief cognitive screening test, which has 
been extensively used and validated since its creation in 1975, allows the assessment of different 
cognitive functions, such as memory, orientation, attention, language, and recall, through 11 
questions, with a maximum score of 30. Elderly people with a score below 24 were excluded 
from our study (N = 3), as this score has been set as the most commonly used cutoff score for 
cognitive impairment (Mitchell, 2009). The Ethical Committee of the Department of Psychology 
of the University of Fribourg approved the study reported here. 
 
5.3.2 Stimuli 
We used the same stimuli as those used by Gold et al. (2013). In order to create their database, 
Gold et al. (2013) asked eight individuals (four females) to record the six basic facial expressions 
of emotion (i.e., anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise) (Ekman & Friesen, 1976). 
The dynamic faces evolved from a neutral state to a full-blown expression at a frame rate of 30 
frames/s. All expressions reached their apex within 30 frames. If the fully articulated expression 
was reached before 30 frames, one to four supplementary apex frames were appended, but as 
the actors were asked to maintain the apex for several seconds, this happened for only seven 
out of 48 movies (for more details, see Gold et al., 2013). Faces were presented in black and 
white and cropped at the hairline to present only the internal facial features. Previous 
experiments have shown that external features attract children’s attention (Leitzke & Pollak, 
2016). Moreover, the faces were centred and seen through an oval aperture, which was placed 
in the middle of a grey-coloured background. The borders of the oval aperture were slightly 
blurred in order to produce a progressive transition between the background and the faces (Gold 
et al., 2013). The faces were resized from the original experiment and measured each 768 
pixels in height and 768 pixels in width. They subtended a visual angle of 12° on the screen, at 
a viewing distance of 65 cm. All faces were equated for luminance and contrast. 
 
Based on these dynamic sequences, Gold et al. (2013) generated two other sets of stimuli: 
a set of frozen images (static condition) and a set of temporally randomized dynamic frames 
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(shuffled condition) (see Figure 5.1; supplementary videos related to this article can be found 
under the specific links). In the static condition, movies were created by taking the apex frame 
of each dynamic sequence and replicating it 30 times in a row. In the shuffled condition, movies 
were generated by randomly selecting the individual frames of the dynamic sequences. This 
condition was originally designed to assess whether human observers were sensitive to the 
temporal development of an expression over time (i.e., order of frames). The results reported by 
Gold et al. (2013) revealed that recognition efficiency did not significantly differ between the 
dynamic and shuffled expressions in young adults, suggesting that young adults are insensitive 
to the temporal properties associated with the unfolding of an expression. 
 
 
 
 
A 
 
 
B 
 
Static condition 
http://perso.unifr.ch/roberto.ca
ldara/JoV/Anger-static.mov 
 
 
Shuffled condition 
http://perso.unifr.ch/roberto.ca
ldara/JoV/Anger-shuffled.mov  
 
 
Dynamic condition  
http://perso.unifr.ch/roberto.ca
ldara/JoV/Anger-dynamic.mov 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Examples of the three different kinds of stimuli used in our study. Panel A 
represents the static images of each actor (column) for the six expressions (row). Panel B represents 
stimuli examples for the static, dynamic and shuffled conditions. Please note the insertion of noise 
in the static condition in order to normalize the amount of energy sampled over time across 
conditions. Click on the specific links to visualize the videos. Adapted with permission from Gold 
et al. (2013). 
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We normalized all stimuli for their low-level properties and the amount of energy 
sampled over time, even for the static condition. The video stimuli were normalized across all 
frames and all expressions using the SHINE toolbox with the default option (Willenbockel et 
al., 2010). In order to partly account for the differences in visual input between static and 
dynamic stimuli, we computed the raw pixel intensity differences between each frame of the 
dynamic movies. We then added these intensity differences to each frame at random permuted 
locations in the static images. The stimuli were displayed on a color liquid-crystal display (LCD) 
with a resolution of 1440 x 900 pixels and a refresh rate of 60 Hz. The whole experiment was 
programmed in Matlab (Matlab 2014B) using the Psychophysics Toolbox (PTB-3, Brainard & 
Vision, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007).  
5.3.3 Procedure 
Participants were told that they would see faces expressing different kinds of emotions on a 
computer screen, and their task would be to categorize them as accurately as possible, according 
to the six following possibilities: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise.  
 
In order to familiarize children with the faces and ensure that they understood the 
conceptual meaning of all expressions, we presented them with printed sheets of the different 
expressions and asked them to tell us how the person presented on the image was feeling.  
 
All participants sat 65 cm away from a computer screen in a quiet room. Each trial 
started with a white fixation cross presented at the centre of the screen for 500 ms. The stimuli 
were then presented in a random order, one at a time, on the centre of the computer screen for 
a duration of 1 s each (for a schematic representation of the procedure, see Figure 5.2). We used 
the same stimuli presentation time in all three conditions in order to fully replicate the study 
by Gold et al. (2013). Note that a presentation time of 1 second was also previously used in other 
studies with dynamic faces (Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 2003; Recio et al., 2013; Richoz et al., 
2015). After each presentation, a response window was displayed on the screen and remained 
there until the participant answered. Observers categorized each stimulus by using a computer 
keyboard in which we labelled the keys accordingly. They could press a “I don’t know” labelled 
key if they were unsure, had not had enough time to see the expression, or did not know the 
answer. We decided to introduce a “I don’t know” option in order to reduce the noise and 
response bias produced by the lack of such a key. We gave our participants as much time as 
required to categorize the expressions and told them that judgement accuracy was important, 
not the response time. Children under the age of 10, participants who were not familiar with 
computers, and elderly people above 65 gave their answers verbally to the experimenter who 
keyed them in. No feedback was provided. The stimuli were blocked by condition. Each 
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condition consisted of two blocks of 48 trials (eight actors, six expressions) presented twice (96 
expressions for each condition), for a total of 288 trials. Participants took part in all three 
conditions in a counterbalanced random order. The testing was done in one session for 
adolescents and adults, two or three sessions for participants under 10 or above 65. Before 
starting the testing phase, participants completed 12 practice trials for each condition.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Schematic representation of the procedure. Each trial began with a white fixation 
cross that was presented for 500 ms, followed by a face presented for 1 second, which expressed one 
of the six basic facial expressions of emotion: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise. 
After each trial, participants were asked to categorize the previously seen expression. 
 
5.3.4 Data Analysis 
Data analysis was performed in Python using Jupyter Notebook. Summary statistics by groups 
are displayed as confusion matrices (Supplementary Figure 5.11A, B, C, D, E) and line plots 
(Figure 5.4) for each condition.  
  
  Bayesian modelling was performed using PyMC3 version 3.2, and the results were 
displayed using Seaborn and Matplotlib. The main aim of the current study was to determine 
the underlying function between expression recognition ability and age, conditioned on the 
basis of different types of visual stimuli. More specifically, we were interested in modelling 
expression recognition ability as a function of age, expression, and stimuli type (static, dynamic, 
or shuffled): 
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 !"#$%&'('$&	*+','(- = 	/(1%", "345"66'$&, 6('78,'	(-4").	
 
Here, recognition abilities were measured using the correct identification (i.e., hit). 
Importantly, as the target function / is a nonlinear function, in order to capture the increase 
and then the decrease in the recognition abilities displayed in the data, we constructed a simple 
step linear function with two linear equations. The first equation captures the increase in 
recognition abilities before a breakpoint, defined as the momentum in age capturing peak 
efficiency, whereas the second equation captures the decrease in recognition abilities.  
 /:(1%", "345"66'$&, 6('78,'	(-4"), 1%" < < /=(1%", "345"66'$&, 6('78,'	(-4"), 1%" ≥ < 
 
Here, the breakpoint < is expressed as a latent variable that is estimated from the 
model. Both /: and /= are linear functions of age during the recognition of specific expressions 
and stimuli type. Thus, the slope of the function /: and /= (coefficient for age) captures the 
change in recognition abilities, whereas the intercept of the function captures the general 
recognition abilities before and after the age <. We estimated the general dynamic advantage by 
computing contrasts of the intercepts between the different stimuli type (i.e., static, dynamic, 
shuffled) and quantified the interaction between stimuli type and age (i.e., whether there is a 
stronger dynamic advantage in young/old age) by computing contrasts of the slopes. Importantly, 
considering that the breakpoint < could occur at different age stages among the expressions, we 
modelled each expression independently, thus turning the target function into:  
 /:(1%", 6('78,'	(-4"	|	"345"66'$&), 1%" < < /=(1%", 6('78,'	(-4"	|	"345"66'$&), 1%" ≥ < 
 
where recognition ability of different types of stimuli is a step linear function of age conditioned 
on a specific expression.  
 
In practice, we formulated functions /: and /= as logistic regressions, with the function 
output being the success probability p in each trial in the Binomial distribution. The total 
number of correct responses for one participant during the presentation of one expression and 
one stimuli type follows a Binomial distribution: 
 @~	B'&$7'1,	(4, &) 
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Thus, this is an extended beta-binomial model with latent variables. The full model is 
formulated as below:  
 
 
 
 
As shown above, the slope of each condition is regularized using a weakly informative 
hyper-prior. The prior of each slope is a normal distribution, with the mean distributed as a 
zero mean Student-t distribution, with three degrees of freedom and 10 standard deviations, and 
the standard deviations distributed as a half-normal distribution. The hyper-prior of the 
breakpoint <  is a Uniform distribution from 0 to 100, which is the overall mean of the 
condition-specific breakpoint that follows a normal distribution with 10 standard deviations as 
prior. Importantly, the intercept of the two linear functions /: and /= is determined by the 
recognition ability C at the breakpoint <. The condition-specific recognition ability	CD follows a 
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Beta distribution as prior. Moreover, we re-parameterized the Beta distribution by the mode C 
and the concentration E (Kruschke, 2014, cf. Eq. 9.4, pp. 223). Here, the mode C follows a 
Uniform prior between 0 and 1, and E follows a Uniform prior with 2 as minimum and the 
number of trials as maximum. 
 
The probabilistic model was built using PyMC3 and we sampled from the posterior 
distribution using NUTS with automatic differentiation variational inference (ADVI) 
initialization. We ran four MCMC chains with 3000 samples each; the first 1000 samples were 
used for tuning the mass matrix and step size for NUTS, and were discarded following this. 
Model convergence was diagnosed by computing Gelman and Rubin's convergence diagnostic 
(R-hat, 1992), examining the effective sample size, inspecting the mixing of the traces, and 
checking whether there is any divergent sample that has been returned from the sampler.  
 
From the posterior distribution, we estimated a) the peak efficiency, namely the point 
at which observers’ recognition performance reaches its maximum before declining; b) the 
steepness of increase and decrease in recognition abilities; c) differences in the steepness of 
increase and decrease between different conditions (e.g., dynamic vs. static); and d) the overall 
processing advantage of the dynamic over the static and the shuffled stimuli. By performing 
statistical inference directly on the full posterior distribution, we were able to properly quantify 
the dynamic stimuli effects and their associated uncertainty. A conceptual representation of the 
model is provided in Figure 5.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3. A conceptual representation of the step linear model. We are interested in the 
posterior distribution of the peak efficiency and the contrasts between the posterior distribution of 
different slopes and the different intercepts. 
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5.4 Results 
The group average categorization performance for each condition is presented in Figure 5.4. 
The non-linear relationship between age and recognition ability is clearly demonstrated, with 
differences among conditions clearly visible for some expressions. When the model returns a 
concave pattern, we refer to the breakpoint as a peak efficiency. This value relates to the point 
at which recognition performance reaches its apex, also relating to the age at which observers 
are the most efficient.  
 
For the Bayesian modeling, trace plots, posterior distributions for the key parameters 
in the model, contrasts of interest, and full numerical reports of the parameter estimations are 
available in the supplementary results. Below, we report the key findings of the step linear 
model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Accuracy across age groups for each expression in the three different conditions. 
Error bars show 95% bootstrap confidence interval for the mean. Age groups were created as follows: 
5–6 / 7–8 / 9–10 / 11–12 / 13–14 / 15–16 / 17–18 / 19–20 / 21–30 / 31–40 / 41–50 / 51–60 / 61–70 / 71–
80 / 81–96.  
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Anger 
The posterior model fit for the raw data is shown in Figure 5.5. By sampling the full posterior 
distribution, we estimated that the overall recognition ability for the expression of anger peaks 
at age 36.13 [22.23, 51.21], 95% highest posterior density interval (hpd). The posterior expectation 
of the age at which observers are the most efficient is given as follows: dynamic 39.17 [31.03, 
46.84], static 35.70 [23.59, 46.41], and shuffled 33.22 [18.13, 49.62]. The overall recognition ability 
of anger at peak efficiency is 0.605 [0.350, 0.872], and the average peak accuracy for each 
condition is given as follows: dynamic 0.660 [0.627, 0.696], static 0.592 [0.554, 0.628], and 
shuffled 0.539 [0.489, 0.587]. On an average, participants showed better performance in the 
dynamic condition as compared to the static and the shuffled conditions, both before (dynamic 
– static: 0.075 [0.042, 0.106]; dynamic – shuffled: 0.096 [0.060, 0.132]) and after (dynamic – static: 
0.043 [0.012, 0.072]; dynamic – shuffled: 0.085 [0.051, 0.118]) peak efficiency. In contrast, the 
difference between the static and shuffled conditions is quite small (shuffled – static before peak 
efficiency: –0.021 [–0.061, 0.019]; after peak efficiency: –0.042 [–0.070, –0.013]). The slopes of the 
step linear functions are the following: dynamic 0.0069 [–0.0011, 0.0156], static 0.0107 [0.0003, 
0.0239], shuffled 0.0040 [–0.0072, 0.0180] before peak efficiency; and dynamic –0.0251 [–0.0300, 
–0.0201], static –0.0183 [–0.0236, –0.0123], shuffled –0.0159 [–0.0211, –0.0108] after peak 
efficiency. Moreover, the differences of the slope across different conditions are mostly 
negligible; most of the posterior contrasts are distributed around zero, with the exception of the 
contrast: dynamic – shuffled: –0.0092 [–0.0162, –0.0020] after peak efficiency (Figure 5.5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Anger. The posterior model fit (solid line) for the expression of anger with the 
individual performance (scatter plot) and the group average performance (dots with error bars) is 
given here. The overall peak efficiency is shown as the red vertical dashed line, and the condition-
specific peak efficiencies are represented by the black dashed lines. 
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Disgust  
The overall recognition ability for the expression of disgust peaks at age 18.87. The posterior 
expectation of the age at which observers are the most efficient is given as follows: dynamic 
18.02 [15.38, 20.75], static 19.71 [18.19, 21.38], and shuffled 18.14 [16.55, 19.67]. The overall 
recognition ability of the expression of disgust at peak efficiency is 0.644 [0.380, 0.920], and the 
average peak accuracy for each condition is the following: dynamic 0.665 [0.644, 0.687], static 
0.724 [0.702, 0.744], and shuffled 0.500 [0.475, 0.522]. On an average, participants showed better 
performance in the dynamic and static conditions as compared to the shuffled conditions, both 
before (dynamic – shuffled: 0.199 [0.160, 0.240]; static – shuffled: 0.183 [0.146, 0.217]) and after 
(dynamic – shuffled: 0.191 [0.170, 0.214]; static – shuffled: 0.152 [0.125, 0.177]) peak efficiency. 
The difference between the dynamic and the static conditions is quite small before peak 
efficiency (dynamic – static: –0.016 [–0.037, 0.072]); it is, however, substantial after peak 
efficiency (0.040 [0.013, 0.069]). The slopes of the step linear functions are the following: 
dynamic 0.0494 [0.0318, 0.0680], static 0.0824 [0.0671, 0.0993], shuffled 0.0686 [0.0511, 0.0860] 
before peak efficiency; and dynamic –0.0104 [–0.0130, –0.0078], static –0.0225 [–0.0254, –0.0196], 
shuffled –0.0128 [–0.0152, –0.0102] after peak efficiency. Moreover, the slopes of the static 
condition are steeper than the ones in the dynamic and shuffled conditions. The contrasts of 
the slopes before peak efficiency are given as follows: dynamic – static: –0.0330 [–0.0577, –0.0096], 
shuffled – static: –0.0138 [–0.0360, 0.0123]; and the contrasts of the slopes after peak efficiency 
are the following: dynamic – static: 0.0121 [0.0084, 0.0161], shuffled – static: 0.0097 [0.0059, 
0.0135] (Figure 5.6). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6. Disgust. The posterior model fit (solid line) of the expression of disgust with the 
individual performance (scatter plot) and the group average performance (dots with error bars) is 
given here. The overall peak efficiency is shown as the red vertical dashed line, and the condition-
specific peak efficiencies are represented by the black dashed lines.  
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Fear 
The overall recognition ability of the expression of fear peaks at around age 20.83. The posterior 
expectation of the age at which observers are the most efficient is given as follows: dynamic 
20.87 [18.71, 23.18], static 19.72 [17.63, 21.43], and shuffled 21.79 [20.17, 23.51]. The overall 
recognition ability of fear at peak efficiency is 0.446 [0.168, 0.697]; the average peak accuracy 
for each condition is the following: dynamic 0.399 [0.372, 0.430], static 0.416 [0.390, 0.443], and 
shuffled 0.526 [0.494, 0.557]. On an average, participants showed better performance in the 
shuffled condition compared to the other two conditions, both before (shuffled – dynamic: 0.056 
[0.013, 0.099]; shuffled – static: 0.055 [0.024, 0.083]) and after (shuffled – dynamic: 0.094 [0.071, 
0.118]; shuffled – static: 0.113 [0.089, 0.135]) peak efficiency; however, the difference between the 
dynamic and static conditions is quite small (dynamic – static before peak efficiency: –0.002 [–
0.043, 0.033]; after peak efficiency: 0.018 [–0.003, 0.040]). The slopes of all conditions are 
comparable: dynamic 0.0706 [0.0546, 0.0867], static 0.0927 [0.0747, 0.1139], shuffled 0.0913 
[0.0764, 0.1056] before peak efficiency; and dynamic –0.0151 [–0.0186, –0.0115], static –0.0189 [–
0.0224, –0.0157], shuffled –0.0176 [–0.0213, –0.0141] after peak efficiency. The maximum 
contrasts of the slopes before peak efficiency is given as follows: dynamic – static: –0.022 [–
0.0473, 0.0022]; and the maximum contrasts of the slopes after peak efficiency is the following: 
dynamic – static: 0.0038 [–0.0010, 0.0086] (Figure 5.7).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7. Fear. The posterior model fit (solid line) of the expression of fear with the individual 
performance (scatter plot) and the group average performance (dots with error bars) is presented 
here. The overall peak efficiency is shown as the red vertical dashed line, and the condition-specific 
peak efficiencies are represented by the black dashed lines. 
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Happiness 
Unlike for the other facial expressions, the overall recognition ability for the expression of 
happiness reaches optimal levels of task performance at a very young age, declining slowly 
throughout the life span. Nonetheless, our model identifies a breakpoint at around age 57.98, with 
a large uncertainty. Importantly, the accuracy rate estimated at this breakpoint is not the apex in 
recognition performance, but rather the peak of the decline (i.e., the model did not return a 
concave pattern). The posterior expectation of the age at this breakpoint is given as follows: 
dynamic 61.27 [24.18, 93.42], static 50.25 [35.90, 62.01], and shuffled 62.22 [21.95, 81.00]. The 
overall recognition ability of this expression at the breakpoint is 0.855 [0.664, 0.999], with dynamic 
0.895 [0.819, 0.972], static 0.898 [0.868, 0.931], and shuffled 0.660 [0.541, 0.896]. Overall, 
participants performed better in the dynamic condition as compared to the static and shuffled 
conditions, both before (dynamic – static: 0.040 [0.027, 0.054]; dynamic – shuffled: 0.106 [0.063, 
0.143]) and after (dynamic – static: 0.060 [0.029, 0.095]; dynamic – shuffled: 0.269 [0.203, 0.319]) 
the breakpoint. Participants also performed better in the static than in the shuffled condition 
(static – shuffled before the breakpoint: 0.066 [0.018, 0.105] and after the breakpoint: 0.209 [0.156, 
0.255]). The slopes of the step linear functions are given as follows: dynamic –0.0248 [–0.0335, –
0.0121], static –0.0078 [–0.0172, 0.0007], shuffled –0.0306 [–0.0375, –0.0163] before the breakpoint; 
and dynamic –0.0239 [–0.0387, –0.0023], static –0.0298 [–0.0381, –0.0217], shuffled –0.0175 [–0.0355, 
0.0026] after the breakpoint. The differences of the slopes across the different conditions are 
mostly negligible. Most of the posterior contrasts are distributed around zero, with the largest 
contrasts being the following before the breakpoint: dynamic – static: –0.0170 [–0.0297, –0.0036], 
and shuffled – static: –0.0228 [–0.0353, 0.0087] (Figure 5.8).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8. Happiness. The posterior model fit (solid line) of the expression of happiness with the 
individual performance (scatter plot) and the group average performance (dots with error bars) is 
presented here. The overall breakpoint is shown as the red vertical dashed line, and the condition-
specific breakpoints are represented by the black dashed lines. 
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Sadness 
The overall recognition ability for the expression of sadness peaks at the age of 28.96. The 
posterior expectation of the age at which observers are the most efficient is given as follows: 
dynamic 27.87 [21.44, 33.90], static 28.12 [23.50, 32.62], and shuffled 30.52 [26.05, 34.74]. 
The overall recognition ability of sadness at peak efficiency is 0.638 [0.408, 0.888]; the 
average peak accuracy for each condition is the following: dynamic 0.605 [0.572, 0.636], 
static 0.631 [0.602, 0.660], and shuffled 0.653 [0.622, 0.681]. The categorization accuracy 
rates of all conditions are comparable both before and after peak efficiency. The maximum 
contrasts of the average performance before peak efficiency is given as follows: shuffled – 
static 0.0277 [–0.0011, 0.0561]; the maximum contrasts of the average performance after peak 
efficiency is the following: shuffled – static 0.0097 [–0.0156, 0.0362]. Similarly, all conditions 
show comparable slopes: dynamic 0.0075 [–0.0031, 0.0181], static 0.0235 [0.0117, 0.0347], 
shuffled 0.0179 [0.0079, 0.0285] before peak efficiency; and dynamic –0.0223 [–0.0262, –
0.0186], static –0.0265 [–0.0306, –0.0223], shuffled –0.0302 [–0.0346, –0.0261] after peak 
efficiency. The maximum contrast between slopes before peak efficiency is the following: 
dynamic – static: –0.0160 [–0.0320, –0.0010]; the maximum contrast after peak efficiency is 
given as follows: dynamic – shuffled: 0.0079 [0.0022, 0.0137] (Figure 5.9).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9. Sadness. The posterior model fit (solid line) of the expression of sadness with the 
individual performance (scatter plot) and the group average performance (dots with error bars). The 
overall peak efficiency is shown as the red vertical dashed line, and the condition-specific peak 
efficiencies are represented by the black dashed lines. 
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Surprise 
The overall recognition ability of surprise peaks at age 22.47. The posterior expectation of the 
age at which observers are the most efficient is given as follows: dynamic 23.55 [20.52, 26.91], 
static 24.30 [20.36, 28.26], and shuffled 19.34 [17.34, 21.76]. The overall recognition ability of 
surprise at peak efficiency is 0.692 [0.466, 0.953]; the average peak accuracy for each condition 
is: dynamic 0.758 [0.735, 0.783], static 0.700 [0.673, 0.725], and shuffled 0.575 [0.552, 0.599]. On 
an average, participants showed the best performance in the dynamic condition, and the worst 
in the shuffled condition. The results were the following: dynamic – static: 0.075 [0.048, 0.101], 
static – shuffled: 0.093 [0.058, 0.123] before peak efficiency; and dynamic – static: 0.107 [0.082, 
0.133]; static – shuffled: 0.172 [0.146, 0.195] after peak efficiency. The slopes of the step linear 
functions are: dynamic 0.0442 [0.0315, 0.0565], static 0.0442 [0.0311, 0.0577], shuffled 0.0530 
[0.0381, 0.0692] before peak efficiency; and dynamic –0.0126 [–0.0164, –0.0092], static –0.0175 [–
0.0213, –0.0133], shuffled –0.0190 [–0.0220, 0.0163] after peak efficiency. The slope between age 
and accuracy is similar across all conditions before peak efficiency, whereas after peak efficiency, 
the dynamic condition shows the most gradual slope: static – dynamic: –0.0048 [–0.0104, 0.0004]; 
shuffled – dynamic: –0.0064 [–0.0109, –0.0018] (Figure 5.10).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10. Surprise. The posterior model fit (solid line) for the expression of surprise with the 
individual performance (scatter plot) and the group average performance (dots with error bars) are 
given here. The overall peak efficiency is shown as the red vertical dashed line, and the condition-
specific peak efficiencies are represented by the black dashed lines. 
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5.5 Discussion  
Our results present a fine-grained developmental tracking of human observers’ ability to 
recognize the six basic emotions when presented with varying temporal properties: dynamic, 
static, and shuffled. Previous studies in the literature, examined expression recognition by using 
arbitrary age groups: ten years bins  (Williams et al., 2009), stages of life (Horning, Cornwell, & 
Davis, 2012) or largely different age groups (e.g., 18-30, 58-70, Calder et al., 2003), while 
revealing either expression recognition improvement (Rodger et al., 2015) or decline (Calder et 
al., 2003; MacPherson et al., 2002; Malatesta, Izard, Culver, & Nicolich, 1987; Moreno, Borod, 
Welkowitz, & Alpert, 1993; Ruffman et al., 2008; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004a). In contrast, our 
approach innovates by estimating the continuous developmental trajectory of facial expression 
recognition (from increase to decline), by considering age as a continuum, ranging from 5 to 96 
years. 
 
Using a Bayesian approach, we estimated for each condition and each expression 
individually the associated uncertainty and a) the peak efficiency, namely the point at which 
observers’ recognition performance reaches its maximum before declining; b) the steepness of 
increase and decrease in recognition abilities; c) differences in the steepness of increase and 
decrease between different conditions (e.g., dynamic vs. static); and d) the overall processing 
advantage of the dynamic over the static and the shuffled stimuli. We will now discuss, in turn, 
each of these findings and their implications. 
 
5.5.1 Recognition trajectory across development: increase, peak efficiency, and decrease 
Our findings revealed unique developmental profiles and peak efficiency for the static, dynamic, 
and shuffled versions of each individual expression. Herein, we will focus on the dynamic and 
static trajectories and the differences between both conditions in a more detailed manner (i.e., 
static and dynamic). The results of the shuffled condition will be briefly considered at the end 
of the discussion.  
 
Efficiency – increase 
In both static and dynamic conditions, the sharpest rises in accuracy were observed for fear, 
followed by disgust and, to a lesser extent, surprise. These findings mirror the results of a 
previous developmental study that investigated the effects of age on the development of emotion 
processing in children, revealing that increasing age produced significant improvements in the 
recognition of fear and disgust (Herba & Phillips, 2004). We observed a more gradual increase 
for sadness and anger, but only in the static condition. Finally, we did not observe any increase 
for the expression of happiness, regardless of the experimental condition.  
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The steepest increase evidenced for fear might be accounted for by the very low 
recognition rates observed for this expression in young children, reaching only 13% in the 5–6 
age group in the static condition (15% in the dynamic condition, Figure 5.11A). The expression 
of fear has been regularly reported in developmental (Herba & Phillips, 2004; Rodger et al., 
2015; Widen, 2013), neuropsychological (Adolphs et al., 2003; Richoz et al., 2015), and 
behavioral studies (Calder et al., 2003) as being the most difficult expression to effectively 
recognize among all the expressions – a difficulty that is puzzling considering the evolutionary 
importance of an adequate and rapid categorization of this expression for survival. However, 
among the basic expressions, fear is probably the one that transmits the strongest multisensory 
perceptual cues. Multisensory and contextual information, such as environmental threats, may 
therefore play a crucial role in the decoding of this expression and be essential for an adequate 
categorization. Consistent with our findings, fear has been observed to display a sharp increase 
in some prior developmental studies (Herba, Landau, Russell, Ecker, & Phillips, 2006; Vicari, 
Reilly, Pasqualetti, Vizzotto, & Caltagirone, 2000), while other studies have revealed more 
gradual improvements (Gao & Maurer, 2009; Thomas, De Bellis, Graham, & LaBar, 2007) or 
stable, albeit low-task performance from early childhood to adulthood (Rodger et al., 2015). 
Differences across studies may be attributed to methodological considerations and task 
differences, as recognition rates have been proven to be task dependent (e.g., Montirosso, 
Peverelli, Frigerio, Crespi, & Borgatti, 2010; Vicari et al., 2000), with performance variations 
occurring even within the same study when the task is changed (Vicari et al., 2000). 
Importantly, the findings reported here provide further evidence that the recognition of fear 
has a special status within the framework of facial expression recognition (Richoz et al., 2015; 
Rodger et al., 2015).  
 
Disgust also showed a steep increase in recognition accuracy, following a similar 
trajectory as fear. In line with our findings, steep improvements from childhood to adulthood 
were previously observed for disgust in a study by Rodger et al. (2015), which measured the 
quantity of information necessary for an observer to accurately recognize facial expressions, as 
well as in earlier studies that investigated expression recognition with matching (Herba et al., 
2006) or labeling tasks (Vicari et al., 2000). As mentioned by Vicari et al. (2000), the steep 
improvement observed for disgust in children aged 5 to 10 may occur owing to the greater 
lexico-semantic abilities in older children. It might be also plausible that the very distinctive 
facial configurations of disgust convey signals about potentially contaminated food. These signals 
are crucial from an evolutionary perspective and hence the need to rapidly improve in the 
detection of this expression in order to stay away from harmful substances.  
 
Finally, our findings also revealed a sharp increase for surprise, in both the static and 
dynamic conditions. Interestingly, the expression of surprise was already well recognized in 
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very young children aged 5 to 6, with recognition rates of 60% for the dynamic stimuli (55% 
for the static images, Figure 5.11A). High recognition rates in young children would rather 
accord with a more gradual developmental trajectory, as suggested by prior research that 
investigated the recognition of surprise from 5 up to 18 years of age (Rodger et al., 2015). 
Interestingly, however, the sharp increase observed for surprise in the current study may be 
accounted for by the very high recognition rates observed for this expression in participants 
above the age of 18, reaching up to 79% in the 21–30 age group for the dynamic stimuli (67% 
for the static images, Figure 5.11C).  
 
We also observed a gradual increase for anger and sadness, although only in the static 
condition. These findings are generally consistent with previous reports (Herba et al., 2006; 
Rodger et al., 2015, for sad; Vicari et al., 2000). In the dynamic condition, children aged 5 to 6 
were nearly as effective in recognizing anger (62%, Figure 5.11A) as young adults aged 17–18 
(64%, Figure 5.11B), 21–30 (66%, Figure 5.11C), or 31– 40 (66%, Figure 5.11D). The same pattern 
was observed for sadness, with identical recognition rates for young children aged 5 – 6 (56%) 
and young adults in the 17–18 age group.  
 
Finally, our results did not reveal an increase for happiness in either condition, task 
performance remaining stable over ages, with our peak efficiency revealing the peak of the 
decline. The absence of improvement observed for happiness may be explained by the very high 
recognition accuracy already found in young children for this expression, which leaves little 
scope for improvement. Our findings for happiness are consistent with previous studies that 
revealed that children as young as five years of age recognize the expression of happiness just 
as effectively as adults (Gao & Maurer, 2009; Gross & Ballif, 1991; Herba & Phillips, 2004), 
even when the presentation time is as fast as 500 ms (Rodger et al., 2015). In order to capture 
the increase in recognition performance for happiness, we should have started earlier, below 5 
years of age.  
 
Additionally, it is worth noting that our findings revealed differences in the steepness 
of increase between the static and dynamic conditions for the expressions of disgust and sadness, 
the increase being steeper with the static stimuli. These findings might be accounted for by the 
low recognition rates found for the static images of disgust and sadness in very young children. 
An exposure to static images of disgust and sadness is rather uncommon in everyday life, 
particularly for young children, whereas an exposure to the dynamic versions of these 
expressions might be more frequent for children when their schoolfellows or siblings dislike 
some particular food they have to eat (disgust) or when they cry or express their sorrow (sadness).  
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Peak efficiency 
The data-driven identification of the peak efficiency, the point at which observers’ recognition 
performance reaches its optimum before declining, revealed a series of novel interesting 
findings. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that has effectively isolated the 
age at which observers are the most efficient for the recognition of the basic facial expressions 
of emotion across life span. We observed the earliest peak efficiencies for both the static and 
dynamic expressions of disgust (18–20 years) and fear (19–21 years) in young adults, followed by 
surprise (23–25 years) and sadness (27–28 years). Peak efficiency for the static expression of 
anger was found at 35 years of age, whereas the recognition of its dynamic version was reached 
at 39 years. The latest breakpoint that emerged from our data was observed for the dynamic 
expression of happiness at around 61 years of age (50 years for the static version). It is worth 
noting that the breakpoints found for each expression were nearly the same in both conditions, 
with the exception of anger and happiness, which reached their breakpoints later with dynamic 
expressions.  
 
There are two explanations for the very early peak efficiencies found for fear and 
disgust. Firstly, as mentioned above, from an evolutionary perspective, these two expressions 
convey important signals about potential dangers or harmful substances, both important for 
survival. Disgust and fear can therefore be expected to reach their peak rapidly in order to 
ensure survival. Secondly, for fear and disgust, the point in time at which the peak efficiency 
emerges may be driven by the inherent properties of those expressions. Stimuli that are difficult 
to recognize for young people might be even more difficult for elderly people, as difficult tasks 
are likely to be more sensitive to cognitive decline (Calder et al., 2003; Ruffman et al., 2008). 
Changes in the slope of the lines may therefore be expected to occur earlier with difficult tasks. 
We examined response biases for each expression, computing confusion matrices across 
different age groups (see supplementary Figure 5.11A, B, C, D, E). The confusion matrices found 
for fear and disgust indeed revealed that these two expressions were particularly difficult for 
our observers to identify. Disgust was commonly confused with anger, with confusion rates 
ranging up to 28% in the 5–6 age group for the dynamic stimuli (Figure 5.11A), 20% for the 71–
80 age group (Figure 5.11E). Previous studies also reported marked confusions between disgusted 
and angry faces, which were interpreted as a general bias towards angry faces (Recio, Schacht, 
& Sommer, 2013). Such a bias could explain the stable and high recognition rates found in the 
current research for angry faces from childhood onwards. Other confusions were observed 
between fear and surprise. In line with previous studies (Rodger et al., 2015), fear was found to 
be the most frequently confounded expression among all age groups, with confusion rates 
reaching up to 53% for the dynamic expression of surprise in the 5–6 age group (Figure 5.11A) 
or even 63% in the 71–80 age group (Figure 5.11E). As mentioned by Calder et al. (2003), age-
related cognitive decline may reinforce these confusions due to perceptual or conceptual 
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difficulties (i.e., fear and surprise are conceptually very close and share facial signals that are 
morphologically similar, Delis et al., 2016). Note also that the reverse confusion was much less 
common. When presented with surprise, the confusion rates observed for fear reached only 3% 
for the dynamic stimuli (4.6% for the static expressions) in the 5–6 age group and 5% (3.3% for 
the static expressions) in elderly people aged 71–80.  
 
Interestingly, our findings also revealed a later emergence of the peak efficiency for 
anger compared to the other expressions. As mentioned before, recognition abilities for anger 
showed no increase in the dynamic condition, task performance being already high in young 
children, and displayed only a slight increase for the static condition, recognition rates being 
also high in young children. A potential while speculative explanation for this observation may 
lie in the fact that we are daily exposed to the expression of anger, arguing with our partners, 
children, colleagues – an exposure that might postpone the recognition decrease of this 
expression and, therefore, the changes in the slope of the line.  
 
Finally, the latest breakpoint found for happiness may be accounted for by the ceiling 
effect found for this expression from childhood onwards.  
 
Altogether, this second set of findings offers novel insights into the development of 
human facial expression recognition. As observed, facial expression recognition develops 
following emotion-dependent trajectories that do not necessarily all reach their peak efficiency in 
early adulthood as predicted by previous studies (Calder et al., 2003; De Sonneville et al., 2002; 
Horning et al., 2012; Williams et al., 2009). The optimal level of task performance can indeed 
be reached at a very late point in development, depending also on the very nature of the 
diagnostic information of the facial expression, its temporal properties and evolutionary value. 
 
Efficiency – decrease 
Finally, we observed differences in the steepness of decrease in recognition performance across 
emotions and conditions. In the dynamic condition, the steepest decreases were observed for 
anger, happiness, and sadness, and less severe decreases for fear and surprise. Disgust showed 
the least severe decrease in this condition. Different patterns were observed in the static 
condition, the steepest decline being for happiness, followed by sadness and disgust. Less severe 
decreases were found for fear and anger, whereas the least severe decrease was observed for the 
expression of surprise. Similarly to the differences in the steepness of increase observed between 
static and dynamic conditions, differences in the steepness of decrease were observed between 
both conditions for the expression of disgust. The recognition of the static expression of disgust 
decreased from 51% to 34% between the ages of 61-70 and 81-90, whereas recognition accuracy 
of its dynamic version remained relatively stable (decrease from 55% to 52%, Figure 11E). 
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This pattern of results posits that the recognition of facial expression declines over time, 
which is consistent with previous models of aging. These models suggest that age-related 
structural changes in different brain regions, particularly in frontal and temporal volumes, as 
well as changes in neurotransmitters (Calder et al., 2003; Ruffman et al., 2008) might be 
responsible for older adults’ impairment in the recognition of facial expression. For example, 
the amygdala, which plays a crucial role in the processing of fear and sadness (e.g., Adolphs et 
al., 2005; Yang et al., 2002), undergoes severe atrophy with age and becomes progressively less 
responsive to negative stimuli (De Winter et al., 2016; Mather et al., 2004; Ruffman et al., 
2008). In contrast, the insula and basal ganglia, which underlie the processing of disgust, seem 
to be less vulnerable to aging, as evidenced by the preserved ability to recognize this expression 
in older adults (Calder et al., 2003; Horning et al., 2012; Ruffman et al., 2008). Interestingly, 
our findings revealed the least severe decrease in recognition performance for the dynamic 
expression of disgust. However, in contrast to previous studies that showed no reduction in the 
recognition of some expressions or even some improvements with increasing age (e.g., Calder 
et al., 2003), our findings revealed steep to moderate decreases for all the expressions, even for 
disgust being usually preserved in elderly people (Calder et al., 2003; Horning et al., 2012; 
Ruffman et al., 2008).  
 
Methodological considerations may be responsible for the differences observed between 
the current study and previous ones. Indeed, previous studies investigated facial expression 
recognition across groups of ages (Calder et al., 2003), stages of life (Horning et al., 2012), or 
decades (Williams et al., 2009), whereas our study investigated elderly people’s ability to 
categorize emotions by considering age as a continuum. This methodological approach 
overcomes the problem of defining arbitrary age boundaries, which are routinely used in the 
literature to relate to critical developmental ages.   
  
  Furthermore, the variability in findings between the current research and previous 
neuropsychological and behavioral studies can be accounted for by the age-ranges tested across 
the studies. For example, Calder et al. (2003) observed improved recognition abilities for disgust 
in their older adult age group, spanning from age 58 to 70 (mean age 65). In contrast, in our 
study, we tested participants up to the age of 96, giving rise to the possibility that the decline 
for disgust appears at a later point in development. This assumption is in line with a previous 
study that showed a decrease in the recognition of disgust in elderly people, aged 80 to 91 
(Williams et al., 2009).  
 
Additionally, the stimuli used across the different studies might also have impacted 
expression recognition performance. In the current study, we used a specific database of 
emotional expressions that are less prototypical than the Ekman and Friesen (1976) standard 
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set of facial photographs used in previous research (Calder et al., 2003; McDowell, Harrison, & 
Demaree, 1994; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004b). Moreover, in contrast to previous reports that 
used only static images displaying the apex or the highest state of an emotional expression 
(Calder et al., 2003; Ruffman et al., 2008), we tested facial expression recognition with static, 
dynamic, and shuffled stimuli. Importantly, our stimuli were controlled for the amount of low-
level discriminative information carried over time. In other words, the quantity of low-level 
information carried by our static, dynamic, and shuffled stimuli was identical across conditions 
and tasks (Gold et al., 2013). In line with previous studies (Krendl & Ambady, 2010; Sze et al., 
2012), we found that elderly people were impaired in recognizing static but not dynamic 
expressions. However, in contrast to the findings reported by Krendl and Ambady (2010), we 
also observed steep to moderate declines for all the expressions, even in the dynamic condition. 
However, in their study participants were provided with additional aiding cues, such as body-
related information or contextual cues, which might have facilitated expression recognition, 
given that the perception of a particular expression is strongly influenced by the context in 
which it occurs (Barrett & Kensinger, 2010; Horning et al., 2012). For example, Aviezer et al. 
(2008) found more consistent recognition performance for fear when person-related or 
contextual information were provided to the participants.  
 
Finally, the divergence between our findings and those of previous research may also 
be due to the small number of trials presented (Horning et al., 2012; Moreno et al., 1993) as 
well as the differences in the settings used, with some studies relying on laboratory settings 
(Calder et al., 2003; Horning et al., 2012) and others on online tasks (Williams et al., 2009). 
5.5.2 Static versus dynamic expressions 
A dynamic advantage before peak efficiency 
Our findings revealed a dynamic face advantage for the recognition of anger, surprise, and 
happiness before peak efficiency. These results are inconsistent with previous developmental 
studies, which revealed that dynamic presentations did not increase children’s recognition 
performance (Nelson et al., 2013; Nelson & Russell, 2011; Widen & Russell, 2015) and with 
some experiments showing even an overall advantage for static expressions (Nelson & Russell, 
2011, Study 1; Widen & Russell, 2015). Such advantage also differs from the results reported by 
previous studies in young and healthy adults (e.g., Christie & Bruce, 1998; Jiang et al., 2014; 
Kätsyri & Sams, 2008), showing that the recognition of facial expressions is not facilitated by 
the dynamic information provided by moving faces. 
   
  The lack of consistency between these studies and the present work may be accounted 
for by methodological factors. For instance, in some of the aforementioned developmental 
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studies, only a single actor was selected to record the facial expressions (Nelson et al., 2013; 
Nelson & Russell, 2011), raising the possibility that the results found could be biased by the 
acting performance. Compared to the Ekman and Friesen (1976) standard set of facial 
expressions, the expressions of the single actor used in the study by Nelson and Russell (2011) 
were indeed more readily labeled as correct by adults, as they were perceived as clearer and 
more intense. Asking children to categorize facial expressions of a single actor in their dynamic 
and static forms might also have impacted their recognition performance since they might have 
been more likely to choose the same label in both the conditions, by using a picture matching 
strategy. In addition, compared to the current research in which children were asked to choose 
the correct answer among six possibilities, previous developmental studies used free labeling as 
a measure of recognition (Nelson & Russell, 2011; Widen & Russell, 2015), which raises the 
possibility that vocabulary performance rather than children’s true ability to understand the 
emotions of others were tested.  
 
  Importantly, most developmental studies that revealed an overall static advantage for 
facial expression recognition (Nelson & Russell, 2011; Widen & Russell, 2015), directly 
compared children’s performance for static expressions to their scores with dynamic expressions. 
In most cases, these direct comparisons can be problematic because they make it difficult to 
determine whether increased recognition rates are caused by psychological or physical factors 
(Gold et al., 2013). For instance, Nelson and Russell (2011) and Widen and Russell (2015) created 
their static images by presenting a single frame of the highest amplitude of the dynamic 
sequences, a procedure that might have created “optimal” static images. The overall static 
advantage found in their research may be due to an increased quantity of discriminative 
information provided by the stimuli rather than an enhanced psychological ability to perceive 
the static expressions. In order to control for this general confounding of physical and 
psychological factors, we decided to rely on a database of stimuli created by Gold et al. (2013), 
who controlled for the amount of low-level information carried by their stimuli over time by 
carefully dissociating these two factors with the use of a psychophysical approach. Compared to 
previous studies (Nelson et al., 2013; Nelson & Russell, 2011; Widen & Russell, 2015), our 
results, therefore, offer a more reliable view and a better understanding of the way in which 
temporal properties influence facial expression recognition from childhood onwards. 
 
A dynamic advantage after peak efficiency 
Our results revealed processing benefits of dynamic stimuli after peak efficiency for all the 
expressions, with the exception of sadness and fear. Interestingly, our data evidenced that these 
results were driven by a suboptimal performance for the recognition of static expressions in 
elderly people rather than increased abilities to recognize dynamic expressions (see 
Supplementary Table 5.1 for the example of surprise).    
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  In everyday life, facial expressions are dynamic events that unfold over time in some 
particular ways, representing a richer and more valid approach to study facial expression 
recognition. Previous fMRI studies have also suggested that different neural substrates underlie 
the processing of dynamic and static expressions (e.g., Johnston et al., 2013; Kessler et al., 2011; 
LaBar, Crupain, Voyvodic, & McCarthy, 2003; Paulmann et al., 2009; Sato, Kochiyama, 
Yoshikawa, Naito, & Matsumura, 2004; Schultz & Pilz, 2009; Trautmann et al., 2009). Dynamic 
faces have been found to selectively elicit higher neural responses in the pSTS, in the anterior 
STS, and in the inferior frontal gyrus (Bernstein, Erez, Blank, & Yovel, 2017; Fox, Iaria, & 
Barton, 2009; Pitcher, Dilks, Saxe, Triantafyllou, & Kanwisher, 2011). A very recent fMRI 
study that used multi-voxel pattern analysis revealed that dynamic expressions were associated 
with increased activation in both face-selective and motion-selective areas as well as higher 
categorization accuracies, compared to static expressions (Liang et al., 2017). Given that dynamic 
faces elicit higher neural responses (Bernstein et al., 2017; Fox et al., 2009; Pitcher et al., 2011) 
and cause the activation of a wider network of regions in the brain (Arsalidou, Morris, & Taylor, 
2011; Liang et al., 2017), their decoding may be less vulnerable to age-related degeneration 
compared to the decoding of static images.  
   
  In contrast, suboptimal performance for static stimuli could be explained by age-related 
structural changes in brain regions responsible for the processing of static emotional 
expressions. For example, De Winter et al. (2016) recently evidenced that age-induced atrophy 
to the amygdala of patients with frontotemporal dementia affected emotion processing in distant 
face-selective areas. More specifically, their findings evidenced a positive correlation between 
grey matter volume in the left amygdala and emotion-related brain activity in the fusiform face 
area, a core region in the face processing network involved in the decoding of static stimuli 
(Pitcher et al., 2011) and emotional expressions (Ganel, Valyear, Goshen-Gottstein, & Goodale, 
2005; Xu & Biederman, 2010).  
   
  Dynamic faces also include information that cannot be completely rendered by static 
images, forcing the observers to shift their attention to different facial features. Multiple shifts 
on different facial areas are likely to benefit expression recognition, given that the facial signals 
critical for the recognition of emotional expressions can be found throughout the face. In 
clinical conditions or normal aging populations, when slower or suboptimal processing takes 
place, dynamic stimuli may provide additional cues, attracting and holding attention as well as 
enhancing motor simulations. The increased attention inherently elicited by moving faces may 
compensate for the apparent age-related deficits found in elderly populations on expression 
recognition tasks with static images. Dynamic face stimuli may naturally drive the focus of 
attention towards the diagnostic information in a bottom-up fashion (i.e., the mouth for 
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surprise), whereas static face images require the observers to move towards those features based 
on top-down internal representations. 
 
It is also important to note that the advantage we observed for dynamic expressions 
cannot simply be attributed to an overall larger amount of discriminative information carried 
by the dynamic stimuli. As reported above, the stimuli used in the current experiment were 
created by Gold et al. (2013), who used an ideal observer approach to effectively measure the 
amount of information provided by the stimuli. Gold et al.’s (2013) findings revealed that their 
dynamic stimuli did not offer more discriminative information to the observers as compared to 
their static images. Thus, the dynamic advantage for anger, disgust, happiness, and surprise 
observed in our participants is unlikely to be the result of physical factors. Rather, this dynamic 
advantage most probably comes from an adequate ability to use the available perceptual and 
diagnostic information. 
 
We did not find a dynamic advantage for fear and sadness, neither before nor after peak 
efficiency. From a sociobiological perspective, the expression of fear is critical for human 
survival (LoBue, 2010) and it has been shown to potentiate early visual processing of perceptual 
events (e.g., Phelps, Ling, & Carrasco, 2006) and enhance attention (e.g., Carlson & Mujica-
Parodi, 2015; Pourtois, de Gelder, Bol, & Crommelinck, 2005). Interestingly, using a single-
trial Repetition Suppression (stRS) approach, we very recently revealed that this expression 
boosts the early coding of individual faces, regardless of attentional constraints (Turano et al., 
2017). Similar findings were reported in a very recent developmental study that examined 
detection thresholds for happy and fearful faces presented with noise. The superior ability for 
detecting fearful faces was observed already in infants aged 3.5 months (Bayet et al., 2017). Our 
brain may be particularly tuned to detect this expression, regardless of its temporal properties. 
This assumption may explain the absence of a dynamic advantage for the decoding of this 
expression. However, enhanced processing of fear would also predict increased categorization 
performance, a prediction that is inconsistent with our findings. Our results indeed revealed 
very low recognition rates throughout the life span. As mentioned above, among all expressions, 
fear is probably the most powerful for transmitting multisensory information. Broader 
contextual information may therefore be necessary to reliably categorize it. This assumption is 
in line with an emerging literature that suggests that isolated facial signals may not be sufficient 
for observers to adequately perceive the emotions of fear and disgust, and that additional 
information regarding the context in which the expression occurs is critical (e.g., Barrett & 
Kensinger, 2010). 
 
The absence of a dynamic advantage for the processing of sadness is consistent with 
previous findings, which revealed that the expression of sadness is better recognized through 
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static pictures (Bould et al., 2008; Recio et al., 2013; Widen & Russell, 2015) or when evolving 
slowly (Kamachi et al., 2001; Recio et al., 2013). Ekman (2003) suggested that among all the 
expressions, sadness is the one lasting the longest over time, a property that may explain why 
slowness or stillness may increase recognition performance. Our results further confirm that 
the idiosyncratic properties of this expression are inherently slow. 
 
We should acknowledge that we did not assess whether elderly people’s cognitive 
abilities influenced recognition performance. Fluid intelligence (e.g., Horning et al., 2012; 
Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004a), processing speed (e.g., Orgeta & Phillips, 2007), verbal memory 
(e.g., MacPherson et al., 2002), or discrimination of visual information (Mill et al., 2009) are 
all cognitive faculties that are critical for the recognition of human facial expressions and have 
been found to decrease with increasing age (e.g., Mill et al., 2009; Salthouse, 2004). Because 
our stimuli were only presented for 1 s, reduced processing speed in elderly people may have 
influenced their recognition performance for static face images, as the number of facial features 
extracted from the faces in this limited presentation time might have been lower than that in 
younger adults. Interestingly, a recent cross-sectional study that examined the influence of 
different cognitive abilities on facial expression recognition observed that these faculties 
contributed to the performance but did not fully account for the impairments observed in older 
adults (Horning et al., 2012). Additionally, in a later study, Zhao et al. (2016) observed that the 
slower processing speed in elderly people was not responsible for facial expression recognition 
deficits (Zhao et al., 2016; but see Suzuki & Akiyama, 2013; West et al., 2012). 
 
  Note also that differences in recognition abilities could stem from differences in the 
cohorts that were tested, such as educational shifts, cultural norms, or social differences. To the 
best of our knowledge, no prior research has ever examined the extent to which the recognition 
of facial expression is influenced by these cohort effects (Ruffman et al., 2008).  
 
The shuffled condition 
We introduced this condition to fully replicate the study conducted by Gold et al. (2013), without 
having clear predictions for this experimental condition. Our results revealed similar 
developmental trajectories for the six basic expressions in the shuffled condition (i.e., increase, 
peak efficiency and decrease) although recognition rates were generally lower than those 
observed in the other conditions. More specifically, our findings revealed a recognition 
advantage for the dynamic expressions of anger, disgust, happiness and surprise over the 
shuffled ones and a recognition advantage for the static expressions of happiness, disgust and 
surprise over the shuffled ones. In contrast, we observed better recognition performance for the 
expression of fear in the shuffled compared to the static or dynamic conditions. As reported by 
our participants, this advantage for fear could be accounted for by the properties of the stimuli 
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themselves. The shuffled expressions were generated by temporally randomizing the frames of 
the dynamic movies. This procedure leads to the impression that the actors preforming the 
emotional expressions are shaking giving the feeling that they are afraid.  
 
  Interestingly, differences in recognition performance across conditions are inconsistent 
with the results reported by Gold et al. (2013) who observed similar performance in all three 
conditions. In that prior study however, the authors did not consider the recognition rates of 
the individual expressions effectively, collapsing them across the six expressions in each 
condition. Our findings offer therefore new evidence that the temporal progression of 
information (i.e., the order of the frames) provided by genuine natural expressions is more 
important for the recognition of some expressions (e.g., anger, disgust happiness, surprise) than 
others (e.g., fear, sad). Given the very non-ecological nature of the stimuli, we will not further 
discuss these results as their contribution is limited in a theoretical point of view.  
 
Methodological considerations 
In the current study, we used a hierarchical Bayesian model with weakly informative priors. 
The flexibility and power of the Bayesian approach in dealing with time series data and building 
nonlinear models was also recently demonstrated in emotion research (e.g., see Krone, Albers, 
Kuppens, & Timmerman, 2017, for an application in personal emotion dynamics) thanks to the 
rapid development in probabilistic language programing. It is worth noting, that there are 
alternative candidates models that could capture the nonlinear relationship between age and 
some psychological or behavioral measurements, including Latent Growth Curve Models (for 
an introductory text, see Duncan, Duncan, & Strycker, 2013), Generalized Additive Mixed 
Models including spline regression, or Quadratic Linear Mixed-Effect Models (Wood, 2006). 
Some of these models have been previously applied to investigate similar questions, such as the 
estimation of the peak efficiency of diverse recognition abilities (i.e., change point estimation, 
e.g., Cohen, 2012; Cudeck & Klebe, 2002). The Bayesian modeling framework we used here 
provides a coherent mathematical language to describe our model and assumption, while giving 
the flexibility to potentially extend part of the component to build more complex models. 
Moreover, it allowed us to properly quantify the uncertainty and regulate the estimation across 
different conditions using hyper-priors. 
 
To identify inverse “U-shape” patterns, as those observed in our study, previous 
modeling methods occasionally involved the testing of a quadratic relationship (e.g., a significant 
regression coefficient of age^2), even if such practice is not always valid (Simonsohn, 2017). 
Instead, Simonsohn (2017) suggested to fit two separate linear models and compare the 
coefficients of the two slopes as a more valid alternative. While our model is conceptually similar 
to Simonsohn (2017)’s model, there are two major differences. First, the inference proposed by 
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Simonsohn (2017) involved multiple model fitting steps, by initially identifying the breakpoint 
(i.e., peak efficiency in our case), and then estimating the coefficients of the two linear functions. 
In contrast, with a full model that jointly estimates the breakpoint and the linear functions, we 
could better estimate the parameters and quantify the associated uncertainty. Second, the 
intercepts of our step linear function are linked and represented as one value (i.e., the 
recognition ability at peak efficiency), whereas in Simonsohn (2017)’s model the two linear 
functions are not linked. The linked linear function is more appropriate in our case, as it is 
unlikely to have a sudden increase or decrease in recognition ability in a short span during 
natural development. Nonetheless, an implicit yet important assumption present in both models 
is that the peak efficiency is found somewhere in the middle of the life span (or more precisely, 
not at either of the two extrema). Indeed, if the peak efficiency is at the lower or upper limit 
(e.g., too young or too old), the parameter estimation may not be accurate.  
   
  Our model estimation performed well, except for the expression of happiness, because 
of the ceiling effect we observed for this expression. The divergence in the trace and the 
multimodal in the posterior distribution of the peak efficiency both indicate that the current 
step linear model is not the best suited to represent changes in recognition abilities across the 
life span for this expression. Currently, all the expressions are estimated independently. While 
modeling this way is easier to interpret, we ignored the random effect in the subjects across the 
expressions. Future studies are necessary to take into account the random effect from each 
subject (intercept and slope). This could be done by directly modeling the full confusion matrix 
from each subject (instead of only looking at the diagonal in the current study), presumably 
with some matrix decomposition trick or a Dirichlet-Categorical model.  
   
  Finally, our model allowed us to estimate the overall advantage of one condition over 
another before and after the peak efficiency. However, since we decided to consider the age as 
a continuum and not rely on specific age groups on the basis of arbitrary boundaries, our model 
did not allow us to finely estimate at which precise age the dynamic advantage emerges or 
disappears.  
5.6 Conclusions 
Current knowledge about facial expression recognition primarily arises from studies that use 
static images. In our daily life, however, natural faces are dynamic; they evolve over time in 
some particular ways to convey crucial information for adapted social behaviors. Prior studies 
investigating the importance of dynamic cues for the processing of facial expressions have 
yielded equivocal results, with some studies suggesting that dynamic expressions are more 
readily recognizable than static images and others suggesting that they are not. In order to 
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clarify these results and to determine if age is a critical factor to account for such discrepancies, 
we conducted a large-cross-sectional study to investigate the recognition of facial expressions by 
participants aged 5 to 96. Over 400 observers were instructed to categorize static, dynamic, and 
shuffled expressions according to the six basic expressions. Our findings revealed that regardless 
of the age of the observer or temporal condition, happiness was the best recognized facial 
expression, whereas fear was the most difficult to effectively categorize, as this expression was 
commonly confused with surprise. Bayesian modelling allowed us to quantify the steepness of 
increase and decrease in performance for each individual expression in each condition. Our 
results also revealed a data-driven estimation of the peak efficiency for every expression and 
finally provided new evidence for a dynamic advantage for facial expression recognition, 
stronger for some expressions than others and more important around specific points in the life 
course. Notably, performance for static images was less effective in the elderly population. 
Altogether, our findings highlight the importance of using ecologically valid faces in exploring 
the recognition of facial expressions and invite caution while drawing conclusions from studies 
that use only static images to this aim. 
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5.8 Supplementary Figures and Table 
 
5–6 age group 
 
 
7–8 age group 
 
 
9–10 age group 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11A. Confusion matrices – Response classification errors. Each row displays one of 
the six presented facial expressions, while each column shows the average frequency of the response 
given by the observers (Null indicates a "I don't know" response). For example, in the 5–6 age group, 
when presented with fear, the confusion rates observed for surprise reached up to 53% in the 
dynamic condition, 44% in the static, and 37% in the shuffled condition. 
There is a correspondence between the colourmap and the numbers displayed in the matrix, with 
dark blue tones indicating low frequency while blue-to-green shades indicate high frequency. The 
values in the main diagonal indicate the recognition performance for each expression. 
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11–12 age group 
 
 
 
13–14 age group 
 
 
15–16 age group 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11B. Confusion matrices – Response classification errors. Each row displays one of 
the six presented facial expressions, while each column shows the average frequency of the response 
given by the observers (Null indicates a “I don’t know” response). 
There is a correspondence between the colourmap and the numbers displayed in the matrix, with 
dark blue tones indicating low frequency while blue-to-green shades indicate high frequency. The 
values in the main diagonal indicate the recognition performance for each expression. 
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17–18 age group 
 
 
19–20 age group 
 
 
21–30 age group 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11C. Confusion matrices – Response classification errors. Each row displays one of the 
six presented facial expressions, while each column shows the average frequency of the response 
given by the observers (Null indicates a "I don't know" response).  
There is a correspondence between the colourmap and the numbers displayed in the matrix, with 
dark blue tones indicating low frequency while blue-to-green shades indicate high frequency. The 
values in the main diagonal indicate the recognition performance for each expression.   
 
 
 
 
 
5. EXPRESSION RECOGNITION ACROSS THE LIFE SPAN  
 
 
 
 
 179 
 
 
31–40 age group 
 
 
41–50 age group 
 
 
51–60 age group 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11D. Confusion matrices - Response classification errors. Each row displays one of the 
six presented facial expressions, while each column shows the average frequency of the response 
given by the observers (Null indicates a "I don't know" response).  
There is a correspondence between the colourmap and the numbers displayed in the matrix, with 
dark blue tones indicating low frequency while blue-to-green shades indicate high frequency. The 
values in the main diagonal indicate the recognition performance for each expression. 
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61–70 age group 
 
 
 
71–80 age group 
 
 
81–90 age group 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11E. Confusion matrices - Response classification errors. Each row displays one of the 
six presented facial expressions, while each column shows the average frequency of the response 
given by the observers (Null indicates a "I don't know" response).  
There is a correspondence between the colourmap and the numbers displayed in the matrix, with 
dark blue tones indicating low frequency while blue-to-green shades indicate high frequency. The 
values in the main diagonal indicate the recognition performance for each expression
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Table 5.1. Recognition performance for surprise between the dynamic and static conditions 
at peak efficiency and above the age of 80.  
 
 
Dynamic Static 
Condition effect 
(D= Dynamic – 
static) 
PE 75.8% 70% 5.8% 
> 80 62.8% 45% 17.8% 
Age effect on the 
conditions (D=PE - 
>80) 13% 25% 
 
 
Note. PE = recognition performance at peak efficiency; > 80 = recognition performance for all the 
observers above the age of 80 (N = 41). 
 
As shown in Table 5.1, we observed an overall advantage for the processing of the 
dynamic facial expression of surprise over the static one. This advantage was even more marked 
for the above 80-year-old observers (D Dynamic – static). Importantly, the recognition 
performance of the dynamic expression of surprise decreased from 75.8% at peak efficiency to 
62.8% after the age of 80 (D = 13%). For the static expression of surprise, the recognition 
performance dropped from 70% at peak efficiency to 45% after the age of 80 (D = 25%). When 
the performance of the observers above the age of 80 is compared to the performance at the 
peak efficiency (DPE –  >80), then the difference in the static condition is nearly twice as large 
that in the dynamic condition. This pattern of results favors the view that the dynamic advantage 
for the recognition of facial expressions of emotion is driven by a suboptimal performance for 
static stimuli.  
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5.9 Supplementary Results 
The experiment script, raw data, and analysis codes are open to access on Github 
(https://github.com/iBMLab/Static_dynamic).  
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6.1 Main findings 
The aim of this thesis was to use dynamic faces to investigate different aspects of face processing 
in different populations and age groups. More precisely, our work examined three questions: (1) 
Is the extraction of gender from dynamic faces and voices influenced by the nature of speech 
signal in 6-, 9-, and 12-month-old infants? (2) Are the dynamic internal representations of facial 
expressions in a prosopagnosic patient similar to those in healthy controls? Further, are these 
dynamic expressions better recognized by patient PS than static images? (3) Besides prosopagnosic 
individuals, do other populations with immature or fragile face processing systems also benefit 
from the presentation of dynamic emotional signals? The following sections will summarize our 
main findings in order to answer each of these questions. 
 
Is the extraction of gender from dynamic faces and voices influenced by the nature of 
speech signal in 6-, 9-, and 12-month-old infants? 
 
In the first experimental study, we used movies of dynamic faces in combination with 
short stories told in infant- or adult-directed speech to investigate infants’ ability to perceive 
multisensory gender coherence. Our findings revealed that by the middle of the first year of 
life, infants displayed the ability to match female faces and voices when the stories were told in 
adult-directed speech. This ability emerged later, between 6 and 9 months of age, when the 
stories were told in infant-directed speech and restricted to female faces. Altogether, our results 
suggest that the speech manner strongly influences infants’ ability to reliably integrate gender 
information in audio-visual communication. They indicate that 6-month-old infants may be 
more likely to match audible and visible gender attributes when looking at adults 
communicating with each other, than when adults are directly speaking to them. Overall, these 
findings suggest that the early multisensory ability to perceive gender is shaped by the very 
nature of social interactions (Richoz et al., 2017). 
 
Are the dynamic internal representations of facial expressions in a prosopagnosic patient 
similar to those in healthy controls? Further, are these dynamic expressions better 
recognized by patient PS than static images? 
 
In the second experimental contribution, we reported a single-case study of the patient 
PS suffering from later-life acquired prosopagnosia. By using a novel 4D technique, we 
examined whether the dynamic internal representations of the six basic expressions in patient 
PS were similar to those in healthy controls. We did so to shed further light on the widely 
debated question as to whether emotional and identity judgments rely on common or distinct 
representational systems. In a previous study, Caldara et al. (2005) demonstrated that patient 
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PS used facial information in a suboptimal manner when asked to recognize familiar faces. 
Here, in contrast, we found that she was within the typical range of controls, using all facial 
features when instructed to categorize dynamic emotional expressions. Moreover, our findings 
revealed that patient PS was selectively impaired in categorizing static expressions, while her 
ability to categorize dynamic expressions was preserved (with the exception of fear). Our 
findings cannot assert an independence between the extraction of face information related to 
identity and expression, as patient PS was selectively impaired in categorizing static emotional 
expressions. However, our findings support the idea that the face system relies on distinct 
representational systems to extract information from static (identity and static expressions) and 
dynamic faces or at least dissociable cortical pathways to access this information. Our findings 
also emphasize the importance of research featuring dynamic displays in the field of emotion 
recognition, particularly in the realm of brain-damaged or clinical conditions (Richoz et al., 
2015).  
 
Besides prosopagnosic individuals, do other populations with immature (i.e., young 
children) or fragile (i.e., elderly adults) face processing systems also benefit from the 
presentation of dynamic emotional signals? 
 
  Following on from our previous neuropsychological findings on a single-case of 
acquired prosopagnosia (CHAPTER 4), we decided to conduct another study to investigate 
whether dynamic signals offer processing benefits in other populations with fragile face 
processing systems, namely elderly people or young children. Our findings provide new evidence 
for a dynamic advantage for facial expression recognition, stronger for some expressions than 
others, and more important in young and elderly participants. In elderly adults, the dynamic 
advantage was driven by suboptimal performance for the recognition of static emotional 
expressions. Critically, this suboptimal performance could be used as a marker for impaired 
face processing associated with other aspects of general cognitive decline. Our results highlight 
again the importance of using dynamic stimuli when investigating the recognition of facial 
expressions in specific populations, inviting to caution when interpreting the results obtained 
from studies that only use static images.  
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6.2 Discussion 
6.2.1 A key involvement of dorsal face-selective brain regions 
The three studies presented in this thesis involved the processing of dynamic and multimodal 
face information. At the neuro-functional level, the ability we observed in processing such 
information from faces in our different experimental populations, might critically relate to a 
common involvement of the dorsal face-selective brain regions.  
 
Recent fMRI studies investigating the role played by dynamic properties in the 
processing of faces have revealed that the dorsal pathway including the posterior Superior 
Temporal Sulcus (pSTS), the anterior part of the Superior Temporal Sulcus (aSTS) as well as 
the Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG), elicits stronger responses to dynamic as compared to static 
faces. In marked contrast, face-selective areas located in the ventral stream do no exhibit a 
preference for moving stimuli (Bernstein et al., 2017; Fox et al., 2009a; Pitcher et al., 2011). In 
our second study, we evidenced that PS, a single-case of acquired prosopagnosia, showed a 
selective impairment in the categorization of static expressions, whereas her performance with 
dynamic stimuli was within normal range. Based on the fMRI evidence mentioned above, PS's 
advantage for the categorization of dynamic facial expressions might relate to her functionally 
intact dorsal pathway, while her selective impairment with static images could be accounted for 
by her lesions in the ventral stream. Although our data provide further evidence for a direct 
cortical pathway connecting early visual areas to the pSTS, a future neuroimaging study with 
PS is necessary to support this assumption and isolate the brain regions underlying her 
performance.  
 
In a similar way, in our third study, dorsal face-selective brain regions probably played 
a key role in elderly people’s perseveration in the recognition of dynamic expressions. Our 
findings indeed revealed that the dynamic advantage for the recognition of anger, disgust, 
happiness, and surprise was driven by suboptimal performance with static images. As dynamic 
stimuli elicit elevated neural responses in the dorsal stream (Bernstein et al., 2017; Fox et al., 
2009a; Pitcher et al., 2011) and cause the activation of a wider network of regions in the brain 
(e.g., Arsalidou et al., 2011; Liang et al., 2017), their decoding might be less vulnerable to age-
related degeneration as compared to the decoding of static images. However, this assumption 
again needs to be further investigated through neuroimaging studies that would directly tackle 
this issue.  
 
Dorsal face-selective brain regions do not only play a key role in the processing of 
dynamic faces but also in the integration of multimodal person-related information. By using 
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fMRI, Watson and colleagues (2014) recently reported that an important region spreading down 
the trunk of the right STS is selectively activated by both faces and voices. Similar findings 
were reported in a later study by Hasan and colleagues (2016), who investigated the integration 
of identity information from auditory and visual cues. These results suggest that dorsal face-
selective brain regions play a crucial role in observers’ ability to integrate information from 
multiple sensory sources. In light of these findings, a question related to our first study 
spontaneously arises: does the STS of young infants already display sensitivity to multimodal 
information?  
 
Previous studies, which investigated the maturation of the cortical network for face 
perception, have frequently reported the STS as being the latest region among face-selective 
areas to reach levels of maturity comparable to those seen in adults (Cohen-Kadosh, 2011; Leroy 
et al., 2011). To the best of our knowledge, however, prior developmental fMRI research did not 
address the question as to whether the STS is involved in the integration of multimodal 
information in infants. As fMRI studies in the pediatric field are particularly challenging due 
to head movements, dropouts, poor performance, or increased noise (Cohen-Kadosh, 2011), such 
a study could be conducted using fNIRS. fNIRS is a growing non-invasive neuroimaging 
technique that allows the localization of brain activity in specific cortical regions by monitoring 
relative changes in oxy-, deoxy-, and total-hemoglobin concentrations. The human brain 
undergoes a number of physiological changes as it responds to environmental stimuli. These 
changes in blood levels and electrochemical activity also affect its optical properties. fNIRS 
captures cortical brain responses by measuring the transmission and absorption of near-infrared 
light through cerebral tissues. Although the spatial resolution of fNIRS is lower than that of 
fMRI, this technique has numerous unparalleled advantages. As demonstrated in previous 
developmental research, fNRIS is a flexible technique that offers new and interesting insights 
into the development of the human brain. Because of its flexibility to head movements, 
blinking, or other artefacts, fNIRS is particularly well suited to investigate the functional 
emergence of the face-selective cortical network in infants or young children (e.g., Nakato et 
al., 2011).  
6.2.2 Our findings in the light of revised frameworks of human face processing 
Based on TMS research (Pitcher, 2014; Pitcher et al., 2014), fMRI studies (Fox et al., 2009a; 
Pitcher et al., 2011), and recent functional connectivity evidence (Avidan et al., 2014; Gschwind 
et al., 2012; Pyles et al., 2013), Duchaine and Yovel (2015) have proposed a revised framework 
of the face processing network, which suggests that dorsal face areas are specifically tuned to 
the processing of facial motion, while the ventral regions are preferentially engaged in the 
processing of form information (see section 1.3.3, Figure 1.48). Inconsistent with the influential 
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neural model of face processing proposed by Haxby et al. (2000), Bernstein and colleagues (2017) 
have further evidenced that the OFA and FFA, although insensitive to motion information, 
display similar sensitivity to both changeable and invariant aspects of faces. In contrast, the 
pSTS elicits a stronger sensitivity to motion information and changeable aspects of faces. The 
revised neural framework proposed by Duchaine and Yovel (2015) provides some interesting 
explanations for the results evidenced in the second experimental contribution of this thesis. 
PS’s preserved ability to recognize dynamic expressions may be related to the functionally intact 
dorsal face-selective brain regions that connect early visual areas to the pSTS and aSTS. 
 
Duchaine and Yovel (2015) further suggested that due to its broad sensitivity to form 
information, the FFA may also contribute to the processing of emotional expressions, at least 
in the case of static faces (see also Bernstein et al., 2017; Cohen-Kadosh et al., 2010; Dalrymple 
et al., 2011; Fox et al., 2009b; Ganel et al., 2005; Xu & Biederman, 2010). Considering the fact 
that the FFA is also anatomically intact in PS (Rossion, 2008; Sorger et al., 2007), one might 
expect equally preserved recognition abilities for the processing of static expressions in patient 
PS. Our findings, however, revealed that patient PS was strongly impaired in that task. These 
findings point to the idea that the FFA alone is not sufficient for the processing of static 
emotional expressions and that the connections between the OFA and FFA may be necessary 
to reliably achieve this task.  
 
Such an assumption is supported by another model of human face processing, the 
reverse hierarchical model proposed by Rossion (2008, 2015, see section 1.3.3, Figure 1.43). As 
stated in the literature review in CHAPTER 1, this model suggests that visual inputs are directly 
sent from early visual areas to the FFA through a route bypassing the OFA. After an initial 
broad representation of the face in the FFA where face-selectivity emerges, the representation 
is sharpened through re-entrant connections with the OFA (Rossion, 2008, 2015). In support of 
this model, Schiltz and colleagues (2006) have demonstrated that despite showing face-selective 
neural activation, the rFFA of patient PS is insufficient to adequately process faces, showing no 
adaptation to repeated presentations of the same face (Schiltz et al., 2006). Similar findings 
were observed by Steeves and colleagues (2006) in patient DF. These results suggest that an 
integrity of the entire face network is necessary to perform the fine-grained analysis required 
to discriminate individual faces and most probably static emotional expressions as well.  
 
To sum up, my view is that neither of these two models can fully explain our 
observations. At the functional level, I defend an intermediate position, which suggests that 
both models, in combination, are necessary to provide an adequate and satisfactory 
interpretation to our findings. The model elaborated by Duchaine and Yovel (2015) offers an 
explanation for the preserved ability of patient PS to recognize dynamic facial expressions and 
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the processing advantage for dynamic stimuli occurring before and/or after peak efficiency in 
our healthy observers. In contrast, Rossion’s reverse hierarchical view (2008, 2015), which 
focuses more on the ventral stream and the functional roles of the OFA and FFA, provides an 
explanation for the selective impairment found in patient PS with respect to static faces.  
6.3 Limitations 
6.3.1 Limitations to our first experimental contribution 
One limitation of our first study (CHAPTER 3) lies in the fact that infants participated only in 
one condition, hearing either infant- or adult-directed speech stories. We decided to use this 
procedure rather than repeated measures due to the attentional difficulties and general 
fatigability usually observed with infants. Additionally, in our study, we did not assess infants’ 
ability to match audible and visible attributes of gender with static faces. In the context of this 
thesis, it would have been of particular interest to assess whether infants exhibit a later 
sensitivity to audio-visual correspondences with static images as compared to dynamic movies.  
6.3.2 Limitations to our second experimental contribution 
In the second study, we demonstrated that PS used all facial features to represent 
dynamic expressions. In a previous research, in contrast, Caldara and colleagues (2005) revealed 
that she used only the mouth region when instructed to extract static information about identity. 
We interpreted these findings as evidence that distinct representational systems support the 
extraction of face information for identity and expression recognition (CHAPTER 4). However, 
since identity and expression recognition tasks are very different, it is possible that the mouth 
bias observed for identity is restricted to identity and does not extend to the recognition of static 
expressions, an assumption that we did not verify in our original experiment, as we 
reconstructed the mental models of the six basic expressions through the use of dynamic stimuli. 
We recently addressed this issue in another study in which we used the Bubble technique with 
eye-tracking to map out PS’s facial information use for static expressions (Fiset et al., 2017, for 
more details on the technique, see Box 6). As shown in Figure 6.1A, compared to healthy 
controls, PS mainly relied on the lower part of the face, namely the mouth and the external 
contours, in order to recognize the expressions of fear, neutral, and happiness. These findings 
suggest that, in contrast to the view that we defended in the second experimental contribution 
of this thesis (CHAPTER 4), some common perceptual mechanisms are dedicated to the 
processing of identity and static expressions, at least at the level of the extraction of information 
from the eye region. These results also mirror previous findings reported by Adolphs and 
colleagues in 2005 with patient SM. This patient, suffering from bilateral amygdala damage, 
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was severely impaired in the recognition of fear and, like PS, used the lower part of the face to 
recognize facial expressions (Adolphs et al., 2005) (Figure 6.1B and C). 
 
A 
 
 
B 
 
 
C 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Suboptimal facial information use in two brain-damaged patients. (A) Compared 
to healthy controls (left panel), PS (center) fails to look at the eyes and rather relies on the lower 
part of the face, namely the mouth and the external contours to categorize the expressions of fear, 
neutral, and happiness. Reprinted from Fiset et al. (2017). (B) Similar findings were reported in 
patient SM when instructed to categorize fear (upper row) and happiness (lower row). (C) As 
demonstrated by the eye-tracking data, SM extracts facial information in a suboptimal way when 
presented with angry, sad, and fearful faces. Reprinted from Adolphs et al. (2005).  
 
Another limitation pertaining to this second experimental contribution lies in the fact 
that we did not objectively assess PS’s abilities to recognize the identity of moving faces. In 
order to ensure that PS’s ability to recognize dynamic expressions is specific to facial expressions 
and not due to an overall advantage in the processing of dynamic cues, a dynamic task of identity 
would have been required. To address this issue, we will conduct a new study to investigate 
PS’s visual information processing strategies when instructed to recognize the identity of moving 
faces. If PS similarly uses all facial features to recognize dynamic identities as she did with 
dynamic expressions, our findings will provide further evidence to substantiate the dissociation 
between the processing of static and dynamic face information.   
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6.3.3 Limitations to our third experimental contribution 
The results of our third study (CHAPTER 5) revealed a decline in the recognition of facial 
expression with increase in age. This reduction was steeper for some expressions as compared 
to others and was also modulated by the temporal properties of the expression presented. We 
should acknowledge here that the cross-sectional nature of our study raises the possibility that 
our results were influenced by cohort effects. Differences in recognition abilities may stem from 
differences in the cohorts tested, as it has been previously demonstrated in studies assessing 
intelligence and other cognitive abilities among different age groups (Flynn, 1987; Gerstorf et 
al., 2011; Zelinski & Kennison, 2007). For instance, our young and middle-aged adults were all 
students or employees with higher level jobs and good quality of life, giving rise to the possibility 
that distinctive cultural or educational factors might have influenced their ability to discern 
emotions. Additionally, in the mid-40s, social and moral norms encouraged people to suppress 
some of their expressions (e.g., anger, sadness) in order to maintain socially appropriate 
interactions. The avoidance or suppression of emotional reactions in our elderly people might 
have impacted their recognition performance as it has been previously shown in collectivistic 
cultures (Zhao et al., 2016). Moreover, with the advent of social networking, our younger 
participants might have been more exposed to static emotional expressions as compared to older 
adults. Elderly people, in contrast, might be more likely to watch television and, therefore, be 
exposed to dynamic faces. To the best of our knowledge, the extent to which facial expression 
recognition is influenced by these cohort effects has never been investigated and should be 
clarified in future studies that investigate the developmental trajectory of emotion recognition 
across the adult life span.  
 
Another limitation pertaining to this study lies in the fact that we only used stimuli 
displaying the emotional expressions of young actors, neither children nor elderly people. 
Whereas some previous studies did not observe an own-age bias in face recognition (Memon et 
al., 2003; Mondloch, Maurer, & Ahola, 2006; Wiese, Schweinberger, & Hansen, 2008; Wilcock, 
Bull, & Vrij, 2007), others reported that younger adults were more accurate in recognizing faces 
of young adults than the faces of children (Anastasi & Rhodes, 2005, 2006; Britton & Britton, 
1969; Kuefner et al., 2008), infants (Chance, Goldstein, & Andersen, 1986; Kuefner et al., 2008), 
or older adults (He, Ebner, & Johnson, 2011). Other studies observed that both children and 
adults more readily recognized own-age faces (Anastasi & Rhodes, 2005; Hills & Lewis, 2011; 
Wright & Stroud, 2002). In light of these findings, it would be interesting to investigate whether 
elderly people also benefit from the presentation of own-age faces and whether the recognition 
profiles of the different expressions would be the same when using such a procedure. 
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6.4 Future directions 
Are cross-cultural perceptual strategies used for facial expression recognition in infants 
influenced by the temporal properties of the expression presented?  
 
A very recent study by Geangu et al. (2016) evidenced that cultural differences in visual 
perceptual strategies are present in 7-month-old infants, but not in 5-month-old ones, when 
exposed to static facial emotional expressions. Based on our work with dynamic emotional 
expressions (CHAPTER 4 and CHAPTER 5), we will conduct a new study to address the 
question as to whether differences in perceptual strategies occur earlier than 7 months of age 
in the case of dynamic faces. To this aim, we will expose 5-month-old infants from Western 
Caucasian and East Asian cultures to the dynamic expressions of fear and happiness by using 
a familiarization-novelty preference paradigm (for more details on this paradigm, see Box 5). 
Infants will be familiarized with dynamic emotional expressions of fear or happiness across 
different identities (familiarization phase), before being exposed to the presentation of pairs of 
dynamic expressions displaying the familiarized emotion together with a novel one (test phase). 
Infants’ perceptual strategies will be monitored by eye-tracking during both familiarization and 
test phases.  
 
Moreover, to further our research, we also plan to investigate whether differences at 
the neural level are present in young infants from different cultures, or whether the same 
neural networks are involved despite differences in the perceptual strategies used. In adults, 
cross-cultural studies have evidenced differences in the neural substrates underlying the 
processing of facial emotional expressions. For instance, Chiao and colleagues (2008) have 
shown differences in the activation of the amygdala when observers were exposed to fear. 
Differences in the reward and affect system when participants were presented with positive 
emotions (Park et al., 2016), as well as differences in the anterior cingulate cortex when 
participants were exposed to the pain of others, were also observed (Xu et al., 2009). In infants, 
we will use fNIRS in order to examine whether cultural differences in emotion processing are 
already present at the neural level in infancy.  
 
Do the dorsal face-selective areas of our prosopagosic patient elicit stronger neural 
activation to the presentation of dynamic expressions? 
 
As mentioned above, the results of the second experimental contribution of this thesis support 
the idea that dissociable cortical pathways underlie the processing of different facial aspects: a 
ventral stream tuned to the processing of static expressions and identity and a dorsal stream 
engaged in the processing of dynamic expressions. We are currently planning a future functional 
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neuroimaging study with fMRI to verify this assumption and to provide a more comprehensive 
view of the brain regions involved in the processing of static and dynamic faces in PS. 
 
Could the pSTS, as a motion-based recognition system, support identity recognition in 
prosopagnosic patients with lesions in the ventral stream?  
 
Another issue that we will further investigate is whether PS also benefits from the presentation 
of dynamic faces for identity recognition. Although in everyday life patient PS does not seem 
to be able to recover identity through dynamic cues, previous studies have suggested that 
dynamic faces facilitate learning and identity recognition (for reviews, see Butcher & Lander, 
2017; Xiao et al., 2014). These studies were conducted using familiar faces (e.g., Lander & Bruce, 
2000; O’Toole et al., 2002; O’Toole & Roark, 2010), unfamiliar faces (e.g., Butcher et al., 2011; 
Lander & Bruce, 2003), or suboptimal stimuli (e.g., Lander, Bruce, & Hill, 2001). Moreover, 
Anzellotti and Caramazza (2017) have recently provided converging evidence that the pSTS 
contains invariant representations of person identity that are critical for multimodal identity 
recognition. In addition to their sensitivity to motion information, dorsal-face selective brain 
regions may also be the neuroanatomical locus of the processing and integration of multisensory 
identity cues (see, Yovel & O’Toole, 2016). 
 
Do other patients also benefit from the presentation of dynamic expressions?  
 
Moving forward from our third study, we are currently investigating the ability of patients 
suffering from mild cognitive impairment (MCI) to recognize static, dynamic, and shuffled 
expressions. At the moment, the number of people affected by dementia is believed to be close 
to 50 million worldwide, a clinical condition that will affect more than 130,000 million people 
by 2050. A new case of dementia is expected to be diagnosed every three second, and in 
Switzerland, the number of people suffering from dementia, MCI, or Alzheimer’s disease will 
dramatically increase. Taking these alarming statistics into consideration, a growing body of 
research is now focusing on this clinical condition. Yet, till date, none of these studies have 
investigated the recognition of static, dynamic, and shuffled expressions in MCI or Alzheimer’s 
patients, using a database of stimuli controlled for the amount of information provided over 
time.  
 
In order to address this gap in the cognitive aging literature, we decided to conduct this 
new research with the aim to answer the three following questions: Do MCI patients also 
benefit from the presentation of dynamic expressions? If so, is this dynamic advantage similarly 
driven by suboptimal performance with static expressions as observed in normal aging adults? 
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Finally, is the potential suboptimal performance with static expressions in MCI patients more 
pronounced than the one observed in normal aging people?  
 
At the practical level, our results could have implications that go beyond our research, 
potentially constituting a future diagnostic tool. We could also use our findings in the case of 
elderly patients with affective decoding disorders, in cognitive interventions, as rehabilitation 
techniques when patients encounter social difficulties, or in combination with more global 
therapeutic approaches. 
 
More generally, future experimental investigations could be carried out using the same 
stimuli, procedure, and statistical analyses as used in our third study, but with other clinical 
populations such as autistic children, children or adolescents suffering from PTSD, or adults 
with difficult life trajectories, those who have been abused, misemployed, maltreated or are 
migrants. 
 
 
Optogenetics: a window to the future 
On a broader note, besides fNIRS, other technologies have been recently developed to further 
dismantle brain circuits underlying cognition and behavior. Optogenetics, for instance, which 
combines optical and genetic methods to optically control the electrical activity of excitable 
neurons or cells, is one of the most powerful and promising technologies in the field of 
neuroscience (Fenno et al., 2011; Kalanithi & Henderson, 2012). This approach has been 
successfully used in rodents to potentiate treatment mechanisms or functional recovery after 
stroke (Cheng et al., 2014; Gradinaru et al., 2009), to deconstruct and map neural circuits 
involved in neurodegenerative diseases (e.g., Gradinaru et al., 2009), epilepsia (e.g., Kokaia, 
Andersson, & Ledri, 2013; Krook-Magnuson et al., 2013; Tonnesen et al., 2009), mood disorders 
(Lammel, Tye, & Warden, 2014), or schizophrenia (Cho & Sohal, 2014; Kellendonk et al., 2006). 
Optogenetics has also been used to modulate previously acquired fear associations, facilitating 
their extinction (Klavir et al., 2017). It is of major importance that this technology has been 
very recently applied for the first time to human brain tissues (Andersson et al., 2016), paving 
the way to promising new research avenues in the medical domain. Optogenetics may one day 
also have potential applications for brain-damaged patients or patients suffering from dementia 
or other pathologies associated with abnormal cognitive aging. 
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6.5 Conclusions 
The overall aim of this thesis was to use dynamic faces in order to investigate different aspects 
of face processing, in different populations and age groups. In our first study, we used dynamic 
faces to investigate whether the multisensory integration of gender is influenced by the speech 
manner. Our results revealed an earlier emergence of the perception of multisensory gender 
coherence for adult-directed speech. These findings are of interest to those studying infant face 
perception, infant-directed speech, and learning. In our second and third study, we investigated 
whether dynamic cues contribute to the processing of facial expressions in a single-case of pure 
acquired prosopagnosia as well as in healthy participants across the life span. Our findings 
provide new evidence for a dynamic advantage for facial expression recognition in brain-
damaged patients, as well as in elderly people. 
 
I hope that my work will contribute – even modestly – to highlight the importance of 
moving towards a comprehensive understanding of dynamic human face processing. I am truly 
convinced that exploring face perception with multisensory dynamic faces will be a major step 
forward, as it will provide a tighter link between behavioral, neuropsychological, or functional 
neuroimaging findings and the way faces are processed by humans in everyday life. My future 
work will follow in this direction with the long term aim to move towards a genuine ecological 
approach to the study of face processing. I hope that one day, with the help of new 
(neuroimaging) technologies, it will be possible to precisely track online the cascade of events 
underlying the very complex information processing of faces, from the very entry level (the eye) 
into the fine-grained neural processing. Importantly, I also believe that this knowledge and 
techniques could be of use in the future in a variety of clinical or neuropsychological settings, 
as well as in the realm of patient care to tailor early interventions or rehabilitation training 
programs. I am fully aware that this is a utopian view. However, landing on the moon was also 
a utopian view in the beginning of the 19th century. 
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